Universal Mutual Responsibility: Heidegger, Selfhood, and the Possibility of an Ethics of Community

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Abstract

Martin Heidegger's treatise *Being and Time*, in seeking to answer the question of the meaning of Being, addresses the subject of the self and various problems relating to selfhood as component parts of his larger project. While addressing the subject of the self, however, Heidegger has overlooked many important considerations, specifically with regards to the way the self interacts with and depends upon its others. The end result of this is that Heidegger's understanding of the self throughout *Being and Time* carries with it both demonstrable inconsistencies and a number of propositions that require further investigation. This study, thus, has sought to exegetically explicate Heidegger's understanding of the self as it is made manifest throughout *Being and Time*, to critically pose problems to Heidegger's concept of the self that highlight those places where the self has been left inconsistent or incomplete, and to draw upon both alternate sources and original research so as to augment Heidegger's concept of the self and return a more robust and complete understanding of the self.

This study demonstrates that, while Heidegger's concept of the self in *Being and Time* is fundamentally incomplete and inconsistent at various points in and of itself, it provides an adequate foundation upon which a more complete and consistent understanding of the self and its interactions with its others can be developed. One possible conceptual solution to this problem, a solution that takes its inspiration from various sections of Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, has been proposed below under the name of “universal mutual responsibility.” This solution offers a
means by which to preserve Heidegger's existing ontological investigations into the self while supplementing these ontological investigations with those existential considerations Heidegger himself left unexplored. These considerations and their various implications have been read back and reinserted into the text, thus solidifying the concept of universal mutual responsibility as a viable advancement upon Heidegger's existing concept of the self within *Being and Time*. 
# Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii  
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1  
Chapter 1: Heidegger's understanding of the self ......................................................... 9  
  1.1: Dasein ................................................................................................................. 9  
  1.2: The self and Being-with: Dasein, its world, and its others ............................ 15  
  1.3: The they-self and the “they” ........................................................................... 23  
  1.4: Heidegger’s concept of self and in/authenticity .......................................... 27  
Chapter 2: Problems of the self ................................................................................. 31  
  2.1: Problems with in/authenticity ........................................................................ 35  
  2.2: Problems with the “they” ................................................................................ 58  
  2.3: Problems with solicitude ............................................................................... 65  
Chapter 3: Rethinking the self .................................................................................. 71  
  3.1: Rethinking the self via literary Being-in-the-world: Dasein and The Brothers  
      Karamazov .......................................................................................................... 72  
  3.2: Rethinking in/authenticity ............................................................................. 77  
  3.3: Rethinking the “they” ..................................................................................... 86  
  3.4: Rethinking solicitude ...................................................................................... 97  
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 104  
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 107
Introduction

In many ways, to read Heidegger is to reward and frustrate oneself in equal measures within a constantly-changing polar dynamic, a dynamic that emerges clearly when reading Heidegger's reflections on the topic of the self. Where Heidegger opens the concept of the self up to its world in one instance, he closes it off and alienates it in another. Where Heidegger stands on the verge of outlining a brilliant and revolutionary ethical program in one paragraph, he shies away from all ethical considerations in another. And where Heidegger's understanding of true and authentic self and selfhood harmonize marvellously against the backdrop of the whole of Being and Time\(^1\) in one section, these concepts run against its grain in another. Thus, in researching Heidegger's concept of selfhood, in posing problems to this concept, and in suggesting alternatives to this concept, I will neither attempt to dismiss nor discard Heidegger's complex and integrated concept of selfhood, but will rather attempt to lay a foundation upon which this concept can be improved and rethought in constructive ways.

Heidegger's concept of the self in Being and Time, once uncovered and made explicit, reveals its strong ties to and dependence upon his understanding of authentic and/or inauthentic existence.\(^2\) For Heidegger, the self is not something that we as individual humans always are, but is rather a mode of existence that an instance of Dasein may or may not be exhibiting at any given time. The mode of being a self is manifested when an instance of Dasein emerges authentically (that is, as its own self), while the mode of being a self is not manifested when an instance of Dasein emerges as an


\(^2\) Throughout this study, I will be substituting the term "in/authentic" or "in/authentic existence" for the longer "authentic and/or inauthentic" or "authentic and/or inauthentic existence".
inauthentic form of itself. Whether or not an instance of Dasein is to be counted as authentic or inauthentic depends entirely upon the veracity of its claim to be itself.

Heidegger states that Dasein is *always* claiming to be itself, but for the most part it makes this claim incorrectly; for the most part – the state of Being Heidegger calls Dasein's “everydayness” – Dasein is *not* in fact itself as it neither makes its own decisions nor chooses its own possibilities. Rather, in its everydayness, Dasein's identity, decisions, and possibilities have been *covertly taken over* in the public sphere of life by a phenomenon Heidegger calls the “they.”

Heidegger's conception of the self thus emerges as a resolute entity that determines its own possibilities and makes its own decisions, always doing so over and against the sway of the amorphous publicness of the “they.”

Within this interplay of self, authenticity, they-self, and inauthenticity, however, a serious gap in Heidegger's overall framework becomes apparent. For while Heidegger has sought to delineate Dasein in its everydayness and to come to understand Dasein as it comports itself in its world, the idea of Dasein as a public, other-minded entity has, for the most part, been left unexplored by Heidegger or has been largely, though not exclusively, relegated to the inauthentic domain of the “they.” Heidegger, in other words, has not sufficiently accounted for the possibility of Dasein's authentic public existence, and has at times precluded possible ways in which Dasein might remain both public and authentic by presenting the “they” as a ubiquitous, totalizing – and decidedly ethical – phenomenon. Thus, it will be the primary task of this study to explore how Heidegger has left these possibilities unattended, to understand why these possibilities have been

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3 A number of alternative translations for Heidegger's own term ("das Man") exist, including Vogel's "the Anyone" and Dreyfus' "the One." For the sake of keeping consistent with the translation I have been using – and what passes for "common parlance" in the sphere of English readings of Heidegger – I will continue to use "the 'they'" myself.

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removed from Dasein within the scope of *Being and Time*, and to examine these unexplored possibilities for the purpose of coming to a broader and more inclusive understanding of Dasein as an in/authentic self, both in its private and public life.

To that end, I shall begin this study in the first chapter by tracing Heidegger's concept of the self back to its origins in his account of Dasein, which functions as the primary subject of his larger project of uncovering the meaning of Being, and the means by which he investigates the question of the meaning of Being. In so doing, I shall primarily be drawing upon my own exegesis of *Being and Time*, while augmenting my own exegetical work with supplements from Hubert Dreyfus' *Being-in-the-World* and Paul Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative*. Following an examination of the concept of Dasein, and its allegedly universal and timeless claim to “mineness,” I will explore the concept of in/authenticity, in/authenticity's close ties to Dasein's claim to mineness, and in/authenticity's ties to Heidegger's concept of the self as a mode of Dasein's authentic existence. With Heidegger's embedded concept of the self thus made more explicit, I will contrast Heidegger's concept of the self with its functioning opposite: namely, the “they-self” that has been lost in the “they.” Having uncovered the foundations of Heidegger's understanding of the self, having revealed the nature of the self and its connection to in/authenticity, and having contrasted the self with its opposites, I will make Heidegger's concept of the self more clear. This task having been accomplished, I will begin to examine the various places where Heidegger's understanding of the self demonstrates its insufficiencies.

In the second chapter, I will begin by examining the problem of Dasein's mineness
with specific emphasis on how these problems manifest themselves against the background of the larger concept of in/authenticity. This will be followed by an examination of how the concept of in/authenticity and the various problems with it have an impact on Heidegger's overall concept of the self, the they-self, the “they” itself, and the way in which Dasein interacts with its others in its solicitude. Making use of Lawrence Vogel's examination of the ethical implications and overtures of *Being and Time* in *The Fragile “We,”* 6 John Caputo's *Radical Hermeneutics,* 7 and Slavoj Žižek's *The Ticklish Subject* 8 and *The Parallax View,* 9 I will present two criticisms of Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity. First, I will deal with the implicit ethical overtones that emerge from the concept of in/authenticity – and why such ethical overtones might prove problematic for Heidegger's larger project throughout *Being and Time* – while secondly, I will begin to investigate the abundant phenomenological data that Heidegger has either missed or ignored in defining Dasein as an entity that *in each case* claims to be its own. Specifically, I will explore the possibility of an instance of Dasein that does not claim to be its own, but instead explicitly and overtly claims to belong to another or a community of others – a manifestation of Dasein that Heidegger's concept of the self in *Being and Time* cannot properly account for – using examples of instances where this behaviour is demonstrated.

Having thus called the notion of Dasein's universal and ubiquitous mineness into question, I will explore how the absence of this mineness affects other aspects of Heidegger's understanding of the self, both *ontologically* – as we now have additional

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phenomenal and existential data that must be accounted for – and ethically – as Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity and its ethical overtones are no longer able to adequately account for the new phenomenal data. Specifically, I will explore both Heidegger's concept of the they-self and the “they,” and Heidegger's understanding of Dasein's solicitude – the way in which Dasein comports itself towards its others – as these two concepts both inform Heidegger's understanding of the self and are founded upon Heidegger's understanding of the self.

Finally, in the third chapter, I will attempt to make use of the hermeneutical opening created in the second chapter for the purpose of proposing alternatives to Heidegger's own concepts, and solutions to the problems raised. I will introduce a concept derived from Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*¹⁰ – a concept I will be calling “universal mutual responsibility” – as a means by which to account for both the new phenomenal data uncovered in the previous chapter and the ethical implications and characteristics of Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity. Beginning with a re-examination of this concept of in/authenticity, I will explore universal mutual responsibility as a way to understand Dasein as an entity that claims to belong to another or a community of others, and as a way to continue to understand Dasein as an entity that claims to be its own. Furthermore, I will propose that universal mutual responsibility can function an effective means by which the ethical notion that Dasein ought to be its own authentic self might be replaced with an ethic that both allows Dasein its mineness and its otherness, while still retaining an ethical structure of in/authenticity as a means by which to judge both Dasein's mineness and otherness. Following that, I will begin the process of rethinking Heidegger's concept of the “they” in light of the possibility of an authentic

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public, attempting to both give examples of the sorts of authentic others and communities of others that might make up this public, and to come to an understanding of how Dasein might function under these circumstances. Finally, I will re-examine Heidegger's concept of solicitude in light of the new phenomenal data uncovered in chapter two and the new guiding ethic of universal mutual responsibility, so as to come to an understanding of how Dasein might comport itself towards its others and its community. Drawing upon my own examples, the ethical concept of universal mutual responsibility, and the scapegoat mechanism proposed by René Girard,\textsuperscript{11} I will explore various ways in which an instance of Dasein comporting itself in otherness might be said to practice both sufficient and deficient forms of solicitude.

The aim of this study is neither to propose a complete ethical system of the self nor to conduct an exhaustive ontological study of the self in its otherness. Rather, the aim of this study is to establish a groundwork by which we might begin to break away from the ethical notion that Dasein ought to be patterned by its mineness, which thus frees us to conceive of in/authentic instances of Dasein that are patterned by otherness. As a result, this study is specifically limited in a number of ways. Primarily, as it pertains to Heidegger's work and \textit{Being and Time} as a whole, this study will be restricted to those concepts within \textit{Being and Time} that pertain to Heidegger's understanding of the self and the way in which this self interacts with and becomes like its others. That is to say, I will not attempt to criticize or come to grips with the overall project of \textit{Being and Time} – the question of the meaning of Being – but will rather aim to come to terms with and critically suggest alternatives to Heidegger's peripheral concept of the self, situated within that larger project. In doing so, I am, in a sense, asking questions of and posing problems

to the text of *Being and Time* that it was not intending to answer or resolve, by removing a set of concepts from the text and examining them on their own merit. While there may be some semblance of “violence” done to the text in the course of such an investigation – the potential to “confine *Being and Time* to a philosophical anthropology that ignores its real intention”\(^{12}\) – I maintain that the project of examining and questioning Heidegger's concept of the self throughout *Being and Time* is justified insofar as Heidegger has, in fact, formed a coherent and consistent concept of the self within its pages. And given the nature of *Being and Time* as a fully integrated, interdependent text – where each concept and proposition relates intimately with every other – removing concepts from their context to pose problems to them and ask questions of them may not do justice to the text as a whole, but it might cast some light on a fundamental problem that can then be read back into the text as a whole. To do so properly and completely would take me well beyond the scope of this study, but I hope to at least touch upon the groundwork necessary for such a reading.

It is equally important to note that my critical examination will be strictly limited to Heidegger's understanding of the self, to Heidegger's understanding of the self within the scope of *Being and Time*, and to my own alternatives to his understanding of the self.\(^{13}\) While I will be making use of other thinkers throughout this study, I will use them primarily to help augment my own thoughts – Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* functions most prominently in this role, with Girard making appearances as well – or to

\(^{12}\) Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Volume 3, 60.

\(^{13}\) While a very brief mention of Kierkegaard's conception of the self as a synthesis does make an appearance, this is merely done to give context to the way in which Heidegger does not automatically grant selfhood to each and every human being. A number of very strong parallels between Kierkegaard's understanding of the self and Heidegger's understanding of the self do exist, but drawing light upon these falls well outside the scope of this study. Having said that, both Caputo in *Radical Hermeneutics* (throughout) and Dreyfus in *Being-in-the-World* (283 – 240) do a wonderful job of making these connections between Kierkegaard and Heidegger explicit.
help clarify Heidegger's understanding of the self – as in the case of Vogel, and Dreyfus. Additionally, a properly “Heideggerian” understanding of the self cannot be derived from Being and Time alone; the popular distinction between “early” and “late” Heidegger has significant implications on any study of a fully Heideggerian understanding of the self, as Heidegger rethought and reworked many of the concepts that support his understanding of the self in Being and Time in his later writings. Consequently, this study should not be read as an attempt to come to terms with a full Heideggerian account of the self; rather, it is simply what it claims to be – an attempt to come to terms with Heidegger's understanding of the self within Being and Time.

Finally, this study should not be read as an attempt to find any sort of fatal or fundamental error in Heidegger's thought. The main goal of this study is neither to dismiss Heidegger's understanding of the self nor his primary project in Being and Time as being erroneous. Rather, the main goal of this study is to explore the possibility of supplementing an already important project with additional concepts and more robust discourse. My intention throughout this study is not to undermine the overall ontological project of concretely answering the question of the meaning of Being, but to explicate those places in Being and Time where ontological terminology glosses over more fundamental ethical concerns. Rather than seeking to invalidate the larger aims of Being and Time, I seek instead to find instances where the ontological survey of Dasein neglects those manifestations of Dasein that may not be easily reconciled back into the project of the question of the meaning of Being, so as to provide a broader alternative reading.

With these qualifications and disclaimers in mind and at the forefront, I shall begin this study with my analysis of Heidegger's concept of the self.
Chapter 1: Heidegger's understanding of the self

Given that *Being and Time* is focused primarily on the question of the meaning of Being, a concept such as “the self” is an understandably tangential concern for Heidegger. While a coherent concept of the self does emerge from the pages of *Being and Time*, it always emerges indirectly, in the service of the larger question of the meaning of Being, and never on its own merit or for its own sake. Thus, in order to comprehend Heidegger's understanding of the self, it is necessary to approach the subject in a somewhat roundabout way. First, it is necessary to understand the concepts and propositions that underlie Heidegger's concept of the self – namely, the concept of Dasein, its world, and the others that inhabit its world – as his understanding of the self is made manifest only in light of these foundational concepts. Following this, Heidegger's concept of the self can be further explicated when contrasted with its effective opposite – the “they-self,” an entity whose existence and character is determined by an amorphous entity Heidegger calls the “they.” Thus, this chapter will aim to make the character of Heidegger's concept of the self explicit, accessible, and open to further question and study.

1.1: Dasein

Throughout the course of *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes use of the entity known as

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14 Throughout the course of this study, I will follow Heidegger on this sentence and refer to Dasein as an “entity.” While I am aware that later Heideggerian texts see the “entity” label as problematic, and while I am aware that Heidegger is not consistent with this label throughout *Being and Time* itself, to properly address the problems surrounding Dasein as an entity would fall well outside the limits of this study. As a result, my use of the label should not be thought of as my having agreed with one position or another on this debate. Rather, I have continued to use the term “entity” to remain as consistent with Heidegger's language in *Being and Time* as possible.
“Dasein” – which he defines as “[that] entity which each of us is himself”\(^{15}\) – as the “subject” through whom the concept and meaning of Being in general are investigated. For Heidegger, Dasein is understood to be the only legitimate means by which the question of the meaning of Being can be answered. Insofar as Dasein is understood to be the only entity whose own Being depends upon asking the question of the meaning of Being, Dasein is demonstrably (ontically) distinct as an intentionally ontological entity: Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being – a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. *Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.\(^{16}\)

Heidegger further conceptualizes Dasein's uniqueness in claiming that Dasein's “essence” is, in fact, its existence.\(^{17}\) As a consequence of this, Dasein cannot be understood as being an entity that is either present-at-hand (that is, an entity that can be observed or appropriated as an entity in itself)\(^{18}\) – Dasein, being existential, has no essence apart from existence, and thus cannot be made present to itself or to another – or ready-to-hand (that is, an entity that can be understood within the context of its being used in the service of a

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16 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 12.
17 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 42.
18 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 211.
task).\textsuperscript{19} Corollary to Dasein's existential essence are both the world in which it exists and the concern it demonstrates for its world; just as Dasein has no essence or substance apart from its existence, the world in which it exists and the concern it demonstrates for its world play a foundational role in defining Dasein's existential essence.

In addition to its existential character, Heidegger defines Dasein as an entity that in each case has a character of “mineness.” Dreyfus, in explaining the concept of mineness, notes that

[Dasein's mineness] cannot mean that each Dasein has a private world of experience. Heidegger's “mineness” must be sharply distinguished from what Husserl calls “the sphere of ownness.” When Heidegger describes Dasein as “owned” in a lecture course in 1923, he warns, “Dasein as its own does not mean an isolating relativization to… the individual (\textit{solus ipse}), rather 'ownness' is a way of being.” Heidegger must do justice to the separatedness of human beings without cutting us off from knowing what is crucial about each other. Therefore my mineness cannot be like my private feelings, such as my headache, the kinesthetic feeling of moving my body, or some private sense of who I am. For Heidegger, Dasein's mineness is the public stand it takes on itself – on what it is to be this Dasein – by way of its comportment…. The possibility of existing (as authentic, inauthentic, or not authentic) is what Heidegger means by mineness.\textsuperscript{20}

Following from this, in each and every instance, Dasein claims to belong to itself and to be its own, even when it does not belong to itself and is not its own.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 104 – 105.
That Being which is an issue for this entity [Dasein] in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference;' or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite…. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine…. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic – that is, something of its own – can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.22

It is important to note that Dasein – as an entity and as a concept – is not itself “the self.” Heidegger follows Kierkegaard before him, who stated that

The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to itself…. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of possibility and necessity, of the eternal and the temporal. In short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two

22 Heidegger, Being and Time, 42 – 43.
terms. Looked at in this way, a human being is not yet a self.\(^{23}\)

While Heidegger neither specifically contrasts the terms “human being” and “self,” nor distinguishes between the self and its alternatives based on whether or not a human being has properly synthesized itself with its spirit, the emphasis on the self being free to define itself is very similar.\(^{24}\) In discussing the self, Heidegger deals primarily with the terms of Dasein and its in/authentic comportment within its world, but does not discuss the self as though it were conscious, stand-alone subject. As Dreyfus points out:

> Heidegger is not interested in giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for existing in his sense. He is only interested in the \textit{de facto} structure of this way of being. Yet he is clear that to be a conscious subject or self is neither necessary nor sufficient for human existence, rather the reverse: “The existential nature of man is the reason why man can represent beings as such, and why he can be conscious of them. All consciousness presupposes… existence as the \textit{essentia} of man.”\(^{25}\)

Dreyfus helpfully notes the need to separate the character of Dasein from the character of a conscious subject, echoing Heidegger's own attempts to move away from this particular misreading of his concept of Dasein that crept into later interpretations of \textit{Being and Time}, notably Sartre's \textit{Being and Nothingness}:

> “Dasein” in colloquial German can mean “everyday human existence,” and so Heidegger uses the term to refer to human being. But we are not to think of Dasein as a conscious subject. Many interpreters make just this mistake. They


see Heidegger as an “existential phenomenologist,” which means to them an edifying elaboration of Husserl. The most famous version of this mistake is Sartre's brilliant but misguided reformation of *Being and Time* into a theory of consciousness in *Being and Nothingness*…. The best way to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to think of our term “human being,” which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of all people or to a specific person—a human being.26

Rather than serving as a placeholder for the conscious subject, Heidegger's concept of Dasein takes the form of an existentially and ontologically unique entity whose Being is in each case characterized by the importance of the question of Being, and the claim that one's Being is in each case one's own. It is from this general claim in each specific instance of Dasein that the foundation of Heidegger's view of the self is formulated:

Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine. This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it. At the same time this tells us ontically (though in a rough and ready fashion) that in each case an “I”—not others—is this entity. The question of the “who” answers itself in terms of the “I” itself, the 'subject,' the 'self.' The “who” is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing. Ontologically we understand it as something which is in each case already constantly present-at-hand, both in and for a closed realm, and

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which lies at the basis, in a very special sense, as the *subjectum.*

Having thus understood Dasein as that “entity which is in each case I myself [whose] Being is in each case mine,” and as that entity which always exists with “irreducible and unsurpassable 'embeddedness' in a concrete and ultimately contingent life-world,” Heidegger rigorously explores and defines his concept of the self throughout sections 25 – 27 of *Being and Time,* examining the ways in which Dasein both exists and functions as a self. Heidegger's primary focus throughout these sections is to answer “the question of the 'who' of Dasein,” and in the course of answering this question, the concept of the self is met and outlined with critical and ontological focus.

1.2: The self and Being-with: Dasein, its world, and its others

In beginning his examination of Dasein as an entity characterized by Being-with, Heidegger points out what he considers to be a common, fundamental problem that other interpreters of Dasein as a self run into when interpreting Dasein in “non-ontological” terms. When “the Being of Dasein has been left indefinite,” Heidegger believes that “Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand.” In such cases, Dasein is interpreted “onto-theologically,” or as entity that by default remains self-same and constant across a variety of experiences throughout time and space. The problem that Heidegger sees as arising from this definition is that it requires that Dasein be

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29 Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject,* 71.
30 Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 114.
32 Heidegger uses this term to describe a causally self-sufficient source (see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World,* 12). More broadly, Heidegger uses this term to describe a metaphysical way in which the meaning of Being is understood. Understanding the self ontotheologically, as a causally self-sufficient source, is thus a smaller aspect of a larger phenomenon.
33 Heidegger, *Being and Time,* 114.
understood as an entity that is present-at-hand. That is, onto-theological understandings of Dasein conceive of it as an entity that categorically \(^{34}\) “occurs”\(^{35}\) within the world, rather than an entity that exists within, through, and for the sake of its world.\(^{36}\)

Dasein as a self, understood apart from its existential character, takes the form of an entity that must possess a sort of immutable essence, and must be capable of remaining constant across time and an ever-changing landscape of situations and experiences. This sort of essence – a soul, a tactile conscience, or any number of alternatives – must, in Heidegger's view, belong to an entity that can be conceived of as being present-at-hand that remains essentially unchanged by the environment it is situated in, its circumstances, or its involvements. In Heidegger's view, however, Dasein's essence is its existence, and thus it cannot have the character of something present-at-hand. Dasein's essence cannot be distilled and made present apart from its environment, circumstances, or involvements, as Dasein's constant, resolute 'essence' is only possible in its world and its concerns:

If the ontological constitution of the self is not to be traced back either to an “I”-substance or to a 'subject,' but if, on the contrary, the everyday fugitive way in which we keep on saying “I” must be understood in terms of our authentic potentiality-for-Being, then the proposition that the self is the basis of care and constantly present-at-hand is one that still does not follow. Selfhood is to be discerned existentially only in one's authentic potentiality-for-Being-one's-self – that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as care.... The constancy of the

34 Heidegger, Being and Time, 44.
35 The term “occurrent” is Dreyfus' preferred term for Heidegger's term “Vorhandenheit.” (Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, xi) “Vorhandenheit” is popularly translated “presence-at-hand”, which is the term I will continue to use throughout this examination.
36 Heidegger, Being and Time, 54.
self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-
possibility to the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling.
Existentially, “self-constancy” signifies nothing other than anticipatory
resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the
existentiality of the self's selfhood.37

Having dispensed with the idea that Dasein as a self resembles anything that might be
conceived of as present-at-hand, Heidegger goes on to make a second claim that runs
against the common understanding of the self by returning to his question of the identity
of Dasein and suggesting that “the 'who' of everyday Dasein just is not the 'I myself.'”38
While Heidegger acknowledges that “the assertion that it is I who in each case Dasein
is”39 remains the most evident, given conclusion when understood ontically, he maintains
that resting in the certainty of such ontical conclusions will fundamentally mislead an
ontological investigation,40 insofar as such ontical conclusions lack both a priori
foundations41 and are not ontologically demonstrable.42 Rather than proceed with the
most ontically “given” conclusion, Heidegger elects to pursue the question of Dasein's
identity by means of an investigation of its existence, hypothesizing that the self is better
understood as a mode of Dasein's Being than as a primordially “given” entity or state of
Being.43

As mentioned above, Heidegger's goals throughout the course of Being and Time
are not primarily focused on questions of the self, subjectivity, or Dasein's subsequent

37 Heidegger, Being and Time, 322.
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115.
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115.
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 116.
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115.
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, 116.
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, 117.
responsibilities within its world. As Dreyfus notes, “Heidegger's primary concern [throughout Being and Time] is to raise the question of being – to make sense of our ability to make sense of things – and to reawaken in people a feeling for the importance of this very obscure question. Moreover, he wants to answer it 'concretely.'”\(^{44}\)

Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's self, subjectivity, and responsibilities takes place within the context of this larger project of “uncovering the meaning of Being.”\(^{45}\)

Consequently, any investigation into Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as a self must follow Heidegger, making enquiries of Dasein as it exists in its world – that is, Dasein's Being-in-the-world, “that basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its Being gets co-determined.”\(^{46}\)

Prior to engaging the subject of the self, Heidegger outlines the way in which Dasein encountered and liberated objects within its world – its 'environment' – as things ready-to-hand. Further to this point, he adds that those tools that are encountered and the work that can be or has been done with them bear, in their readiness-to-hand, a reference to those for whom the work is intended, or those who have already completed the work.\(^{47}\)

As a result, Dasein not only encounters and liberates tools and objects as ready-to-hand, but also encounters and liberates those others – who, like Dasein itself, are neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand\(^{48}\) – whom are referenced by said tools and objects.

Heidegger is careful, however, to reinforce that these others encountered within-the-world are not “everyone else but me – those over against whom the 'I' stands out,” but are rather “those from whom, for the most, part, one does not distinguish oneself – those

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45 Heidegger, Being and Time, 1.
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, 117.
47 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
48 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
among whom one is too.” That is to say, the others encountered within-the-world are not encountered as isolated present-at-hand subjects by a Dasein who itself functions as a present-at-hand subject, but are rather encountered environmentally and familiarly within a world. Dasein itself, in its world, is constituted by its capacity for Being-with (Mitsein) others, while others, in their worlds, are constituted by their capacity for Being-with (Mit-Dasein, or Dasein-with) Dasein. Consequently, insofar as Dasein is constituted by its world, it is also constituted by those others that exist within its world. While Dasein, for the most part, interacts with its world by means of its concern for the world, the fact that Dasein's others are unlike the rest of Dasein's world – given that they possess the same sort of Being that Dasein itself possesses – requires that Dasein interact with its others differently. This alternate mode of interaction is one that Heidegger calls solicitude.

Much like concern, solicitude can take both sufficient and deficient forms. Heidegger suggests that Dasein largely exists in its deficient mode in its everydayness, but he makes it clear that these deficient modes of solicitude do not resemble an ontologically present-at-hand relationship between Dasein and its others. Instead, the spectrum of solicitude is defined by two polar extremes, both of which see Dasein interacting with its others in a manner that is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand. At the one extreme, one finds a form of solicitude that substitutionally removes the other from the position of its concern:

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Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 119.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
[Solicitude] can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the other that with which he is to concern himself. The other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude the other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away ‘care’, is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand.  

At the other end of the spectrum, we find a sort of solicitude that does not substitute itself in for the other (leap in), but rather temporarily takes the place of the other with the expressed purpose of returning the object of the other's concern back to the other (leap ahead):

In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the other, not to a “what” with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.  

In its solicitude, Dasein possesses a means by which it may interact with its others while

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56 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
being both “bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with
its authentic Being towards itself.”\textsuperscript{58} Heidegger further emphasizes that Dasein's
solicitude most often takes shape when Dasein finds itself mutually engaged in a matter
of concern with an other:

Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a
matter of common concern in such Being. A Being-with-one-another which arises
from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part
within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-
with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on
mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in
common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each
in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become authentically bound
together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the
other in his freedom for himself.\textsuperscript{59}

Heidegger makes it clear that Dasein's solicitude – as Dasein's everyday Being-in-its-
world and Being-with others – always exists somewhere between these two polar
opposites in different mixtures and varieties. Dasein's solicitude is never entirely
sufficient nor entirely deficient in any singular instance, as no one instance of Dasein's
solicitude is fully sufficient or deficient, nor is it entirely sufficient or deficient across the
spectrum of its solicitous behaviour, as no instance of Dasein is patterned exclusively by
sufficient or deficient solicitude.\textsuperscript{60} Solicitude can manifest itself as considerateness and

\textsuperscript{58} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 122.
\textsuperscript{59} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 122.
\textsuperscript{60} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 122.
forbearance in its sufficient modes, while manifesting itself as inconsiderateness or intolerance in its deficient modes.

Regardless of the form Dasein's solicitude takes – be it sufficient, deficient, or some hybrid of the two – solicitude serves as the means by which Dasein liberates others to be Dasein-with in its world, by means of Dasein's own Being-with others and Being-in its own world.\textsuperscript{61} For Heidegger, Dasein's Being-with others is not understood as an optional mode of existence that Dasein may or may not exhibit at any given time. Rather, insofar as Dasein's others constitute its world, Being-with others is understood to be an ontologically foundational aspect of Dasein's Being that precludes any knowledge of oneself\textsuperscript{62} or informational acquaintance with another.\textsuperscript{63} Even when Dasein is physically alone, with no others nearby, Heidegger maintains that Dasein's Being-with others remains as a constitutional element of Dasein's Being.\textsuperscript{64}

It is this primordial solicitous Being-with of Dasein that first begins to offer a clue both to the identity of everyday Dasein and to Heidegger's understanding of the self. As Heidegger has already suggested, the idea that “I am in each case Dasein” may not be accurate, as Dasein in its everydayness may not even be itself: “Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein \textit{is not itself}?\textsuperscript{65} To answer the question of who Dasein is in its everydayness – the question of who Dasein is when it is not itself – Heidegger uses the structures of Dasein's primordial Being-with as a means by which to introduce the subject of Dasein in its everydayness: an entity Heidegger refers to as “the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 124.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 116.
\end{itemize}
'they.'

1.3: The they-self and the “they”

As a direct result of its existential Being-with, Dasein finds itself (explicitly, cognitively, or otherwise) in a relationship of care with its others. Heidegger states that this care primarily manifests in the form of what he calls “distantiality,” which he defines as “care as to the way one differs from [others], whether that difference is merely one that is to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the others and wants to catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out to keep them suppressed.” Rather than effectively setting Dasein apart from its others, however, Heidegger suggests that distantiality solidifies Dasein's connection to others by placing it in subjection to its others, relegating its others to the phenomenon known as the “they:”

This distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the others to dispose of as they please. These others, moreover, are not definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the others oneself and enhances their power. 'The others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally

66 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
and for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the some of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the “they.”

At the same time that Dasein's Being has been removed from it, the Being of its others has been removed from them. Dasein's lack of clarity in its distantsiality towards its others renders them indistinguishable from one another. As a result, the other is not encountered as a distinct other, but rather as a part of the ambiguous “they.” Dasein itself demonstrates the inauthentic characteristics of a they-self, and in turn encounters and understands its others as the “they.” As Heidegger understands it, this process of absorption into the “they” is heightened by forms of mass communication, encountering others (levelling down), and the averageness in which Dasein exists in its everydayness. This averageness that the “they” possesses as an existential characteristic is transmitted to Dasein in the form of what Heidegger calls “publicness.” This publicness carries with it a form of tranquillized comfort and assurance that stands in contrast to the authentic anxiety that belongs to individualized Dasein:

In our first indication of the phenomenal character of Dasein's basic state and in our clarification of the existential meaning of "Being-in" as distinguished from the categorical signification of 'insideness,' Being-in was defined as "residing alongside…" "Being-familiar with…." This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the “they,” which brings tranquillized self-assurance – 'Being-at-home,' with all its

67 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
obviousness - into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world.' Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the "not-at-home."\textsuperscript{70}

The end result of this publicness is not only that Dasein's Being and ownership of its possibilities have been removed from it, but also that Dasein no longer finds itself in a position wherein it is required to answer for itself or take responsibility for itself. Rather, Dasein's accountability and possibilities have been assumed and overtaken by the “they,” whose Being Dasein now shares. The end result of this “dictatorship of the 'they'”\textsuperscript{71} is that “everyone is the other, and no one is himself.”\textsuperscript{72} The identity of everyday Dasein is revealed to be the “they,”\textsuperscript{73} who now take the form of “the 'Realest subject' of everydayness”\textsuperscript{74} and the functional interpretive matrix through whom Dasein – as a they-self – has become familiar\textsuperscript{75} with all that it encounters:

The self of everyday Dasein is the \textit{they-self}, which we distinguish from the \textit{authentic self} – that is, from the self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been \textit{dispersed} into the “they,” and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of Being which we know as concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us. If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 188.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 127.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 192.
\end{itemize}
the “they” itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest. Dasein is for the sake of the “they” in an everyday manner, and the “they” itself Articulates the referential context of significance. When entities are encountered, Dasein's world frees them for a totality of involvements with which the “they” is familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the “they's” averageness…. Proximally, it is not 'I,' in the sense of my own self, that 'am,' but rather the others, whose way is that of the “they.”  

As Dreyfus notes, however, Heidegger's concept of the "they" ought not to be read in an exclusively "negative" light; as an entity, the "they" is responsible for establishing the “positive” averageness necessary for common language, behaviours, and other societal norms:

Norms and the averageness they sustain perform a crucial function. Without them the referential whole could not exist…. The very functioning of equipment is dependent upon social norms. Indeed, norms define the in-order-tos that define the being of equipment, and also for-the-sake-of-whichs that give equipment its significance.  

Using this understanding of the necessary socialization and normalization of the "they," Dreyfus separates Heidegger's concept of the "they" into two distinct parts: the positive function of the "they" – conformity as the source of intelligibility – and the negative function of the "they" – conformism as levelling. Although Heidegger does not differentiate between these two aspects of the "they" in any clear way throughout Being

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76 Heidegger, Being and Time, 129.
and Time, Dreyfus nonetheless establishes both the existence and the importance of this distinction when examining the “they.” For while the "positive function" of the "they" is required to establish necessary norms and practises, the "negative function" of the "they" is responsible for the "suppression of all meaningful differences."\(^{78}\)

Against this backdrop, Heidegger's understanding of the self is made manifest both in light of his understanding of the “they” and in light of his understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity. As noted by Heidegger above, it is insufficient to simply say that “I myself am my self,” as this statement can be made by both the authentic self and the inauthentic they-self.\(^{79}\) Rather, the key to further understanding Heidegger's conception of the self lies in coming to a more complete understanding of his concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity.

### 1.4: Heidegger’s concept of self and in/authenticity

Heidegger's concept of authenticity and its variants, as they appear throughout Being and Time, can be divided into three general modes of existence: the authentic, the inauthentic and the not authentic (or undifferentiated) modes:

What is the status of the fore-sight by which our ontological procedure has hitherto been guided? We have defined the idea of existence as a potentiality-for-Being – a potentiality which understands, and for which its own Being is an issue. But this potentiality-for-Being, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated.\(^{80}\)

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79 Heidegger, Being and Time, 321 – 322.
80 Heidegger, Being and Time, 232.
The themes of authenticity and inauthenticity are both important and far-reaching throughout the whole of *Being and Time*: the scope of concepts affected by these themes extends further than Heidegger's concept of the self. However, while the tripartite in/authentic theme extends beyond Heidegger's conception of the self, Heidegger's own preliminary definitions of authenticity and inauthenticity cannot be fully nor properly understood without keeping his concept of the self in mind. Heidegger understands Dasein to be an entity which in each case claims to be its own self, either authentically – when it “choose[s] itself and win[s] itself” – or inauthentically – when it “lose[s] itself and never win[s] itself; or only seem[s] to do so.” In both instances, the 

*terminological* concept of in/authenticity, which bases itself in Dasein's mineness, is wholly contingent upon what Dasein has made of its possibilities. Dasein exists authentically when it chooses itself from its own Being, exists inauthentically when it loses itself and is unable to choose itself while claiming to possess its own Being, and not authentically when it claims nothing at all for itself – this latter existence, in Heidegger's estimation, is the existence we find Dasein in for the most part, in its everydayness.

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81 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 43.
82 As was noted above, Heidegger claims that the terms “authentic” and “inauthentic” were chosen terminologically: “As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness” (*Being and Time*, 43). That is to say, the concept of in/authenticity initially functions as a word to merely describe the ontological phenomenon of Dasein's mineness, and not as a stand-alone ontological concept. Dasein can be described as authentic when it claims to be its own and is, in fact its own; at the same time, Dasein can be described as inauthentic when it claims to be its own but is not in fact its own. Here and throughout, I stress the fact that Heidegger founds this concept as a “terminological” one, primarily to show the fact that this term - and any ontological weight and merit it might carry - is solely dependent upon the ontological weight and merit of the concepts it describes. This relationship between the terms authentic/inauthentic and the ontological phenomena that they describe will be explored more closely in chapter 2.1.
83 Heidegger merges and interchanges the inauthentic mode and the not-authentic mode throughout *Being and Time*. So while Dasein's in/authenticity is legitimately a tripartite mode of existence - Dasein as it authentically claims to be itself, Dasein as it inauthentically claims to be itself, and Dasein as it non-authentically claims nothing for itself - the inauthentic and not authentic modes are functionally equivalent to one another for the purposes of this investigation.
Thus, for Heidegger, “the self” comes to represent the mode of Dasein's authentic Being: Dasein exists in the mode of “the self” when Dasein “chooses itself and wins itself” – when it emerges from its absorption into the world of its concern, when it recovers from its fall into the they-self,⁸⁴ and when it hears its own voice through the call of its conscience.⁸⁵

The theme of the authentic self and the inauthentic they-self permeates Heidegger's treatment of the subject of Dasein as a self throughout the whole of *Being and Time*, and manifests itself in a wide variety of ways: when Dasein understands, it does so either authentically from its own self⁸⁶ or inauthentically in its everydayness;⁸⁷ when Dasein is anxious, it is anxious either as its authentic self⁸⁸ or inauthentically as absorbed into the world;⁸⁹ when Dasein discloses itself, it does so either in terms of its own self and its own potentiality-for-Being, or it does so in terms of its world and its others,⁹⁰ and so forth. Heidegger's concept of the self is wholly dependent upon the concept of in/authenticity. To be a Heideggerian self is to be “self-sufficient,” to have one's own Being constituted and auto-generated from one's own self, independent and apart from an other, a group of others, or the amorphous conglomeration of others and oneself known as the “they.”

Thus, the Heideggerian conception of the self can be said to involve three distinct claims regarding the character of Dasein: Dasein is an entity that in each case claims to be its own, Dasein exists alongside others, and Dasein's authentic existence alongside

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⁹⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 221.
others takes the form of an auto-generated, independent and “self-sufficient” entity.

While the first two characteristics of Dasein are common to all instances of Dasein – both those that exist in the mode of the authentic self and those that exist in the mode of the inauthentic they-self – the third characteristic distinguishes those instances of Dasein that exist as selves from those instances of Dasein that might merely – and inauthentically – claim to be selves.
Chapter 2: Problems of the self

Throughout *Being and Time*, Heidegger demonstrates that Dasein, when comporting itself in the authentic mode of Being, exists with a healthy conscience, an altruistic and salvific attitude towards its others, and a proper understanding of both itself and the world from which it has been constituted: Dasein exists as a reputable and upstanding entity. However, when Dasein exists inauthentically – either unconsciously in the “not authentic” mode of Being or consciously-but-falsely in the explicitly inauthentic mode of Being – Heidegger demonstrates that Dasein's conscience is unhealthy, that Dasein's attitude towards others is corrupt and unable to distinguish others as distinct others, that Dasein is unable to distinguish between itself and its others, and so forth: Dasein exists as a disreputable and disdainful entity. Across the spectrum of Dasein's in/authenticity, an unwritten mandate becomes clear: in comporting itself, Dasein ought to be its authentic self.

While inserting this “ought” into Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity can bring a measure of clarity to the text and the way in which Heidegger has contrasted authentic Dasein from inauthentic Dasein, it also introduces a disruptive and controversial ethical implication in light of Heidegger's consistent claims to have wanted to avoid ethical considerations in *Being and Time*. Heidegger considered the project of *Being and Time* – the attempt to arrive at the meaning of Being – to be of an exclusively ontological sort that was capable only of describing the structures of existence, and not the sort that was capable of ethically defining them. As Žižek describes it, Heidegger's ontological

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elaborates the opposition between authentic and unauthentic modes of Dasein by revolutionizing the frame of traditional ontology; the price he pays for this, however, is that this opposition is deprived of the dimension of concrete ethical engagement, translated into a kind of proto-transcendental, formal a priori indifference toward concrete choices (Heidegger, in a symptomatic way, repeatedly insists on how his recourse, in order to designate the unauthentic mode of Dasein, to terms with a distinct negative ethical connotation is to be taken as a wholly neutral ontological description).  

Following the spirit of Žižek's bracketed criticism, Lawrence Vogel points out in the introduction to his treatise The Fragile “We” that despite [Heidegger's] insistence in Being and Time itself that fundamental ontology only describes the essential structures of human existence, the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity surely carries prescriptive weight. At stake in the distinction is nothing less than the alternatives of either “winning oneself” or “losing oneself.” Furthermore, Heidegger admits that authenticity is a “factual ideal” that governs the entire account of Being-in-the-world. If Being and Time appears to lay the foundation for the imperative, “Dasein ought to be authentic,” the reader wonders what sort of character-ideal its hero, the authentic individual, represents.

Or, as Jean-Luc Nancy bluntly stated, “only those who have read Heidegger blindly, or

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92 Žižek, The Parallax View, 86.
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
94 Vogel, The Fragile "We", 1.
not at all, have been able to think of him as a stranger to ethical preoccupations.” In essence, while Heidegger’s explicit, stated goals throughout *Being and Time* are not of an ethical nature – Heidegger describes ethics in *Being and Time* in relation to ontology as a non-primordial, ontical discipline, akin to anthropology or poetry, that is unable to grasp the full meaning of Being – the outcome of his philosophy points in a decidedly ethical direction. For while every instance of Dasein’s authentic existence manifests itself in a decidedly healthy manner, every instance of Dasein’s inauthentic existence is not only founded upon a self-deception – namely, the idea that Dasein is my own when in fact it is not – but moreover finds its foundations in that amalgam of itself and its others known as the “they.”

In light of Heidegger’s dismissal of ethics and the ability of ethical considerations to function within the ontological scope of the question of the meaning of Being, suggesting the possibility of a positive presence of ethics substituted in place of what Heidegger understood to be exclusively ontological concepts has an overall “negative” effect on Heidegger’s larger project. As Žižek points out:

We cannot have it both ways: we can never achieve a concrete ethical engagement based on a full critico-philosophical reflection. On the one hand, for the ethical engagement to be truly binding and unconditional, it has to rely on an accepted *doxa* (which, in this case, of course, means: on the *doxa* impregnated by the tradition of metaphysical ontology). Such an engagement cannot survive endless self-reflective probing, the full questioning of its presuppositions. On the other

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96 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 16.
hand, critico-historical philosophical reflection easily reveals how the very norms on which our engagement has to rely are the ultimate source of the “regression” to the unethical, to the unauthentic mode of existence; that is, how they are never sufficient to ground a proper ethical attitude.  

Thus, if we are to entertain the possibility of having to engage *Being and Time* on an ethical level, an additional set of problems involving both the scope and depth of Heidegger's survey of Dasein and related phenomena must come to the surface. If the concept of in/authenticity emerges as an ethical concept, the question of whether or not Heidegger has adequately investigated the many manifestations of Dasein emerges alongside. Thus, we have an opportunity to ask whether or not Heidegger has adequately surveyed all instances and manifestations of Dasein, and to enquire as to whether or not an ethical prejudice regarding how Dasein *ought* to manifest itself has limited the scope of Heidegger's investigation.

While it may not be possible to determine Heidegger's motives, asking this question may yield profitable results, as it creates an opening for the reader to find that place where an “ethical engagement” interferes with “the full critico-philosophical reflection.” The question puts Heidegger's concept of Dasein to the test, as it were, and allows us to entertain the idea that some of Dasein's phenomenal possibilities have been missed or cast aside, while other phenomenal possibilities may have been reconciled into the binary categories of the concept of in/authenticity that perhaps should have been examined and defined in entirely different ways. Putting the question of Heidegger's underlying motives aside, this chapter will seek to exploit this phenomenal opening, so as

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to propose the possibility of an instance of Dasein that does not claim to be its own.

To that end, the following sections will begin to explore various ways in which Heidegger's concept of Dasein as an entity and Dasein as a self has been ethically coloured, phenomenally overlooked, or otherwise hastily reconciled into the categories provided by Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity, so as to demonstrate a fundamental need to rethink Heidegger's concept of the self and the main conceptual structures that support his concept of self. To the concept of Dasein, I will pose the possibility of an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others, rather than claiming to be its own, and the problems that result with Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity as a result of this possibility. Following that, I will examine how a different concept of in/authenticity causes problems for Heidegger's concept of the “they,” and how a new understanding of in/authenticity thus makes a new type of public and communal group that Dasein might claim to belong to necessary. With the possibility of a different sort of Dasein and a different sort of community or public that Dasein might belong to explored, I will examine the concept of solicitude and the problems that arise with this concept when the previous concepts of Dasein, in/authenticity, and the “they” are questioned.

2.1: Problems with in/authenticity

Heidegger's description of Dasein, while complete within the parameters that he himself has advanced, shows demonstrable gaps and inconsistencies when Dasein's mineness – the idea that Dasein in each case claims to be its own – is put to the question. In
examining Dasein as a phenomenon more closely and more openly, one can find a number of instances where Dasein does not claim “mineness.” Rather than claiming to be their own, such contrary instances of Dasein appear to openly claim that they are not their own, stating instead that their Being and possibilities have been determined by another or by a community of others.

When Dasein is considered authentic, it is thought of as such not because it is its own self and has determined its own possibilities, but rather because it accurately/authentically claims to be its own self with its own possibilities. Similarly, Dasein is considered to be inauthentic not because it is not its own self and has lost its own possibilities, but rather because it inaccurately/inauthentically claims to be its own self with its own possibilities. Dasein, as Heidegger has defined it, claims to be my own in each case, even (and especially) when it is not my own at all.98 When Dasein claims to be my own and is in fact my own, its claim is authentic; when Dasein claims to be my own but is in fact lost in the “they,” its claim is inauthentic. Granting Heidegger the premise that Dasein always claims to be its own, the term “in/authenticity” adequately describes Dasein as either an authentic self or an inauthentic they-self.

Acknowledging that Heidegger’s definition and use of in/authenticity functions adequately within the scope of his premises, it is important to note that while “in/authenticity” describes a set of ontological phenomena, it is not itself a stand-alone ontological phenomenon. Dasein's authenticity or inauthenticity depends solely on the veracity of its claim, leaving the concept of in/authenticity somewhat malleable. For instance, if Dasein were to claim to belong to another or a community of others, its

98 Heidegger, Being and Time, 322.
in/authenticity would depend upon whether or not this claim was genuine, and not upon the state of its Being. Under these conditions, Dasein would be considered “authentic” if it accurately claimed to belong to another or a community of others, but would be considered “inauthentic” if it inaccurately made this claim. For his purposes, Heidegger initially uses in/authenticity to describe whether or not Dasein accurately claims to be its own. Throughout the course of Being and Time, however, this concept of in/authenticity evolves from a term describing the truth or falsehood of Dasein's claim to be its own into a concept carrying implicit ethical judgements – namely, in the implication that Dasein ought to be authentic.\textsuperscript{99} in/authenticity becomes “a factical ideal of Dasein.”\textsuperscript{100} This factical ideal of Dasein, however, proves to be problematic throughout Being and Time, both for the oversimplified manner in which it describes the authentic and inauthentic manifestations of Dasein, and for the implicit yet unmistakably ethical language it uses in doing so.

Heidegger portrays the inauthentic self as an entity lost in the “they” by consolidating overwhelmingly large and diverse possibilities into simple, undifferentiated categories and descriptors. Heidegger’s concept of publicness, for instance, takes shape by consolidating the concepts of distantiality,\textsuperscript{101} averageness,\textsuperscript{102} and levelling down. This, in turn, amalgamates actions as potentially unrelated as competition, subjugation, reading a newspaper or taking a bus\textsuperscript{103} into a single devastating, homogeneous concept of inauthenticity that “proximally controls every way in which the

\textsuperscript{99} Vogel, The Fragile “We”, 1.
\textsuperscript{100} Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
\textsuperscript{101} Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
\textsuperscript{102} Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
\textsuperscript{103} Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
world and Dasein gets interpreted”\footnote{104} while in turn removing Dasein's Being from it:

In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, [the they] keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the “levelling down” of all possibilities of Being.\footnote{105}

For Heidegger, the inauthentic self is the they-self: “the self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self – that is, from the self which has been taken hold of in its own way.”\footnote{106} As has been demonstrated above, the they-self – and, by consequence, all inauthentic and undifferentiated manifestations of Dasein – does not exist as an all-inclusive category of Dasein’s Being, but is rather the sort of Being that has its own very specific characteristics. The they-self is a phenomenon absorbed in and determined by the “they,”\footnote{107} a phenomenon that is kept ignorant of its context and loss of decision-making,\footnote{108} a phenomenon that prevents Dasein from hearing itself,\footnote{109} a phenomenon that is lost and must find itself,\footnote{110} a phenomenon engrossed in idle talk and “hubbub,”\footnote{111} a phenomenon that collapses upon hearing the appeal of its own
conscience,\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 273.} and a phenomenon engrossed with public rules and ways to circumvent them.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 288.} As Vogel notes, the language used to describe the “they” and the actions ascribed to the “they” appear to judgmentally colour Heidegger's apparent ontological neutrality:

> While insisting that he does not mean to “disparage” the everyday or to evaluate it negatively, [Heidegger] characterizes its mode of discourse as “idle talk” dominated by gossip, its mode of sight as “curiosity” marked by distraction, the lust for novelty and the refusal to dwell anywhere in particular, and its mode of interpretation as “ambiguity” or noncommittal superficiality. Being-in-the-world is essentially “tempting,” “tranquilizing,” “alienating,” “entangled in itself,” “turbulent,” and “plunging downward.”\footnote{Vogel, \textit{The Fragile “We”}, 13.}

Additionally, Žižek points out that while the concept of the “they” is written about and dealt with as a homogeneous concept, it in fact possesses an inherent multiplicity:

> The problem with \textit{Being and Time} is how to coordinate the series of pairs of oppositions: authentic existence versus \textit{das Man}; anxiety versus immersion in worldly activity; true philosophical thought versus traditional ontology; dispersed modern society versus the People assuming its historic Destiny…. The pairs in this series do not simply overlap: when a premodern artisan or farmer, following his traditional way of life, is immersed in his daily involvement with \textit{ready-at-hand}\footnote{Žižek uses the term “ready-at-hand” throughout \textit{The Ticklish Subject}, rather than the more common “ready-to-hand,” the term I have chosen to use as an English equivalent of Heidegger's \textit{Zuhandenheit}.} objects that are included in his world, this immersion is definitely not the same as the \textit{das Man} of the modern city-dweller…. Is it not, therefore, that, in
contrast to these two opposed modes of immersion – the authentic involvement with the ready-at-hand and the modern letting oneself go with the flow of *das Man* – there are also two opposed modes of acquiring a distance: the shattering existential experience of anxiety, which extraneates us from the traditional immersion in our way of life, and the theoretical distance of the neutral observer who, as if from outside, perceives the world in 'representations'?\textsuperscript{116}

While Dreyfus' differentiation between the "positive" and "negative" functions of the "they" helps to demonstrate the potential benefits that the "they" might provide for Dasein, it is unable to account for a more fundamental problem with the concept of the "they:" namely, that Heidegger fails to establish a *public* alternative to the "they." The "they" may provide Dasein with both "positive" and "negative" possibilities, but Heidegger nonetheless fails to make adequate room for a communal, collective entity – like the "they" – that differs from the "they" and its necessary traits.\textsuperscript{117}

Having delineated the "they" as a *necessary* and *exclusive* entity that both promotes "conformity" and "conformism"\textsuperscript{118} Heidegger’s overall structure of in/authenticity reveals both a totalizing and ethical characteristic, insofar as it consolidates a plurality of possibly diverse forms of everyday public life into the single form that is the "they," and all forms of inauthentic existence into a homogeneous "lostness." As Vogel points out, Heidegger's ontological survey of the "they" and the language used to describe the "they" effectively contradict Heidegger's alleged ethical indifference:

\textsuperscript{116} Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 12.
\textsuperscript{117} Heidegger's concept of the authentic, history-making community may be an exception to this, but for reasons that will be explored below, this will not be counted as a viable communal or public alternative to the "they."
Although he claims not to be waging any “moralizing critique of the everyday,”
Heidegger’s portrait of everyday life surely has critical and moralistic overtones.
He describes persons as being primarily “inauthentic:” “lost” in the public world
into which they have “fallen,” governed by the anonymous “Anyone” (das Man)
to which each has ceded the burden of self-responsibility…. The person is faced
with the value-laden alternatives of inauthentically “losing himself” in the
possibilities prescribed for him by “the Anyone” or of authentically “winning
himself” by diverting his attention from the levelling chatter of “the Anyone” and
taking hold of his own possibilities.119

Amidst the totality that is his interpretation of public life, otherness, and inauthenticity,
Heidegger neglects to adequately explore possible alternative and non-destructive forms
of public and/or inauthentic existence involving instances of Dasein that do not claim
their Being or their possibilities as their own. Thus, the idea that Heidegger’s concept of
the “they” is fundamentally and conceptually limited will be explored. To that end, I will
propose the possibility of an entity that both sets the necessary norms that Dasein requires
to exist, while at the same time returning authentic existence and meaning back to
Dasein.

In its world, Dasein can be seen claiming to belong to another or a community of
others in many ways and in many instances. And while the claim to belong to another or
a community of others may be regarded as a mere “existentiell” mode of a particular
Dasein’s existence – and not, as it were, an “existential” mode that characterizes all
instances of Dasein120 – such a critique is problematic for a number of reasons. Ricoeur

120 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Volume 3, 64 – 65
distinguishes the existentiell and existential modes of Dasein's existence by indicating that the existentiell mode “characterizes the concrete choice of a way of Being-in-the-world, the ethical commitment assumed by exceptional personalities, by ecclesiastical and other communities, by entire cultures,” while the existential mode “characterizes any analysis that aims at explicating the structures that distinguish Dasein from all other beings and, therefore, that connect the question of the meaning of the Being of the entity that we are to the question of Being as such, to the extent that, for Dasein, the meaning of its Being is an issue for it.”

Primarily, as Ricoeur has shown, the distinction between the existential and the existentiell is by and large a blurry one throughout *Being and Time*:

[The] distinction between the existential and the existentiell is obscured by its interfering with the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic, which itself is caught up in the search for the primordial. This latter overlapping is inevitable as soon as the degraded and fallen states of the concepts available to a hermeneutic phenomenology reflects the state of forgetfulness in which the question of Being lies, and when this fallen state requires the labour of language referred to above. The conquest of primordial concepts is thus inseparable from a struggle against inauthenticity, which itself is practically identified with everydayness. But this search for the authentic cannot be carried out without a constant appeal to the testimony of the existentiell.

Secondly, apart from the possible incoherence of the distinction between the existentiell and the existential, while Dasein's claim to belong to a particular other or a group of others remains an existentiell of Dasein – Dasein's claim to belong to its job, its spouse,

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its religion, its political party, its county of origin, etc., will not be existentially shared by all other instances of Dasein – the more basic *claim to belong* is something much more fundamental, and possibly even existential, than the specific claims to belong.

Finally, if Dasein's claim to otherness is, in fact, made over and against a claim to mineness, the concept of mineness itself becomes an existentiell: it is only now capable of describing individual instances of Dasein, and not each and every instance of Dasein, as it previously claimed to do. The possible implications of Dasein's otherness on the existential concept of Dasein's mineness are extensive, and will not be dealt with in this study. Rather, I will try instead to give examples of instances in which Dasein's otherness does, in fact, manifest itself over and against its mineness. In so doing, my primary purpose will not be to engage the existential/existentiell distinction more thoroughly, but rather will be to bring the concept of in/authenticity into question. To that end, I will begin to explore various instances where one might find Dasein explicitly comporting itself in its otherness, rather than its mineness.

Vocationally, when Dasein signs on for employment, it not only agrees to exchange labour for currency, but quite normally agrees to take on or share in the identity of its company or corporation. To that end, it may sign non-disclosure agreements that limit what it can and cannot say, it may agree to promote the company it works for in word and deed both inside and outside the work day – or, at the very least, agree not to slander, defame, or in any way detract from the image of the company in word or deed. Dasein may agree to drive a vehicle with its company's name and symbols emblazoned on it, and/or it may agree to adopt a corporate code of ethics that dictates the sort of behaviour expected of it. In each instance, Dasein willingly and knowingly hands over
its possibilities and its decisions in exchange for currency and various other financially valuable benefits, a position within a hierarchy, a set of responsibilities, and an ethical code. Such an agreement within the vocational community can be benign and non-committal, as in the case of an instance of Dasein that simply seeks a means for itself and/or an instance of Dasein that enjoins itself to a company that is lackadaisical in holding its employees accountable to their agreements. However, such an agreement can be emphatic and all-encompassing, as in the case of an instance of Dasein that truly believes in its company, a Dasein that is seeking identity through its career, and/or when Dasein enjoins itself to a company that believes in itself and its ethical arrangements.

On the level of nation-states, Dasein can agree to patriotically recognize its country in terms of supremacy over another country, or in terms that value the country in and of itself simply because it is Dasein's country. Dasein can celebrate national and memorial days, pay homage to the various veterans of war that served and/or died for the sake of its country – or itself go to war for the sake of its country should the opportunity present itself. Dasein can surround itself with nationalistically referential symbols, vote in elections, take part of community meetings or protests, sing national anthems and pledge allegiance to its country, pay its taxes for the good of the nation-state, comport itself in terms of a “social contract” with its country, and/or represent its country abroad. Dasein can enjoin itself to the community of the nation-state in a passive and non-committal mode, such as when it pays taxes as a “good citizen” and votes as a “civic duty” without any perceptions of receiving an explicit identity in and for its nation-state on a patriotic level, or Dasein can overtly declare its love, allegiance, and identity with its nation, as in the instance of John McCain, whose national identity was augmented after
being deprived of his nation while in captivity:

I fell in love with my country when I was a prisoner in someone else’s…. I loved it for its decency, for its faith in the wisdom, justice and goodness of its people. I loved it because it was not just a place, but an idea, a cause worth fighting for. I was never the same again. I was not my own man anymore. I was my country’s.123

Socially, Dasein can find itself willingly and knowingly enjoined to others in a wide variety of cultural situations: through marriage and/or familial commitments, through various community units (neighbourhood, ethnic type, common language, level of income, professional similarities), through shared artistic talents and/or appreciation, through supporting a common athletic event or team, and so forth. As above, Dasein can enjoin itself to its social groups and its culture passively, by not committing to its marriage and/or its family, by not participating alongside or actively sharing identity with those other Daseins with similar geography/ethnicity/income, etc., through largely private appreciation or manifestation of artistic talent, or through an exclusively casual support and following of athletics. Dasein can also enjoin itself more fully into its culture by “focusing on its family,” exclusively making its home and living its lifestyle amongst that geographical/ethical/financial sector it identifies with, by joining an artistic commune or following a respected artist wherever he or she goes, or through fanatical, fully-costumed and aggressive devotion to its sporting club or event. In each case, Dasein can intentionally take stock of its others and enjoin itself to them in exchange for the identity

associated with its others and the responsibilities its others return to it.

Religiously, Dasein can enjoin itself to others – or possibly the “holy other”\textsuperscript{124} – as a means of reconciling itself to its others and its world; specifically, I am speaking to historically Christian religious practise and confession, if not for a lack of examples in other traditions than certainly for my lack of familiarity with other traditions and their examples. Christian confessions and practises speak, for instance, of losing or denying oneself, as in the example of Jesus telling his disciples that, “If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever would save his life would lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it.”\textsuperscript{125} Paul refers to the church as an entity that redefines one's identity and self-ownership:

In Christ Jesus you are all sons of God, through faith. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you are Christ's, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{124} While the term “holy other,” as used here, connotes the relationship between Dasein and a supernatural entity, the factical existence of such an entity is a secondary concern at best. Throughout this study, my investigation has been devoted to analyzing Dasein in a variety of contexts that I believe have been overlooked by Heidegger, including the way in which Dasein behaves and interacts within a religious context. In the case of the supernatural and supernatural entities, Heidegger's exclusion of these considerations may perhaps be understood on the grounds of the intangibility of such entities: that is to say, given that the ontological existence of the supernatural or any supernatural entities is either difficult or impossible to substantiate, such entities may not have been considered the proper objects of an ontological study of being as being. However, given that Heidegger's study of Dasein seeks to phenomenologically come to terms with Dasein's being by means of an investigation into how Dasein presents itself within its world, and given that there are factical instances of Dasein that comport themselves within their respective worlds as though the supernatural and supernatural entities were a reality – regardless of whether or not this is factically true – I have determined that it remains important to subject such instances of Dasein to my own investigations and studies, without specifically touching upon the question of the existence or inexistence of the particular supernatural entities that such instances of Dasein understand to be real, within their worlds.

\textsuperscript{125} Matthew 16:24 (English Standard Version).
\textsuperscript{126} Galatians 3:26ff (ESV).
Additionally, the church, according to Paul, understands its members as a functional part of an integrated and interdependent whole:

For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks, slaves or free – and all were made to drink of one Spirit. For the body does not consist of one member but of many. If the foot should say, “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part of the body. And if the ear should say, “Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part of the body…. God has so composed the body, giving greater honour to the part that lacked it, that there may be no division in the body, but that the members may have the same care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honoured, all rejoice together.\(^{127}\)

In addition to realizing unity between oneself and fellow members of the church, Paul sees the Christian as having attained unity between himself or herself and God:

Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we shall certainly be united with him in a resurrection like his. We know that our old self was crucified with him in order that the body of sin might be brought to nothing, so that we would no longer be enslaved to sin. For

\(^{127}\) 1 Corinthians 12:12 – 26 (ESV).
one who has died has been set free from sin. Now if we have died with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him. We know that Christ being raised from the dead will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. For the death he died he died to sin, once for all, but the life he lives he lives to God. So you also must consider yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus.\textsuperscript{128}

As a member of a faith community with such confessions, an instance of Dasein might participate with the community, share with the community, receive its identity from the community while neither authentically confessing nor experiencing any such loss of self and enjoining to either its others or its holy other. On the other hand, when asked what its only true comfort in life and death is, an instance of Dasein may genuinely respond, as per the Heidelberg Catechism

\begin{quote}
that I am not my own,

but belong –

body and soul

in life and in death –

\end{quote}

to my faithful saviour Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{129}

Dasein, as an entity in the world, manifestly and repeatedly presents itself not merely as an entity that claims to be its own, but also as an entity that overtly claims not to be its own: as an entity that confesses that it belongs to a spiritual community of others, as an entity that confesses that it belongs to a holy other, as an entity that shares its identity and Being with its social community, as an entity that manifests as a child of its nation-state,\textsuperscript{128, 129}

\textsuperscript{128} Romans 6:3 – 11, (ESV).
\textsuperscript{129} The Psalter Hymnal, The Heidelberg Catechism (Grand Rapids: CRC Publications, 1987), 861.
as an entity that takes its identity and responsibility from its vocational hierarchy, and so forth.

Each existentiell\textsuperscript{130} manifestation of Dasein claiming its Being as a functional part of a larger community bears evidence to a larger ontological principle: namely, that as an entity in the world, Dasein \textit{cannot} be characterized \textit{solely} by mineness. It must, as it manifests itself as a functioning participant in a larger communal dynamic, be characterized by its “otherness,” by its \textit{willing} and \textit{intentional} Being-with others of its choosing, and not merely by its unwitting and unintentional “fall” into the “they.” It may be argued that the concept of Dasein, insofar as it does not necessarily refer to any individual, specific instance of itself – a human being – could include within its scope a collective or communal instance of itself – a human \textit{community}, or humanity as a whole. While this potential for Dasein \textit{as a community} opens up the scope of Heidegger's concept beyond any particular manifestation of Dasein as an individual, the fundamental problems with Dasein's mineness remain: namely, the inability of this model to account for instances of Dasein – individual, communal, or universal – that do not claim to be their own, but claim instead to have their Being determined by others. Culturally, communally, or individually, Dasein must also be characterized by its potential for authentic otherness.

To bring these problems to light, and to insist that Heidegger's concept of Dasein ought to be rethought for the reasons mentioned above is not to suggest that \textit{Being and Time} did not contain its own proposed means by which Dasein ought to comport itself towards its others. Rather, in the second division of \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger develops

\textsuperscript{130} That is, each individual and particular manifestation of Dasein's Being.
his own understanding of how Dasein, as an entity faced with the anxiety of its existence, might find a way to comport itself authentically both as its own self, and as a participant in a larger authentic community.

In outlining Dasein as an entity characterized by anxiety, Heidegger proposed the possibility that Dasein might either flee its anxiety – returning to the inauthentic comforts of the “they” – or grab hold of its anxiety and let itself “become paralyzed by the revelation that all that it accepted as serious does not matter at all.” Facing up to its anxiety, Dasein has the potential to comport itself in the mode of what Heidegger calls “resoluteness,” or the “reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety.” In the mode of resoluteness, “the stand that produces the authentic self,” Dasein may authentically comport itself towards others when its “resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others.” When comporting itself in this way, Dasein, as a resolute, constant, and self-constituted entity, is ready for both the anxiety of life and the task of participating in an authentic culture by means of fateful repetition and authentic historicality:

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual "there" by shattering itself against death - that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been – can, by handing down to itself the possibility it

131 Heidegger, Being and Time, 266.
133 Heidegger, Being and Time, 297.
135 Heidegger, Being and Time, 298.
136 Heidegger, Being and Time, 391.
has inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the moment of vision for "its time." Only authentic temporality, which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate - that is to say, authentic historicality.  

This task of historicality is, for Heidegger, a communal task, and it is in this communal task of historicality, fate, and destiny that Heidegger's own understanding of authentic Being-with others and Dasein's otherness is to be found. As Caputo notes, Dasein is free to take to the task of its heritage as a participating part of a larger authentic whole: Dasein's heritage may be either individual or collective. The possibilities which are sent to Dasein may be sent either to individual Dasein or to the larger historical group of which it is a part. The heritage of the individual is what Heidegger calls "fate...." Heidegger does not mean that the individual with a "fate" is the victim of circumstances beyond his control, for only the resolute, authentic individual has fate, that is, can seize upon the possibilities that have been sent his way. But Dasein is never merely an individual, for Being-in-the-world is always Being-with, and historicizing is always cohistoricizing. And this collective heritage Heidegger calls “destiny...." In Being and Time "destiny" means the heritage which is sent to collective Dasein, to a community or people, which it is up to the resoluteness of the community to seize upon.

Within a community of resolute, authentic individuals, the Heideggerian model of authentic Being-with others takes the form of an authentic historicality, wherein a community is able to embrace its fate and free its own destiny: “Dasein's fateful destiny

\[137\] Heidegger, Being and Time, 385.
\[138\] Heidegger, Being and Time, 384.
\[139\] Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 88.
in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.”

The fate and destiny of the historical community constitute what Caputo calls an “originary ethics,” an ethical system with foundations in ontology:

Originary ethics is an important delimitation of value theory which stands value theory on its head. Directives are issued by Being itself, not man, whose task is to become responsive to the nomos sent his way, not to be a legislator of universal imperatives…. Heidegger's more originary ethos is a higher version, an eschatological version, of metaphysics. For it tells the story of the primordial ethos and the great beginning, prior to the subject-object split, and looks ahead to a new dawn, which is to be an eschatological repetition and renewal of what began in the early Greeks, before metaphysics and all metaphysical ethics.\textsuperscript{141}

Thus, while it cannot be said that Heidegger fails to provide either a social model of Dasein in its otherness (as he does in the collective fate of the resolute and authentic community) or a communal ethics (as is implicitly made manifest in the delineation of the fateful, destined community) the question of whether or not Heidegger's communal model and its implicit ethical values ought to be accepted remains open. Furthermore, questions regarding whether or not the examples above – where Dasein does not initially claim to be its own, but claims to belong to another or a community of others – in any way require the preconditions of Heidegger's authentic community or meaningfully fit into Heidegger's model of authentic communal living ought to be asked. For while Heidegger provides some means by which Dasein might locate itself in an authentic community, Heidegger's authentic historizing community still has the potential to exclude

\textsuperscript{140} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 285.
\textsuperscript{141} Caputo, \textit{Radical Hermeneutics}, 237.
any number of communities that do not pattern themselves on destiny and fate, but still authentically return identity and responsibility back to their members. Ontologically, Heidegger's historizing community does not allow for a wider array of communal options. Additionally, the communal ideal of destiny, fate, and historical identity has the potential to include any number of communities that neglect the not-strictly-historical identities and responsibilities of their members in favour of death-shattering authentic historicality. Ethically, Heidegger's historizing communal ideal leaves the door open for communities to make history and embrace fate, but fails to account for any of the potentially devastating costs associated with making history and choosing destiny on either a communal or individual scale.

Furthermore, the communal model Heidegger provides remains one dependent upon Dasein's initial claims to mineness. Within Heidegger's authentic communal model, Dasein remains an entity that claims its Being as its own, but does so in a fateful and destined way alongside others with a common goal, where “Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being.”142 The collective fate and destiny of the community arguably takes the form of such a “common concern,” and not the form of a collective, mutual admission of the interdependence of Being. And while such communal interdependence is by no means a necessary precondition for communal living, it is a possible communal mode that Heidegger neglects to explore.

That having been said, the ethic that emerges from Heidegger's authentic community is one of a collective, generational, originary fate, wherein the resolute

142 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
forging of historical destiny by means of authentic repetition assumes the mantle of the communal concern. Ethically, this is a decidedly impoverished option, and thus will not be entertained as a viable means by which to define Dasein in its otherness throughout the remainder of this study. Furthermore, the communal comportment of Dasein proposed by Heidegger is in many ways ontologically deficient, given that it still fails to account for those instances of Dasein who, prior to any anticipatory resoluteness or any fateful, historical concerns, do not claim their Being as their own, but instead claim to be dependent upon an other or a community of others. None of the manifestations of Dasein mentioned above – Dasein as a political entity, Dasein as a religious entity, and so forth – require authentic historicality prior to their communal involvements – though they may still exhibit such behaviour once legitimately involved with their communities. Rather, they have the potential to be communal before they are able to stave off anxiety in resoluteness, before they create an ethos of fate and destiny, and before they might even consider to resolutely repeat their existences over and against the flux of meaningfulness. Consequently, the criticism of the deficiency of Heidegger's accounting for Dasein's otherness both ontologically and ethically remains.

With the concept of Dasein's mineness still very much in question, problems with his concept of in/authenticity subsequently emerge. With sufficient grounds upon which to suspect that Dasein may not, in each case, claim to be its own, Heidegger’s concept of in/authenticity can no longer function as it has without further explanation and exploration. Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity is wholly founded upon the idea that Dasein might in one instance legitimately claim to be its own, while in another instance claim to be its own when it is truly in the possession of another or a community of others.
As Heidegger defines it, Dasein in each case claims to be its own: it does so authentically when it actually is its own self, but does so inauthentically – and for the most part – when it is in the possession of others. Accordingly, if Dasein were in fact claiming to be in the possession of its other or community of others, its in/authentic structure would be effectively reversed. If Dasein were to claim to be in the possession of its other or community of others and in fact be so, it would be manifesting itself authentically, while if Dasein were to claim to be in their possession and, in fact, be alienated and isolated from them, it would be manifesting itself inauthentically.

Heidegger neglects to adequately explore the possibility that Dasein might neither be its own nor claim to be its own. Instead, he elects to focus on how Dasein inauthentically claims to be its own self while in the possession of others – who, alongside inauthentic Dasein, take the form of the “they” – the predominant “social” manifestation of Dasein made available throughout the course of *Being and Time*. The emergence of the possibility of an instance of Dasein that is not patterned by mineness requires that the concept of in/authenticity – which, as demonstrated above, is wholly dependent upon Dasein's claim to mineness – be rethought.

Further compounding the problem of in/authenticity is the fact that Heidegger’s own usage of in/authenticity serves a dual purpose. While explicitly it serves as an adequate terminological definition of Dasein’s state of Being, it at the same time serves as an implicit, ethical means by which to separate a “good” way of Being from a “bad” way of Being. As noted above, Heidegger’s own focus and goals throughout *Being and Time* are not of an ethical nature, but despite this fact, the outcome of his philosophy provides the reader with a clear ethical imperative: Heidegger presents two possible ways for
Dasein to comport itself, one of which is ultimately rendered ethically impoverished.

Inauthentic Dasein leaves us with nothing of any ethical worth to cling to – given its self-deception, given its lostness, given the “they” that it has both unwittingly enjoined itself to and continues to perpetuate – while authentic Dasein stands above rebuke – given the accurate knowledge of self it fights for, given its grounded self-assurance, given its helpful nature and desire to liberate those lost in the “they.”

However, when the entire structure of in/authenticity gets called into question, this clear yet implicit ethical mandate is no longer readily available, insofar as authenticity is no longer the de facto ethically viable option. A Dasein that authentically acknowledges its dependence and ontological unity with another or a community of others may or may not be enjoined to a community of others that returns responsibility and identity back to Dasein: Dasein may, as it were, acknowledge its dependence and ontological unity with a community of others whose nature is similar to that of the “they.” At the same time, inauthenticity is no longer able to adequately define those Daseins whose existence is ethically impoverished. A Dasein who believes himself or herself to be enjoined to another or a community of others may not be enjoined to the other or the community at all – that is to say, Dasein may claim to be involved with a community of others that does not acknowledge Dasein's involvement, or Dasein may claim to participate in a community of others without ever taking on their responsibilities or their identity.

However, if the purposes of that other or that community of others are ethically bankrupt, that Dasein’s inauthenticity and subsequent alienation may be indicative of an ethically attuned anxiety.

The criticism of Heidegger’s concept of in/authenticity brings to light that which
has been true from the beginning: namely, that Heidegger’s in/authentic criteria cannot support the implicit ethical claims of Being and Time. Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s participation in and shared ontological Being-with others has, from the start, been synonymous with lostness in the “they.” However, the problem of in/authenticity explicates the fact that Dasein can be ontologically enjoined to others who are not themselves the “they” – an impossible task within the scope of Heidegger’s criteria, given both that his insistence that Dasein's mineness in each case obfuscates its Being-with others, and that Dasein’s blindness to its Being-with helps to create the amorphous “they” out of its others – and second, that Dasein can enjoin itself to these others both willingly and knowingly. Dasein, then, can no longer interpret any sort of “call of conscience” as a mere call towards authentic, individuated existence. Ontologically, the boundaries of the domain of in/authenticity have expanded to include those instances of Dasein that claim to belong to another or a community of others, while ethically, the project of the call of conscience begins to reveal the way in which it “secularizes the Protestant notion of Sin as consubstantial with human existence as such,” thus “depriving it of its positive theological foundation by redefining it in a purely formal way.”

Authentic existence – and indeed, all existence – requires more than an authentic claim to mineness to determine whether or not its authentic existence is a worthwhile authentic existence or a worthless authentic existence. That is to say if the project of in/authentic ethics is to be continued, the “ethical qualifier” Heidegger uses must itself be rethought. Without wanting to abandon Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity outright – thus denying its potential value – and without wanting to simply reverse the terms of

143 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 53.
in/authenticity to include manifestations of Dasein that do not profess mineness – thus denying potentially valuable manifestations of Dasein that do profess mineness – the task of rethinking the concept of in/authenticity must both acknowledge and “judge” those instances of Dasein that claim to be their own and those instances of Dasein that claim to be in the possession of another or a community of others.

2.2: Problems with the “they”

When the possibility of Dasein's “authentic” existence as an entity which may claim to belong to another or a community of others is acknowledged, a number of corresponding concepts are affected. As the concept of in/authenticity was put to question by the appearance of an instance of Dasein that claimed to belong to an other or a community of others, so too is Heidegger's concept of the “they” put to question by the appearance of a Dasein characterized by its otherness, as well as by a concept of in/authenticity that may no longer take Dasein's mineness as its ethical ideal.

As Heidegger understands it, Dasein, for the most part, exists inauthentically, insofar as it claims to be its own while its Being, its decisions, and its possibilities have been unknowingly usurped by the “they.” Only when Dasein’s conscience adopts the motif of guilt and begins to call it back to authentic existence is it ever made aware of the fact that its Being, decisions, and possibilities are no longer its own; at this point, it becomes anxious and begins a process whereby it recovers its Being, decisions, and possibilities and becomes a self once more. What if, however, instead of recovering its own possibilities and its own Being, Dasein were to decide that it was content to have others – even those others whose Being is characterized by the “they” – manage its Being
for it, or to consciously lose itself and never regain itself? Would it thus be possible for Dasein to exist “authentically” in the “they,” but neither as an entity which did not consider its Being (Heidegger's “not authentic” mode) nor as an entity that presumed itself to be something that it was not (Heidegger's “inauthentic” mode)? Such a mode of existence, to be considered terminologically “authentic,” must entail that Dasein as an entity recognizes itself as being enjoined to the “they” without feeling the need to “recover” itself from the “they.” Charles B. Guignon, while discussing Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, discusses this possibility while outlining the inauthentic and not-authentic modes of Dasein's Being as follows:

For Heidegger, we are always choosing from among the cultural possibilities and against the cultural background of intelligibility into which we have been thrown. That is, we are always understanding ("taking a stand on") our being on the basis of our thrownness or facticity. Human being is essentially self-interpreting being ("-in-the-world"). But for the most part this self-interpreting is not only implicit – it is anonymous ("public" in Kierkegaard's sense). We choose, frequently without realizing we are choosing, to do "what one does." When these choices are virtually unconscious, we are existing in what Heidegger calls an undifferentiated mode vis-a-vis authenticity and inauthenticity. But when we choose to interpret our being in the public way - living in the world of the one (*das Man*), doing "what one does" because it is either the "right" or the comfortable thing to do - we "fall" into the inauthentic way of being.\(^{144}\)

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While Guignon's analysis of Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity is demonstrably incorrect – given that the concept of in/authenticity is inseparably linked to Dasein's claims to be its own – it does point towards an important problematic encountered in Heidegger: namely, this suggestion of the possibility of willingly enjoining oneself to the “they,” a possibility Heidegger himself makes no room for. Guignon carries on with justification for his explanation of the inauthentic mode of Being:

We have a tendency toward the inauthentic understanding of our being because some of the facts of [human] life are hard to take. These all have to do with the lack of ground, foundation, or objective justification for our being. The general background of intelligibility or world that gives us our most basic sense of things, others, and ourselves is itself without any ultimate source of intelligibility or ground. It is the deepest level for us or of us. It is that according to which we must interpret everything, but is itself nothing more than further interpretation. We are, and the world is, interpretation all the way down. What is rock bottom in terms of basic skills and felt familiarity is only contingently so - there is no further sense of correctness or final justification for the way we are. Even the choices we make from among the possible interpretations (purposes, projects) culturally available to us are utterly contingent - determined if at all by more fundamental implicit choices that are themselves contingent. In both directions our understanding of being is in this sense groundless. The sense of ourselves and our world that our cultural past sticks us with has no ultimate claim to validity, and the future-directed projects and practices that constitute our taking over of this cultural facticity and our interpretation of ourselves in terms of it are equally
incapable of objective validation. Our practices, skills, and familiarity are grounded in nothing firmer than further practices, skills, and familiarity. And all of these facts of life can be brought vividly home to us by an attack of the mood Heidegger calls anxiety.¹⁴⁵

On strictly terminological grounds Guignon's analysis must be rejected: Dasein is not to be considered inauthentic because it has accepted the “they” as an ethically viable alternative to its own authentic selfhood, but is rather to be considered inauthentic because it claims to be its own self when it truly is not. However, Guignon's analysis of the concept of in/authenticity brings with it the suggestion that Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity provides an option that Heidegger himself never properly considers, due in no small part to his orthodoxy of Dasein's “mineness:” the option of willingly accepting that one's possibilities are not one's own. While Guignon suggests that Dasein might willingly enjoin itself to the “they,” this possibility is difficult to consider – given that the “they” is, by nature, indefinite, and not the sort of thing one can identify as an ethical placeholder – and is at best a secondary concern. Of primary importance is the possibility that Dasein might willingly accept a definite other or community of others as being the vanguard(s) of its Being and its possibilities.

Upon acknowledging the possibility of Dasein 'renouncing' its “mineness” and consciously claiming to enjoin itself to another entity in a spirit of “otherness,” the concept of in/authenticity begins to deteriorate. It can no longer be assumed that “authentic” Dasein is its own self, nor can it be assumed that “inauthentic” Dasein is lost in the “they” – as Dasein might authentically claim to be 'possessed' by another or a

community of others and truly be so. The possibility that Dasein might not claim to be its own in every case necessarily changes the parameters by which we can judge Dasein as being authentic or inauthentic: Dasein can, as it were, claim to belong to another or to a community of others either authentically or inauthentically. And while this may be no more than an added nuance from a terminological standpoint, even a cursory analysis of the way in which the concept of in/authenticity has been used throughout *Being and Time* reveals the problem this poses for Heidegger's overall ontological project.

As discussed above, the “they” requires certain and very specific conditions in order to exist at all – namely, “distantiality, averageness, and levelling down.” It requires an existential connection to others that are themselves viewed by Dasein in an “inauthentic” manner – namely, a manner that perceives all others as being the same, a mindset that Heidegger attributed to Dasein when it is approaching others while lost in the “they” yet inauthentically claiming to be its own:

But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* to others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the others to dispose of as they please. These others, moreover, are not *definite* others. On the contrary, any other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination by others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the others oneself and enhances their power. 'The others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who

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146 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 127.
proximally and for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the "they." 147

Given the very specific conditions that must be met in order for Dasein or any of its others to be considered they-selves lost in the “they,” and given the possibility that an instance of Dasein might consciously seek out definite others to help determine its possibilities and create its identity, the possibility that an instance of Dasein, lost in the “they,” might hear conscience's call towards authentic existence and seek out such others must be considered more closely. The possibility of an “authentic” instance of another or a community of others becoming the 'call of conscience' seeking to reconcile Dasein back into an “authentic” community already finds a foundation – albeit an underdeveloped foundation – in Heidegger's demonstration of how an instance of Dasein can solicitously serve as the conscience of its others:

Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I.' And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others. In light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the

147 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others. Only by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another – not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 'they' and in what 'they' want to undertake.\(^{148}\)

Thus, while Dasein may be able to inauthentically encounter its others for a time, the authentic comportment of its others should produce a crisis of conscience within Dasein, who in turn has the opportunity to recognize its others as definite others that seek to return both distinct identity and definite responsibility back to Dasein.

Dasein's others, when behaving in specific ways – when helping one another out, when seeking constructive and authentic existence for one another, when absorbing one another in ways conducive to accepting responsibility and subsequent action both individually and collectively, and so forth – do not, in any way, demonstrate any of the characteristics of the “they.” Thus, the possibility of an identity-giving, responsibility-returning community of others who lack the characteristics of the “they” poses a challenge to Heidegger’s understanding of an other-self as defined by the “they.”

\(^{148}\) Heidegger, Being and Time, 298.
2.3: Problems with solicitude

A large part of Heidegger’s understanding of the “they” and the way in which it manifests its inauthentic dealings with Dasein demonstrates itself in his concept of solicitude. Heidegger’s concept of solicitude closely draws upon in/authenticity, and relates directly to the way in which Dasein in/authentically behaves, either as a part of the “they” (solicitude in its deficient mode) or as a self-sufficient entity (solicitude in its “sufficient” mode). Dasein's solicitude manifests itself sufficiently when it seeks to liberate and empower its other towards self-sufficiency, while manifesting itself deficiently when it seeks to encapsulate and make decisions for its other in a way that keeps the other dependent.

Heidegger contextually situates his concept of solicitude alongside his concepts of care and concern; while the concept of concern, as Heidegger defines it, expresses the sort of relationship Dasein has towards things that are ready-to-hand, the concept of solicitude similarly expresses the sort of relationship Dasein has towards things that are neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand: namely, other Daseins and the objects of their concern:

If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then, like our circumspective dealings with the ready-to-hand within-the-world (which, by way of anticipation, we have called ‘concern’), it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of care; for as “care” the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined. Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities
encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude.\textsuperscript{149}

Just as Dasein's care and concern for its world and those objects ready-to-hand within-the-world frees those objects ready-to-hand within-the-world by rendering them significant, so too does Dasein's solicitude act as a means by which others are freed by Dasein within-the-world:

The world not only frees the ready-to-hand as entities encountered within-the-world; it also frees Dasein – the others in their Dasein-with. But Dasein's ownmost meaning of Being is such that this entity (which has been freed environmentally) is Being-in in the same world in which, as encounterable for others, it is there with them. We have interpreted worldhood as that referential totality which constitutes significance. In Being-familiar with this significance and previously understanding it, Dasein lets what is ready-to-hand be encountered as discovered in its involvement. In Dasein's Being, the context of references or assignments which significance implies is tied up with Dasein's ownmost Being – a Being which essentially can have no involvement, but which is rather that Being for the sake of which Dasein itself is as it is.\textsuperscript{150}

Within the realm of the concept of solicitude, Heidegger proposes the existence of two distinct modes: the “sufficient”\textsuperscript{151} or authentic mode of solicitude, and the deficient,

\\textsuperscript{149} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 121.  
\textsuperscript{150} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 123.  
\textsuperscript{151} While Heidegger speaks of this mode as dispensing “authentic care” (H. 122) for the Other, he does not give a name for this particular mode. I have chosen this term myself to serve as a contrast to his named “deficient” mode of solicitude.
inauthentic, and indifferent mode of solicitude, in which he suggests Dasein maintains itself in its everydayness.\textsuperscript{152} As Heidegger understands it, Dasein's solicitude – sufficient, deficient, and all points in between\textsuperscript{153} – is most often made manifest when Dasein is working in close quarters with its others:

A Being-with-one-another which arises from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become \textit{authentically} bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the other in his freedom for himself.\textsuperscript{154}

Heidegger's concept of solicitude is intimately linked to his concept of in/authenticity. Dasein, as a sufficiently solicitous entity, seeks to establish its solicitude for the express purpose of returning concern back to the other; it seeks to aid and abet the other for the purpose of having the other do the same for its own sake in the future. On the other hand, Dasein as a deficiently and/or indifferently solicitous entity, seeks to establish solicitude for other reasons: it may be that deficient solicitude seeks to “leap in” for the other simply for the purpose of helping it out, or it may be that the outcomes of “leaping in” which Heidegger outlines – namely, dependency, domination, and so forth – are the intention of Dasein in its deficient solicitude. Heidegger's discussions on the subject

\textsuperscript{152} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 121.
\textsuperscript{153} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 122 – 123.
\textsuperscript{154} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 122.
primarily provide us with the results of the two polar modes of solicitude without exhaustively elaborating upon the intentions behind either mode, yet solicitude's ties to in/authenticity are apparent: sufficient solicitude seeks to foster an authentic, self-sufficient Dasein in the other, while deficient solicitude either seeks to foster an inauthentic, dependent Dasein in the other, or is otherwise unconcerned with or unaware of the inauthentic Dasein that it creates in the other.

With the concept of in/authenticity examined and called into question, the concept of solicitude requires further examinations of its own. While Dasein’s propensity towards solicitous behaviour should by no means be ontologically tied to the concept of in/authenticity – rather, it is ontologically tied to the concept of Being-with – it demonstrates how Heidegger uses his concept of in/authenticity as a means by which to make “ethical” judgements. That is to say, whether Dasein is sufficiently solicitous or deficiently solicitous is dependent upon the outcome of its solicitude, but that outcome is wholly evaluated by means of the terms of in/authenticity without any ontological or primordial argument to justify this claim. The opposing pair of outcomes that Heidegger proposes as emerging from Dasein’s solicitous behaviour come to resemble either the sufficient self (in the sufficient mode of solicitude, the other takes form as a sufficient self) or the deficient they-self (in the deficient mode of solicitude, the other risks becoming a they-self, dependent upon and dominated by Dasein). If Dasein can be thought of as an entity that claims to belong to another or a community of others “authentically” – if this claim can be thought of as being potentially sufficient, not needing to change, and not needing to conform to the ethical ideal that Dasein ought to be characterized by mineness – then the end goal of solicitude – namely, a self-sufficient self
– becomes problematic. Additionally, if we are to retain some understanding of in/authenticity as a means by which Dasein's decision to participate in its community or to refuse to participate in its community might be qualified, then Heidegger's idea that sufficient solicitude “liberates” while deficient solicitude “dominates” requires further elaboration: if Dasein's liberation and domination cannot be determined strictly by the presence or absence of a self-sufficient self, how ought they to be judged?

Finally, having called both Dasein's mineness and the evaluation-structure of in/authenticity into question, the structure of Heidegger's concept of solicitude – that which sees “leaping in” as a dominating form of solicitude and “leaping ahead” a liberating form of solicitude – must also be questioned. While operating under the ethical ideal of Dasein's authentic mineness, Dasein's “leaping in” for another is hardly commendable: to leap in for the other is to remove responsibility from the other, to perform a task in the place of another, and to return the finished product back to another without providing the other the means by which to perform said task or handle said situation in the future. To leap in for the other is to dominate the other and make the other dependent upon Dasein. Operating within a communal dynamic that presumes the possibility of Dasein's authentic otherness, however, necessarily changes the way in which the mechanism of “leaping in” is viewed. Leaping in and removing responsibility from another may not return that task back to the other, but it may free the other to perform a task it is more suited to within the communal dynamic, it may help to perform a task for the larger community of others that could not have otherwise been performed, or it may help to save the other and/or the entire community of others from otherwise unavoidable harm or hardships.
Changing the way in which Dasein is viewed – in this case, allowing for the possibility of instances of Dasein that claim to belong to another or a community of others – changes the scope of a great many of Heidegger's concepts. While not negating his existing findings, the possibilities within each concept – Dasein itself, in/authenticity, the “they” and solicitude – both necessarily expand and change to accommodate new data. At the same time, however, new problems arise: the concept of in/authenticity is no longer “fit to judge” or guide the concept of solicitude, and the “they” can no longer account for all possibilities of a Dasein not its own. Accordingly, the task of rethinking the self – as possibly manifesting as a communally authentic self – must begin. Given the problems with Dasein's mineness, the concept of in/authenticity's dependence upon this incomplete claim, the dissolution of the they-self and the “they” in the wake of new phenomenal openings, and the collapse of Heidegger's concept of solicitude, the way towards new conceptions and manifestations of all of the above-mentioned concepts finds an opening. Demonstrably, Dasein does not claim to be its own in each case, but Heidegger's approach always understands Dasein in this way. For this reason, Dasein will need to be rethought and re-examined, so as to better understand Dasein in its “otherness.”
Chapter 3: Rethinking the self

With Dasein's mineness called into question, the concept of in/authenticity left indeterminate, the “they” demonstrably insufficient, and Dasein's solicitude deprived of its existing foundations, we are faced with at least three options to build upon: to end with a criticism and leave Heidegger's concepts with their respective difficulties and conceptual gaps, to otherwise abandon Heidegger's line of thought and proceed in an entirely new direction, or to attempt to salvage Heidegger's concepts so as to reconcile them with the new above-mentioned phenomenal data. The first option is a non-option, if one believes that there is any value to Heidegger's project at all; that is to say, if Heidegger's project was in any way worthwhile, it is insufficient to simply abandon it in light of critical problems that may arise. The second option is more plausible, but even this option seems to undervalue Heidegger's overall project via its method. Heidegger's larger goal – of coming to an understanding of Being by means of Dasein – remains intact as we continue to investigate it phenomenally, but his entire method is consequently dismissed – we acknowledge that Heidegger's goals were good, but that the means by which he achieved them were misguided. In light of these options, the final method seems preferable: to both affirm the value of Heidegger's project while working toward a more complete reconciliation between his phenomenal data and the new information about Dasein as a communal entity gained in the previous chapter.
3.1: Rethinking the self via literary Being-in-the-world: Dasein and *The Brothers Karamazov*

Heidegger himself claims in *Being and Time* 197ff that the use of literature – in his case, the use of a fable about care – can be indicative of Dasein's state of Being and Dasein's interpretation of itself. Just as Heidegger's recollection of a fable about 'care' helps to elucidate what Heidegger considered to be the already-present ontological nature of Dasein – Dasein's interpretation of itself was already “embedded” within the fable, as it were – so too can other instances of literature help to elucidate other aspects of Dasein, its Being, and the way in which it interprets itself. While not specifically a fable, Fyodor Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov* may yet prove to be one such example of a story that, while in and of itself falling outside strictly ontological parameters of investigation, provides us with a means by which we might bring the existential and ontological traits of Dasein into a somewhat clearer light.

Through Dostoevsky's redemptive character of Father Zossima, a concept emerges that I will refer to as “universal mutual responsibility” – the idea that each and every person is fundamentally responsible for each and every other person. As Dostoevsky puts it – through the words of Father Zossima – universal mutual responsibility is the state of realizing that we are

not only worse than others, but that [we are] responsible to all men for all and everything, for all human sins, national and individual…. For know, dear ones, that every one of us is undoubtedly responsible for all men and everything on earth, not merely through the general sinfulness of creation, but each one
personally for all mankind and every individual man.\textsuperscript{155}

As Zossima indicated, the concept of universal mutual responsibility is not itself based upon a metaphysical \textit{fall} from a lost paradise into the subsequent corruption and groaning of all things visible and invisible, but is in fact a more fundamental, existential reality for each and every one of us.

Dostoevsky first introduces this concept by means of the memoirs of the recently deceased Father Zossima, as transcribed by his underling Alyosha Karamazov. Zossima recollects a time, early in his childhood, when his brother Markel grew gravely ill. Throughout his life, Markel had mocked his family's orthodox tendencies and denied the existence of God, but upon growing ill “a marvellous change passed over him [and] his spirit seemed transformed.”\textsuperscript{156} He began to light lamps to the icons in his room, apologized to his servants, thanked his visitors, and professed to exist in a state of immanent bliss wherein “life [was] paradise,” “we [were] all in paradise,”\textsuperscript{157} and where “one day [was] enough for a man to know all happiness.”\textsuperscript{158} Most important for Zossima, however, was Markel's confession of being-guilty towards all things and all men:\textsuperscript{159}

When the servants came in to him he would say continually, “Dear, kind people, why are you doing so much for me, do I deserve to be waited on? If it were God's will for me to live, I would wait on you, for all men should wait on one another.”

Mother shook her head as she listened. “My darling, it's your illness makes you

\textsuperscript{155} Dostoevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}, 177.
\textsuperscript{156} Dostoevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}, 317.
\textsuperscript{157} Dostoevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}, 317.
\textsuperscript{158} Dostoevsky, \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}, 318.
\textsuperscript{159} Markel frequently professes his guilt to his servants, his mother, and nature – specifically to the birds in his garden – throughout \textit{The Brothers Karamazov} 316 – 319. Later in this section, Zossima himself professes his guilt to his servant in \textit{The Brothers Karamazov} 328 – 329, a confession prompted once again by hearing birds in his garden.
talk like that.” “Mother, darling,” he would say, “there must be servants and masters, but if so I will be the servant of my servants, the same as they are to me. And another thing, mother, every one of us has sinned against all men, and I more than any.” Mother positively smiled at that, smiled through her tears. “Why, how could you have sinned against all men, more than all? Robbers and murderers have done that, but what sin have you committed yet, that you hold yourself more guilty than all?” “Mother, little heart of mine,” he said (he had begun using such strange caressing words at that time), “little heart of mine, my joy, believe me, every one is really responsible to all men for all men and for everything. I don't know how to explain it to you, but I feel it is so, painfully even. And how is it we went on then living, getting angry and not knowing?”

Markel eventually succumbed to his illness and died, leaving his mother alone with Zossima, whom she later enrolled into military school shortly before dying herself. Zossima progressed well in the military, and soon came to forget all of Markel's musings. As time carried on, Zossima found himself transforming into what he described as “a cruel, absurd, almost savage creature” with a penchant for gambling, debauchery, and inflamed passions that eventually saw him in a pistol-duel with a rival for the love of a woman. Shortly before the duel commenced, however, Zossima recalled that he beat his servant mercilessly for reasons he no longer remembers. Upon returning home that evening, he found himself “in a savage and brutal humour,” but after falling asleep and waking up only a few hours later at daybreak, he opened the window out to his garden.

160 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 317.
161 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 325.
162 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 326.
163 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 327 – 333.
164 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 328.
and was struck by a form of anxiety:

“What's the meaning of it?” I thought. “I feel in my heart as it were something vile and shameful. Is it because I am going to shed blood? No,” I thought, “I feel it's not that. Can it be that I am afraid of death, afraid of being killed? No, that's not it, that's not it at all…” And all at once I knew what it was: it was because I had beaten Afanasy the evening before! It all rose before my mind, it all was as it were repeated over again; he stood before me and I was beating him straight on the face and he was holding his arms stiffly down, his head erect, his eyes fixed upon me as though on parade. He staggered at every blow and did not even dare to raise his hands to protect himself…. I hid my face in my hands, fell on my bed and broke into a storm of tears. And then I remembered my brother Markel and what he said on his death-bed to his servants: “My dear ones, why do you wait on me, why do you love me, am I worth your waiting on me?”

Having recoiled at his anger towards his servant, Zossima recalled his brother Markel and the words that Markel had spoken years ago in his vulnerable, sick condition:

For the first time in my life this question forced itself upon me. He had said,

“Mother, my little heart, in truth we are each responsible to all for all, it's only that men don't know this. If they knew it, the world would be a paradise at once.”

“God, can that too be false?” I thought as I wept. “In truth, perhaps, I am more than all others responsible for all, a greater sinner than all men in the world.” And all at once the whole truth in its full light appeared to me; what was I going to do? I was going to kill a good, clever, noble man, who had done me no wrong, and by

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165 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 328 – 329.
depriving his wife of happiness for the rest of her life, I should be torturing and killing her too. 166

Coming to this realization, Zossima promptly apologized to his servant Afanasy, and attended the pistol-duel but refused to fire, even when he was fired upon and nearly hit. Zossima made full apologies to his dueling partner and his wife – whom he had been enthralled with – sought discharge from the military, and announced his desire to join a monastery, which he eventually did.

The concept of universal mutual responsibility makes two more important appearances throughout the course of *The Brothers Karamazov*. The first – the instance of the mysterious visitor – is contained within the memoirs of Father Zossima, while the second – the madness of Ivan Karamazov – concludes the novel itself. All the while, at the heart of Dostoevsky's recollections of the life of Father Zossima and tale of Ivan's madness lies this concept of universal mutual responsibility that can be reduced to a maxim, a paraphrase of Father Zossima's above-mentioned statement: namely, that “we are personally and individually responsible to all men for all and everything, and for all human action, both on a communal and individual scale.” And while Dostoevsky's proxy 167 of Father Zossima speaks primarily in terms of “human sinfulness,” the concept is fully immanent and present, extending beyond any sort of transcendent metaphysical corruption of humanity and the physical universe.

While this specific concept of responsibility is neither endorsed nor explored by

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166 Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, 329.
167 It should be noted that the identification of Zossima as Dostoevsky's proxy – that is, as the figure with whom Dostoevsky identifies and speaks his own position through – is not uncontroversial. While there is significant room for discussion regarding which character Dostoevsky would have most readily and intimately identified with in *The Brothers Karamazov*, this will not be a focus of this thesis.
Heidegger, strong resonances between this concept of responsibility and Heidegger's own understanding of the authentically manifested responsibility and Being-with of Dasein do exist. It shall be my position in the following sections that this distilled maxim of universal mutual responsibility ties the explored elements of Heidegger's philosophy together better than Heidegger does himself. To rephrase the above maxim for better integration into Heidegger's thought and philosophy, we might say that: Dasein is itself personally and individually responsible to all its others, and for all human action, both on a communal and individual scale. By reading this aphorism back into Heidegger's text – specifically, by reading this aphorism into the concept of Dasein's otherness, the recently ethically vacated concept of in/authenticity, the demonstrably insufficient concept of the “they,” and Dasein's solicitude – I hope to at least lay the foundation for a means by which to rethink several of Heidegger's problematic concepts, proposals, and ideas.

3.2: Rethinking in/authenticity

In light of the new question of whether or not Dasein truly claims to be its own in each and every case, a number of ways to conceive in/authenticity present themselves. One possibility is that we can continue to use the concept of in/authenticity as Heidegger has used it all along, recognizing within it some sort of inherent merit that would continue to function as a valid way of understanding Dasein as Heidegger presented it. Given that this possibility must, in some form or another, either altogether ignore or otherwise marginalize the body of critical work presented above, it is not a possibility I will take up.

Another route would be to abandon Heidegger’s concept of in/authenticity entirely, given its failure to accommodate a substantial number of phenomenal
manifestations of Dasein. While this possibility gives full recognition to my own
criticism of the limits of Heidegger’s phenomenal investigation, it misunderstands the
problem at hand. To take this route would be to abandon the beneficial aspects of
Heidegger's phenomenal findings along with those aspects of Heidegger's thought that
require further elaboration and investigation.

Yet another route would be to retain Heidegger’s concept of in/authenticity while
expanding its scope and definition to include those manifestations of Dasein that do not
claim to be their own; it is this method of investigation that I shall be pursuing throughout
the course of my attempt to begin rethinking Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity. Prior
to embarking upon this exploration, however, we will first need to better understand the
ways in which Dasein might manifest itself in cases of “authentic” otherness.

When Heidegger first introduces the concept of Dasein, he introduces it as a
phenomenon which always has a character of mineness about it. As his ontological
investigation progresses, Heidegger effectively demonstrates that Dasein’s Being is not in
each case my own, and is for the most part in the possession of the “they.” What
Heidegger maintains, however, is that Dasein continues to understand itself as being its
own: even while possessed by the “they,” Dasein maintains that it is its own. As was
demonstrated above, however, factical instances wherein Dasein ceases to claim to be its
own present themselves: in the case of religious experience and creed, in the case of
political rhetoric and theory, in the case of corporate and societal contracts, in the case of
Dasein's voluntary enjoining to its others in marriage pacts, and so forth.

As was discussed above in Chapter 2, the ethical implications of Heidegger's
concept of Dasein surround and are founded upon the idea that Dasein ought to be its
own authentic self. However, once the possibility that Dasein might not claim to be its
own is introduced, the question of whether or not Dasein ought to be its own self-
sufficient self is subsequently raised. If it is possible for Dasein to constructively
comport itself in a mode of otherness, then it is possible that Dasein, under some
circumstances, ought to be “authentically” other in the same way that Dasein, in some
circumstances and as demonstrated by Heidegger, ought to be its authentic self.

Openness to the possibility that there might be an “authentic” otherness that
Dasein makes manifest raises its own set of questions, the most important of which
involve the nature of this new sort of “authenticity,” which can no longer be exclusively
understood in terms of Dasein's mineness. Revealing Dasein's mineness as an ideal
rather than a factual persistent state of Dasein's Being creates something of a fissure in
Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity, inasmuch as the concept of in/authenticity is
primarily based upon that ideal and not its ontological state of Being. Thus, if
Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity – with all of its ethical trappings – is a concept
worth preserving, the ethical ideal will need to be rethought. To simply continue to use
Heidegger's standard of measure would neglect the new phenomenal data uncovered,
while abandoning or reversing the current concept of in/authenticity would neglect the
existing valuable phenomenal data Heidegger has already given us. Accordingly, the task
of this section will be to develop a means by which we might both preserve a concept of
in/authenticity in Heidegger's existing examples, while concomitantly making room for
the new phenomena revealed when Dasein ceases to claim to be its own.

Rather than continuing to understand Dasein's in/authenticity on the basis of the
ethical ideal of mineness, I propose that Dostoevsky's concept of universal mutual
responsibility be substituted in its stead. And rather than judging Dasein's in/authenticity on the basis of its mineness – which I suggest is neither ethically ideal nor Dasein's exclusive factual state of Being – I propose that Dasein's in/authenticity ought to be judged on whether or not Dasein manifests and/or accepts personal responsibility for its others on both a communal and individual scale. This proposal, then, would entail that Dasein be counted as authentic when it accepts and/or manifests such responsibility, while being counted as inauthentic when it neither accepts nor manifests such responsibility. I suggest that the concept of universal mutual responsibility be substituted as the ethical heart of in/authenticity for three reasons. First, universal mutual responsibility ought to be substituted because it provides a constructive alternative path that Dasein might take in its Being-with others. Second, universal mutual responsibility ought to be substituted because it provides a more reasonable explanation for Dasein's in/authentic behaviour. Finally, universal mutual responsibility ought to be substituted because it is wholly inclusive of both the new manifestations of Dasein as an entity that claims to not be its own – as explored and developed in Chapter 2 above – and Heidegger's own manifestations of Dasein as an entity that claims to be its own.

Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity is wholly dependent upon the concept of Dasein's mineness: the notion that Dasein, in each case, claims to be my own both when it genuinely and authentically is my own, and when it falsely and inauthentically is not my own. As per the above analysis, the phenomenon of Being-with is that which primarily undermines Dasein's authentic claims of mineness: while Dasein always claims to be my own, at the same time it is existentially and ontologically enjoined to others; Dasein's connection to others is a fundamental, foundational element of its Being.
inasmuch as it cannot exist without its others. And although Heidegger allows for the possibility of authentically individuated coexistence with others, for the most part Dasein inauthentically exists alongside its others, and winds up lost in the “they.”

The emergence of a form of Dasein that does not claim to be its own, however, opens up new vistas of possibilities for Dasein's Being-with others. For while Dasein as an entity that claims to be its own is, by default, ill-equipped to deal with the reality of its dependence upon others, Dasein as an entity that claims to not be its own has a semblance of this reality already at its disposal. Such a manifestation of Dasein, aware that it does not belong to itself, would bring with it an awareness of some other or others to whom it does belong. That being said, this manifestation of Dasein would by no means necessarily have a view of depending upon/belonging to all others – nationally/patriotically-other Dasein may see itself as belonging to its nation over and against all other nations, corporately-other Dasein may see itself as belonging to its company and not the competition, religiously-other Dasein may see itself as belonging to a holy-other and not to any other Dasein, and so forth. To properly come to terms with its Being-with others, Dasein would not only need to acknowledge and accept responsibility for those others that it has understood definitely and with whom it is acquainted, but would in fact need to acknowledge all of its others – those others it stands with, those others it opposes itself to, and even those others who are simply missing.168

The emergence of an other-minded instance of Dasein requires that Heidegger's enterprise of Being-with be rethought, as such an instance of Dasein would react to the existential-ontological state of Being-with very differently than an instance of Dasein that

168 Heidegger, Being and Time, 120
claimed to be its own self against the backdrop of co-dependent Being-with. While an instance of Dasein claiming to be its own seeks “distantiality” in relation to its others so as to set itself apart from them, an instance of Dasein claiming to belong to others would seek similarities in relations to others, so as to come to understand how it is the same as its others. An instance of Dasein whose mineness is a concern does not suspect that the mechanism of Being-with is at work in its world would as such have difficulty recognizing its others as definite others, while an instance of an other-minded Dasein professes some knowledge of its Being-with others in the world. In short: while those instances of Dasein that profess to be their own both balk at the idea of Being-with existentially-ontologically foundational others and require recovery from the “they,” those instances of Dasein that profess to be a part of another or a community of others already exist in a mode that is receptive to Dasein's foundational state of Being-with.

Naturally, within such a scenario, the possibility of “inauthentic” existence still presents itself as a very real possibility and pitfall, but under what conditions could such existence be called inauthentic? I would suggest that this existence could be called inauthentic upon the basis of Dasein's insufficient acknowledgement of all the others that it depends on in splitting the world of others into an inescapably divided and potentially destructive framework. Whether it be a divide between nations, companies, religions, or any other sort of group dynamic, the potential for partial and insufficient acknowledgement of one's co-dependence upon others is just as likely in that Dasein that claims to belong to others as it is in that Dasein that claims to be its own. Similarities within a group can be masks for distantiality in the way in which one group differs from another, while the act of recognizing some others as definite others does not necessitate
that Dasein will recognize all of its others as definite others. And just as those instances
of Dasein which claim to be their own authentic selves are often least so when they
loudly and adamantly claim to be so, so too is it conceivable that those instances of
Dasein which claim their interdependence with and upon others are least so when they
are at their loudest – the rally-criy of unity within a group is often made over and against
those excluded others.

This is not, of course, to say that such divisions are themselves inherently
destructive, nor is it to say that any one form of competition between such divisions is
inherently destructive. Rather, the failure to recognize responsibility to the other and co-
dependence with the other beyond these divisions, and the failure to understand all of its
others as authentic others are the destructive elements that breed inauthenticity in Dasein.
In summary, then, it might be said that, given the fact that Dasein's is constituted by its
world, and given that Dasein's world is existentially and ontologically constituted by
other, Dasein's others are responsible for Dasein. Given that Dasein existentially and
ontologically constitutes and creates the world of others for others, it can be said that
Dasein is responsible for its others. Thus, we find the existential and ontological
foundations in Heidegger for the concept of universal (the sum total of others, the others
in their Dasein-with in Dasein's “world”) mutual (both Dasein and its others have a share
in constituting one another's worlds) responsibility.169

169 While some ties between my own formulation of responsibility and the existentialist
formulation of responsibility – as exemplified especially by Sartre – may be found,
they are largely incidental. My own understanding of Dasein's responsibility differs
from Sartre's primarily in that I follow Heidegger more closely on the subject of
meaning, and its consequential implications on the subject of responsibility. That is
to say, while Sartre begins with an entity that gives meaning first to its world and
then to the world at large – and in turn, takes responsibility first for its own world
and its own sphere of “ownness,” followed by responsibility for the world at large – I
favour Heidegger's decision to begin with the world, and not with the subject within
the world. Sartre's subject remains largely separable from the world, with its own
sphere of ownness and its own responsibilities that are prior to the world; my own
If the concept of universal mutual responsibility is to be entertained as any sort of solution to the problem of in/authenticity, the question of what to do with the massive body of phenomenological data provided by Heidegger's own exegesis of and researches into Dasein must be asked. That is to say, while it is well and good to demonstrate how the concept of universal mutual responsibility might keep Heidegger's “ethical ideal” of in/authenticity alive, it remains necessary to demonstrate how this replacement structure will explain Heidegger's existing findings – and whether or not it is capable of doing so at all.

While a concept of universal mutual responsibility cannot go so far as to affirm Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity exactly as it manifests itself in *Being and Time* – namely, Heidegger's concept of in/authenticity as based upon Dasein's il/legitimate claim to mineness – it is capable of both reconciling the many symptoms of Dasein's authentic and inauthentic behaviour (as outlined by Heidegger) and providing a more believable explanation for the root cause of said symptoms. Put otherwise, the concept of universal mutual responsibility as an ethical ideal is able to create a hermeneutical space for the new phenomenological data as supplied by those instances of Dasein that claim to belong to another or a community of others while at the same time providing a potentially superior explanation for the in/authentic behaviour of those instances of Dasein that claim to be their own.

Heidegger delineates Dasein's behaviour in very distinct ways when it operates either as an authentic self or an inauthentic they-self. To this end, Heidegger draws an ontological link between Dasein's *behaviour* as an in/authentic entity and its *il/legitimate understanding of* Dasein follows Heidegger, insofar as Dasein is already in its world, with its Others, with whom the exchange of responsibility is entirely mutual.
claim to mineness, wherein an instance of Dasein that claims to be its own legitimately behaves as it does because it is its own self, while an instance of Dasein that claims to be its own illegitimately behaves as it does because it supposes to be its own self when truly it belongs to the “they.” With the ontological link between Dasein and its mineness called into question, however, it remains to be asked what becomes of this relationship between Dasein's behaviour and Dasein's state of Being; is it the case that Dasein behaves as it does because it has lost itself in the “they,” or has found itself in itself? Could the behaviour of an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others be ontologically delineated in the same way, producing the same results?

Rather than embark upon my own ontological examination of Dasein's state of Being when not claiming to be its own, I would suggest that the above-introduced concept of universal mutual responsibility – as an explicitly ethical evaluation based upon the ontological state of Dasein's Being-with – is capable of explaining Dasein's in/authentic behaviour more easily and consistently. Heidegger's own pattern of in/authentic instances of Dasein already fits well into the ethic put in place through universal mutual responsibility: authentic Dasein demonstrates an awareness of its others and a responsibility towards them, while inauthentic Dasein fails to recognize others as distinct others and is unable or unwilling to care for them properly.

The concept of universal mutual responsibility has the potential to do a better job of evaluating Dasein's variant behaviour as an in/authentic entity than Heidegger's concept of ontological mineness, if only because the way in which Dasein comports itself towards its others is primarily an ethical concern, and not an ontological one. Ontologically, an instance of Dasein that claims to be its own while truly having its
possibilities determined for it by another could simply be mistaken while conceivably
treating others quite well, while ethically an instance of Dasein that neglects those others
towards whom it is responsible is behaving unethically, regardless of its awareness of and
claims surrounding its true ontological state of Being.

The ontological state of Dasein does not sufficiently account for Dasein's
behaviour in every instance, nor is it suited to the in/authentic ideal. An ethical
foundation of some sort is required. In this case, the ethical guideline of universal mutual
responsibility covers the in/authentic behaviour delineated by Heidegger, whose authentic
Dasein is a Dasein in the role of accepting its mutual universal responsibility for others,
an acceptance that is made manifest in the way in which it behaves solicitously towards
its others, and in the way in which it seeks to rescue others from the “they.” At the same
time, the ethical guideline of universal mutual responsibility allows for additional
in/authentic judgements to be made of those instances of Dasein that claim to belong to
another or a community of others – who either draw universal mutual responsibility out
from Dasein or suppress Dasein's ability to be universally mutually responsible.

3.3: Rethinking the “they”

With the emergence of an instance of Dasein that explicitly claims to belong to another or
a community of others presenting itself, Heidegger's pair concepts of the they-self and the
“they” must be rethought and re-examined, although not necessarily abandoned in their
entirety. The existence of an other-minded instance of Dasein requires that we consider
what sort of other or group of others such an instance of Dasein might enjoin itself to, but
the existence of such an instance of Dasein by no means precludes the existence of the
instances of Dasein that follow the strictly Heideggerian model of in/authenticity: those instances of Dasein that il/legitimately claim to be their own, and are thus either their own true selves or are they-selves lost in the “they.”

With this in mind, I suggest that Heidegger's pair concepts of the they-self and the “they” ought not to be abandoned, insofar as they adequately cover those instances and manifestations of Dasein that they were intended to cover. At the same time, I suggest that these instances and manifestations of Dasein cannot account for the entire phenomenological spectrum of Dasein. Specifically, I suggest that the they-self and the “they” do not adequately account for an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others, nor do they provide a reasonable means by which we might come to understand such an instance of Dasein as a social entity. And while there may be some merit to be found in examining whether or not Dasein is capable of willingly and consciously enjoining itself to the “they,” this will not be the focus of this section. Rather, this section will be dedicated to examining a possible alternative or alternatives to the “they,” as a group or as groups that an other-minded Dasein might enjoin itself to, and the concerns that this may bring in light of the thematic proposed concept of universal mutual responsibility.

Heidegger's characterization of the “they” is predominated by themes of missing identity and a loss of responsibility. To Dasein, the “they” has no specific identity: it is composed of Dasein and its others, but “not definite others.”170 Rather, these others are “the nobody to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other.”171 As a result, when Dasein is pressed to take responsibility for its actions, it is

170 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
171 Heidegger, Being and Time, 128.
unable to do so: its “answerability” has been removed from it by the “they:”

[The “they”] can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It ‘was' always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been ‘no one.' In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one.” Thus the particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the “they.” Not only that; by thus disburdening it of its Being, the “they” accommodates Dasein if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy. And because the “they” constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its Being, the “they” retains and enhances its stubborn dominion.

The various dangers that the “they” present to Dasein thus fall into two broad categories: first, that the “they” is an entity composed of lost identities, both Dasein's lost identity – it does not know who or what it is, and its others do not know who or what it is – and the lost identity of Dasein's indefinite others, and; second, that the “they” serves as a means by which Dasein might pass off its responsibility while at the same time the “they” is incapable of actually bearing the burden of any responsibility. And while Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as a collective entity – that is, as an entity whose possibilities, determined or otherwise, have been given over to another or a community of others – does not extend too far beyond the “they” and the they-self that Dasein becomes when enjoined to the “they,” there is little or no indication throughout Being and Time that would suggest other forms and variations of a collective are not possible. Heidegger's

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172 Heidegger’s own term: see Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
own proposed resolute, authentic historical community, in fact, suggests just the opposite. The collective entity known as the “they” removes identity, is untrue about its motives, dissolves and disperses responsibility, and can be summarily addressed as the collective “nobody.” As a consequence of this, the possibility of the existence of a collective entity that supplies identity, that is forthright about its motives, addresses and accepts responsibility, and is overtly and rightly understood as a collective “somebody” remains open for exploration.

As per above, a number of such communal entities – whose possibility was alluded to by Heidegger, but left almost entirely unexplored throughout Being and Time – have already revealed themselves through those instances of Dasein that claim to belong to another or a community of others: Dasein as a patriotic or nationalistic entity seeks an identity in a nation-state and the citizenship it provides, Dasein as an otherwise political entity seeks an identity in shared sets of social expectations and the stewardship they provide, Dasein as a corporate entity seeks an identity in the company it works for and the vocation and hierarchy the company establishes, Dasein as a cultural entity seeks an identity in like-minded groups of others and the interests and lifestyles they have adopted, Dasein as a religious entity seeks an identity in shared hermeneutics of belief or faith and the purpose and intention that they provide, and so forth. For each instance of Dasein claiming to belong to another, a community of others, or any number of combinations of another or community of others – in present society, any given Dasein may find itself enjoined to any number of the above-mentioned groups and/or any

174 Dreyfus points out Heidegger's allusion to a communal “cultural” entity in Being and Time, referencing Heidegger’s discussion of science as having existence as its means of Being (Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 15, and Heidegger, Being and Time, 16).
unexplored alternatives – there is that other or community of others to which Dasein claims to belong. Dasein's claim to have a stake in another or a community of others does not end with Dasein's claim: there must be a group present that not only accepts Dasein's belonging, but also returns the identity and responsibility that Dasein has entrusted to them back to Dasein.

In seeking after such communities, the identities they supply, and the responsibilities they require, however, the pitfalls of the “they” remain. As mentioned above, Dasein in our present society is capable of claiming allegiance to many different communities across many different spectra, each with their own unique responsibilities given and identities returned, and each with its own set of – quite possibly conflicting – expectations of Dasein; it may even be said that it is much more likely that Dasein would have an identity spread across multiple communities than merely having an identity in any single one. Given the propensity for these different communities to come into conflict for any given Dasein – the conflict between “work” and “family” being an oft-lamented one – and the potentially totalizing demands of any or all of these communal spheres of existence upon Dasein – Dasein's vocation requires a level of commitment that would dissolve its family, or Dasein's family requires a level of commitment that would see Dasein released from its vocation – a conflict between Dasein's communities may well lead to “authentic” anxiety and a crisis similar to the one outlined by Heidegger. This sort of anxiety, as one of Dasein's possibilities of Being together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it – provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being. Dasein's Being reveals itself as care. If we are to work out this basic existential phenomenon, we must
distinguish it from phenomena which might be proximally identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction and urge. Care cannot be derived from these, since they themselves are founded upon it.\textsuperscript{175}

While such a crisis may be considered distinct inasmuch as it is taking place amongst communities of others that Dasein is familiar with and purposefully enjoined to, it is equally possible that Dasein might realize that its various communities have dissolved into the “they,” without centre, without location, without responsibility and without any possibility of internal resolution. Faced with this crisis, a Dasein in such a situation can act in a number of ways: it can resolve to comport itself and make its own decisions \textit{over and against} the demands of the various collectives, it can attempt to \textit{compartmentalize} itself \textit{within} the demands of the various collectives, or it can take stock of its various collectives and \textit{defer to any one or number over the other}.

The first response to the crisis is similar to Heidegger's own response to the call of conscience, wherein Dasein is called to its own decisions and possibilities and resolves to make them – “resoluteness” – over and against those decisions prescribed for it by its others – who here could either be definite others in conflict with Dasein, or the “they.” Following Caputo's description of Dasein in its resoluteness, such an instance of Dasein would find its constancy in

the "anticipatory resoluteness" which stands against the wavering of inauthenticity (the Kierkegaardian determination of the "self" as an ethicoreligious unity, a product of the freedom of repetition). Dasein is neither subject nor object; it is a resoluteness which commits itself to a course of action and abides by it. Dasein

\textsuperscript{175} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 182.
unifies itself in the unity of a projection in which it binds itself to what it has been all along.\textsuperscript{176}

Given Heidegger's existing volume of work on the possibility of Dasein in its anticipatory resoluteness, I shall not seek to add more, save to say that this option is not viable for any manifestation of Dasein that seeks identity from and participation in another or a community of others.\textsuperscript{177} This option may remain legitimate for those instances of Dasein that seek their mineness, but just as an instance of Dasein that claims its own Being and its own possibilities will find itself discontent when it discovers that its Being belongs to another, so too will an instance of Dasein that claims its Being is in the hands of another or a community of others find itself discontent when faced with the task of coming into its own possibilities 'alone.'

The second response would see Dasein attempting to understand and organize the various demands of its communal others and separate them as far as possible from one another for the purpose of minimizing the conflict between them. This conflict between the communities of others is not one that is legitimately “fought” between the various communal groups, but is rather a conflict that is “fought” with Dasein serving as both proxy for the conflict and the battleground of the conflict. Using the above example of a family-employment conflict, one would neither expect Dasein's family members to bring their demands to Dasein's vocational superiors, nor would one expect Dasein's vocational superiors to bring their demands back to Dasein's family; rather, one would expect these

\textsuperscript{176} Caputo, \textit{Radical Hermeneutics}, 84.
\textsuperscript{177} As noted above, Dasein's anticipatory resoluteness is a necessary precondition for its historicizing and cohistoricizing with Others. In this sense, anticipatory resoluteness is a very viable option for an instance of Dasein in its “otherness.” However, given my prior rejection of Heidegger's model of Dasein's authentic Being-with Others in its historicality as a viable option for modelling otherness, it will suffice here to say that Dasein's resoluteness over and against the dissonance of its various communities remains a nonviable option.

92
demands to be brought to Dasein itself. Thus, the responsibility for resolution thus falls to Dasein itself: it may find that the conflict is avoidable – a reorganization of time commitments, a rethinking of priorities, or a misunderstanding of the expectations that have been placed on it – or it may find that the conflict is unavoidable – demands are genuinely totalizing, or ethical conflicts exist between various communal groups (the religion advocates a belief that the political party disagrees with, the job requires Dasein to perform tasks that the culture frowns upon, and so forth).

Faced with the former scenario, Dasein may be able to properly compartmentalize itself while retaining full participation across its various communities of others. Faced with the latter scenario, however, Dasein will find genuine resolution to be impossible while retaining full participation across its various communities of others. As a result, if Dasein is to pursue compartmentalization, it must effectively limit its participation – and thus both its responsibility to its communities and its identity derived from its communities – in one or more of its spheres of existence. For each unresolvable conflict between separate communities of others, Dasein must itself resolve to limit participation, to decline responsibility, and to refuse identity. While this method may be feasible in doses, its direction is clear: the abject refusal of responsibility and the total loss of identity while remaining entwined with others is, as per Heidegger, to be lost in the “they.”

The third approach would see Dasein faced with a task similar to the one in the second method above, wherein it must take account of its various communities of others, but without the goal of necessary resolution between the different spheres in mind. Faced with the possibility of increased conflict, here Dasein would rather remove all
participation and identity in one community of others in a “leap of faith” than limit and erode participation and identity across the spectrum of its collectives. An ethical conflict between Dasein's political affiliations and Dasein's day job may see Dasein either removing itself from its political affiliations altogether on the one hand, or voluntarily ending its employment on the other. A widening difference in values between Dasein's culture and the family into which Dasein was born and in which Dasein was raised may see Dasein abandon its culture and stop engaging in its activities, or it may see Dasein sever all family ties. Disagreements between Dasein's religious affiliations and the nation-state it lives in may see Dasein either abandoning its religious beliefs while increasing its involvements in the cosmopolitan and patriotic affairs of Dasein's government, or it may see Dasein renounce any association with the country in which it lives in favour of a counter-culture faith community, and so forth.

In every instance, Dasein is required to account – either outright and deliberately or silently and unintentionally – for its involvement in its various communities of others, and in each case here Dasein makes a decision in favour of full participation, identity, and responsibility in one community that is inevitably made over and against all participation, identity, and responsibility returned by another or several others. In each case, Dasein's decision to abandon one community of others in favour of another community leaves Dasein with an absence, a missing identity that must be forged elsewhere, and both a different set of responsibilities and a different way in which Dasein is thus responsible to its others. In some instances, Dasein may elect to replace the community it has abandoned – a job, a political affiliation, a religious belief, family ties, and so forth – with another that is understood to not be in conflict with the community it
has prioritized, while in other instances, Dasein may elect to make up for its lost identity within that community it has prioritized and devote its entire identity to it.

It is worth noting, however, that Dasein's decision to forgo participation in any one community does not negate its responsibility to that community. Rather, it merely changes the terms of responsibility to that community, rejecting the responsibility and the terms of responsibility returned to it by the community it rejected in favour of those of the community it prioritized. For instance, abandoning one's religious community in favour of one's job does not by default negate responsibility to those within the religious community. Rather, it merely means that Dasein rejects the terms of identity and responsibility returned to it by the religious community in favour of the terms of identity and responsibility returned to it by the company it works for.

The danger of privileging one community over another is the danger of privileging one community over and against another, a phenomenon that can emerge both when Dasein has abandoned one community in favour of another – and comes to see its former community as something inherently and tragically wrong, as a “lost cause” that is best avoided altogether – and when Dasein has joined a community that already returns identity and responsibility to its members in such a way. A religious community that demonizes other religious communities as being composed of infidels (or excommunicates members of its own community on grounds of heresy), a company engaged in unfair and malicious competition with another, a nation-state that sees other nation-states as enemies to be overcome, a political party that homogenizes and slanders its opponents, and so forth, are all examples of those sorts of communities that Dasein might find itself a part of that are themselves already inauthentically bearing their
communal responsibilities to their others. In such instances, while Dasein and the community in question are authentically recognizing similar others as distinct others and returning both identity and responsibility back to them, they are in turn regarding different others as undifferentiated and homogenous – as belonging to the “they,” as it were – and not as the proper recipients of Dasein's responsibility.

Dasein's burden of universal mutual responsibility still remains across all three responses to conflicts between communities of others, whether it chooses to abandon all communal identity in favour of self-consistent decisions, whether it chooses to compartmentalize itself across all its communal identities, or whether it chooses to abandon one or more conflicting communal identities in favour of another. And across all three responses, it may take up the burden of universal mutual responsibility authentically through its identity and responsibility reforms, or it may inauthentically fail to take up the burden of universal mutual responsibility altogether, seeing its individuation as a freedom from responsibility in the first response, dissolving its communal identity and responsibility to the point where Dasein finds itself in the “they” in the second response, or taking the severance of participation in one community to mean the severance of all responsibility to that community in the third response. Dasein, in each instance, has the chance to respond either authentically or inauthentically to its others.

Dasein, manifested as a communal entity, does not in and of itself provide a solution to the problem of the “they;” it merely changes the circumstances under which the “they” might appear and the shape that the “they” takes upon appearing. Thus, while Dasein can manifest itself within a communal entity that itself bears no resemblance to the “they” – an entity that accepts and returns responsibility, an entity that returns an
identity to its members – such a community still has the potential to regard others outside itself as the “they.” Within the communal manifestations of Dasein, only those instances that accept their responsibility to others – both inside and outside the community – as a universal mutual responsibility can avoid the phenomenon of the “they” through their authentic responsibility.

3.4: Rethinking solicitude

By and large, Heidegger's concept of solicitude takes its form from his concept of in/authenticity: Dasein is sufficiently solicitous when it “leaps ahead” and returns responsibility to its other – thus furthering and affirming the other's independence – while it is deficiently solicitous when it “leaps in” and takes over responsibility for its other – thus leaving its other dependent upon it. And while Heidegger's concept of solicitude is, by his own admission, an underdeveloped concept, the themes of liberation/individuation and domination/integration emerge quite clearly. With the possibility of an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others posed, and with the concept of in/authenticity having been reformulated as a concept of universal mutual responsibility, however, the subject of Dasein's solicitude – that is, the means by which Dasein cares for its others – ought to be rethought as well, given its dependence upon Heidegger's ideal of in/authenticity and the way in which it is directed towards Dasein's sufficient, individualized existence. To that end, we must ask both how Dasein's leaping in and leaping ahead might manifest in an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others, and how Dasein's leaping in

178 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
and leaping ahead measure up against the concept of universal mutual responsibility.

Within a community of others, Heidegger's concept of Dasein leaping ahead of its others in order to return responsibility back to them remains more or less intact as a sufficient mode of solicitude. For while the end goal of this solicitude may change in a communal dynamic – where one might find Dasein's solicitude aiming towards the reconciliation of its other back into the community, rather than aiming towards the self-sufficient individuation of its other – the pattern of behaviour is largely the same. Solicitous Dasein, rather than fully taking responsibility over for the action or task of an other, assumes responsibility for the express purpose of returning that responsibility back over to its other or others.

When Heidegger's concept of Dasein's "leaping in" for another is applied to a communal dynamic, however, the question becomes more difficult. For while on an individual, Dasein by Dasein, action by action, and task by task basis, the concept of leaping in for another is difficult to justify, when Dasein is understood as an entity that is integrated into a much larger whole, the reasons for its leaping in and the effects of its leaping in change in important ways. In leaping in for another, Dasein may not return responsibility for one particular task to its other, but it may free up its other for a task the community requires, a task for which the other is more suited. In a corporate dynamic, for example, a project manager removing a trained accountant from a position involving community relations with the intention of performing that task himself or herself would not return the task of community relations back to the accountant, but the project manager may free the accountant to perform tasks he or she is more suited to. Leaping in for another and/or the larger community of others, in this case, is a leaping in as a

98
teleological substitution: Dasein takes the place of another to aid both the other and the community of others in their larger end-goals.

In leaping in for another or a community of others, Dasein may perform a task that cannot otherwise be performed. Examples of this are frequently found in the political sphere, where elected representatives take on the burden of arranging for infrastructure to be built, programs to be put in place, and systems to be set up, accomplishing large-scale tasks that would not otherwise be accomplished: politicians do not commission new power plants or reform health care systems with the goal of returning these responsibilities back to their communities, but these responsibilities are, by and large, not feasible without some measure of leaping in. In this case, leaping in for the other or the community of others takes the form of pragmatic substitution: Dasein takes the place of an other for the sake of accomplishing an otherwise unfeasible task.

In leaping in for another or several others, Dasein may perform a task that would save the other or the community of others from hardships or harm; a Dasein who puts himself or herself in front of a moving vehicle to prevent another from being struck by it does not do so with the intention or the end result of returning the responsibility of being hit by a vehicle back to the other. Here, leaping in for the other or the community of others takes the form of sacrificial substitution: Dasein takes the place of the other by sacrificing itself for the other and/or the larger community of others, performing a task with the intent of sparing the other and/or the larger community of others unnecessary hardship.

Finally, in leaping in for another or a community of others, Dasein may perform a task with the express purpose of preventing all future instances of the task. Such a case
would manifest itself in the instance of philosopher René Girard's “scapegoat effect”
described by Girard as

that strange process through which two or more people are reconciled at the expense of a third party who appears guilty or responsible for whatever ails, disturbs, or frightens the scapegoaters. They feel relieved of their tensions and they coalesce into a more harmonious group. They now have a single purpose, which is to prevent the scapegoat from harming them, by expelling and destroying him. ¹⁷⁹

Should an instance of Dasein seek to be solicitous to its others by “leaping in” in such a situation, Dasein might, as it were, take the place of the other designated for sacrifice, with the goal of putting an end to the crisis and restoring unity to the community by taking the blame of the community onto itself. This instance of leaping in for the other and the larger community of others could be called sacrificial atonement, wherein Dasein intentionally accepts blame for the actions of its community – taking responsibility for all and returning responsibility to all – for the purpose of putting an end to strife, division, and the mechanism by which such sacrifices are made in the first place.

In each above instance, some form of liberation remains present: the accountant vocationally liberated to perform a more suitable job, the community liberated to enjoy its benefits, another liberated to continue living without injury, and a community liberated to continue existing with reduced conflict and discord. So while much of Heidegger's understanding of solicitude ought to remain in tact – that is, solicitude as a means by which the other is liberated, rather than dominated – the concept of liberation itself

¹⁷⁹ Girard, The Girard Reader, 12.
cannot be viewed and evaluated on the basis of the individual, nor can it be viewed and evaluated strictly on the basis of the concept of individualization. Dasein, when manifesting itself as a communal entity, will expect to have some tasks removed from it for the express purpose of liberation in other tasks; that is to say, Dasein being dependent upon its community ought not to be equated with Dasein's being dominated by its community.

Heidegger's use of the terms “liberation” and “responsibility” to describe the desired outcome of solicitude returns us once again to the need to view the concept of solicitude as a whole against the concept of universal mutual responsibility as a means by which to evaluate such terms, given the demonstrated insufficiency of the concept of Dasein's mineness and Heidegger's understanding of in/authenticity to reconcile all instances of Dasein – specifically, those instances of Dasein that claim to belong to another or a community of others. Primarily, with the introduction of the concept of universal mutual responsibility to Heidegger's concept of solicitude, it will be necessary to see how Heidegger's own use of the concept of solicitude measures up to the concept of universal mutual responsibility.

By and large, Heidegger's own formulation of the concept of solicitude is left unharmed by the introduction of the concept of universal mutual responsibility. While Heidegger's use of solicitude is found to be somewhat lacking when viewed against a larger communal dynamic, the basic principle of his concept of solicitude – being that sufficient solicitude liberates while deficient solicitude dominates – stands. The true impact of the concept of universal mutual responsibility is not the way in which it might negate or take away from Heidegger's concept of solicitude, but is rather the way in
which Heidegger's concept of solicitude must be expanded upon in light of the idea that Dasein is responsible to all its others.

While the concept of universal mutual responsibility does not detract from the authentic individualization of Heidegger's solicitude, it expands the scope of what sorts of responsibilities must be returned back to Dasein's others, and whether or not the liberation that Dasein is performing ought to be considered authentic liberation; that is to say, simply returning responsibility to the other is not sufficient if that responsibility returned is not in keeping with Dasein's larger universal mutual responsibility. If Dasein were to leap ahead of another by performing a task that was already not in keeping with universal mutual responsibility – spreading inflammatory sectarian literature, causing harm to another, negotiating a hostile takeover, covering up a corporate scandal – the “authentic” return of that task to the other could still take the shape of leaping ahead, but would by no means be in keeping with the larger responsibilities of Dasein or the other. Or if Dasein were to leap ahead of another by performing a task that was initially either in keeping with or posing no conflict to the other's larger responsibilities but return that task as something not in keeping with universal mutual responsibility – progressing an otherwise legitimate business contract with illegal deals, deciding upon a political stance with demonizing statements, resolving an interpersonal conflict through violent means – then Dasein's leaping ahead of its other to return responsibility back to its other is equally short-sighted, given the larger responsibilities of both Dasein and its other.

Heidegger's concept of solicitude is largely in tune with universal mutual responsibility inasmuch as it demands that Dasein seek to liberate its others, and not dominate its others. At the same time, however, it is fundamentally incomplete,
inasmuch as his task of solicitude fails to recognize the larger scope of Dasein's responsibility: that is, Dasein's responsibility to all of its others, and not simply that particular other or community of others that it is presently engaged with. Any instance of Dasein that recognizes the larger task of universal mutual responsibility has the means for sufficient solicitude at its disposal, while any instance of Dasein that is unaware of its universal responsibilities or has rejected its universal responsibilities risks liberating its others at the expense of the domination of different others.
Conclusion

Throughout *Being and Time*, Heidegger consistently surveys Dasein, both in its everydayness and in those special and particular modes where it abandons its everyday they-self and assumes the mantle and the mode of the authentic self. However, while Dasein as it manifests and comports itself within its world has been considered, Heidegger often misses an opportunity to hear what Dasein itself claims to be in a great many cases, both in its everydayness and in its special modes. Seeing Dasein in each instance as an entity that claims to be its own, Heidegger overlooks those contrary instances where Dasein claims that it is not its own: where it claims that it belongs to another, several others, an entire community of others, or that it is constituted across a vast array of interacting others and communities of others.

As has been stated above, Heidegger's overall project throughout the course of *Being and Time* is by no means an attempt to come to a full and complete understanding of the self, to come to a complete understanding of in/authenticity or Dasein's solicitude, nor to by any means provide an ethical foundation by which the self might know how or how not to comport itself. Rather, Heidegger's overall goal is to develop a concrete and ontological answer to the question of the meaning of Being. Given that this study has been solely and specifically focused upon Heidegger's understanding of the self throughout *Being and Time*, it is by no means qualified to pass judgement on whether or not Heidegger was successful in his larger goals. Rather, this study is only able to make some determination as to whether or not Heidegger's concept of the self as manifested
throughout *Being and Time* is problematic, and if so, what problems it presents and what solutions might be implemented. This study has, in a sense, effectively and intentionally missed the point of the overall project of *Being and Time*, examining concepts and propositions not as they serve within the larger context of the project of the meaning of Being, but rather for their own merit. In effect, this study is posing a set of questions to the text of *Being in Time* that it does not intend – and may not be qualified – to answer.

In removing Heidegger's concept of the self from its “ready-to-hand” contextual place within the text of *Being and Time* and in posing new questions and problems to it, however, some beneficial results might follow. While Heidegger may have neither appreciated nor agreed with the act of making his concepts present to themselves outside of their textual place, or posing ethical dilemmas to an intentionally and exclusively ontological work, doing so allows one the opportunity to see these concepts in a new light and to evaluate them in a way that could not have been done while these concepts remained in the service of the larger question of the meaning of Being. That is to say, while these concepts may reveal a sort of sense and coherency within a larger scheme, leaving them out to hang for a bit\(^\text{180}\) affords us the opportunity to check for an otherwise occult – or hidden – incoherence.

Posing a problem or making a single adjustment to any one of the interconnected nature of the concepts throughout *Being and Time* affects the work as a whole. As demonstrated above, for example, posing the possibility of an instance of Dasein that claims to belong to another or a community of others affected the way in which

\footnotetext{180 The image of suffocating a philosophical concept belongs primarily to Caputo, who speaks of Heidegger hanging the concept of Being as presence while resisting the urge to cut it down when it turned a little blue (Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics*, 1 - 2).}
in/authenticity, the “they,” and solicitude had to be read – alongside any possible number of equally interrelated concepts that were not specifically dealt with in this study. By removing Heidegger's concept of Dasein from its contextual place in *Being and Time*, an opportunity was afforded by which we could bring to light an otherwise hidden incoherence – both with the concept itself and with those concepts dependent upon it – and survey a number of phenomenal manifestations and philosophical opportunities that Heidegger overlooks.

In missing the possibility of an instance of Dasein patterned by otherness, Heidegger misses an opportunity to come to understand Dasein in its otherness as potentially authentic Being whose possibilities have not been covertly usurped by the nebulus “they,” but whose possibilities have been willingly handed over to its others in return for an identity and a solicitous responsibility. In watching Dasein lose its Being while Being-with others, Heidegger fails to see a chance by which instances of Dasein might repossess and reinterpret their Being while Being-with others. And in watching Dasein lose its sense of responsibility when enjoined to its inauthentic others, Heidegger fails to see instances of Dasein regaining their sense of responsibility for their others – a duty of Dasein that must perhaps be understood ethically in order to be thought of as imperative, a duty of Dasein that both finds its roots in Heidegger's ontological project while at the same time judging Heidegger's ontological project, and a duty of Dasein that calls it to responsibility for all and to all.
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