Abstract:
Hannah Arendt’s distinction between public and private rests upon a distinction
between freedom and necessity that many have argued is ontological and thus immutable. This essay disputes that interpretation by discussing the tentative foundations of Arendt’s work on history and the human condition, in order to argue
that this distinction stems not from a phenomenological essentialism but rather a
meditation on historical forms of living-together that explicitly rejects notions of
human nature and causality in history. This tentativeness stems from what Arendt
regarded as the disastrous tendency of philosophy to systematize the chaos and
disorder of human affairs, so that Arendt claims that the role of political theory is
not to preclude or supersede political debate and deliberation, but rather to “think
what we are doing.” This interpretation of Arendt’s thought is supported by her shift
towards the Roman republic and praise of grassroots political councils, as well as
her notions of understanding and judgment as they are reflected in her writings.
Ultimately it is shown that freedom and necessity in human affairs are not absolute
categories beyond amendment, but two halves of a fluid distinction that is only valid
in an inevitably tentative and incomplete hindsight. This has significant implications
both for contemporary interpretations of Arendt’s thought and for the politicization
of social issues.
Description:
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Social and Political Thought, University of Regina. iv, 105 l.
