

PRINCE ALBERT'S CRIME/RISK REDUCTION  
APPROACH TO COMMUNITY SAFETY

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

Police Studies

University of Regina

By

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Regina, Saskatchewan

October 14, 2016

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## **Abstract**

Faced with escalating crime rates and increasing demands for services the Prince Albert Police Service led a mobilization effort to implement a crime/risk reduction strategy called Community Mobilization Prince Albert (CMPA). The study examines the evolution of crime prevention practices from police-based efforts that relied on focused enforcement practices to the current risk reduction model. This research examines the outcomes of crime prevention efforts and their results on reducing crime and social disorder after the implementation of the CMPA in 2011.

In terms of methodology, two strategies were used. First, a pre-and post-implementation strategy was used to examine whether changes in levels of crime as well as calls for service declined during the period of the study. The analyses revealed that the CMPA resulted in reduced rates of violent, property and other crimes during the four years after implementation of CMPA along with a reduction in calls for service for acts against the public order such as loud parties. Second, an examination of whether the costs of crime to society decreased after the implementation of the CMPA was carried out. Those analyses indicated that overall savings to society were realized after the implementation of the CMPA, although that finding was sensitive to the era being studied. Given those findings, a number of implications for policy, practice, and future research are presented.

*Keywords: Community Mobilization, Proactive Policing, Costs of Crime, Police Calls for Service.*

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to express my sincere thanks to Rick Ruddell who mentored me through this thesis. As well, I extend my gratitude to the members of the committee, Drs. Nick Jones and John Winterdyk for their guidance and thought provoking insight.

I would also like to formally acknowledge the support and cooperation of the Prince Albert Police Service. Former Chief Dale McFee and present Chief Troy Cooper cooperated extensively by permitting Tony Hon to release crime statistics and information. Tony Hon accommodated each request for information and undertook additional work on my behalf in order to provide timely answers to my inquiries for information.

I would also like to thank Dale McFee, currently the Deputy Minister of Corrections and Policing for Saskatchewan. Dale was the genesis of CMPA and he sparked my interest in conducting research into this innovative approach to crime reduction. I would also like to thank the HUB committee. During the initial stages of the CMPA, I had the privilege of watching this very dedicated group of professionals in action. Their commitment to their roles, their ability to assess risk and their commitment to their community and this crime reduction project is remarkable.

Last, thanks to my spouse Karen and my adult children, Jeff and Raeane. They encouraged me to complete my post-graduate studies.

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to my family for their strong encouragement, especially during the research and writing stages of this thesis.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.1 Introduction

This research examines the outcomes of a community mobilization model that was developed to reduce levels of crime and social disorder in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. This approach, formally introduced in 2011, emerged as a partnership between the Prince Albert Police Service (PAPS) and a number of local stakeholder groups, including representatives from health, education, and social service agencies. The approach to community mobilization was developed after a realization that the police, by themselves, could not manage the growing demands for service and escalating crime. This led the administration of PAPS to both examine its internal operations as well as conduct a global search for promising crime reduction practices.

In terms of examining its operations, during 2008 and 2009, the PAPS tracked its calls for service (e.g., 911 calls) and estimated that with the increasing public demand year over year, coupled with increasing crime rates, the police service would have to continue to hire more police officers to respond to the calls for service and manage the rising rates of offending (Prince Albert Police Service, 2013). Police chief Dale McFee stated that he could not hire enough police officers to keep up with the escalating demand for service although also acknowledging that many of the calls for service were related to social problems and not directly related to crime (McFee & Taylor, 2014). The following sections describe the challenges of responding to crime and disorder in Prince Albert using traditional police responses.

## **1.2 Crime in Prince Albert**

In order to fully understand the situation in Prince Albert that led to the development of the Community Mobilization Prince Albert (CMPA), it is necessary to provide an overview of the conditions within the community with a specific focus on the geographical and demographic characteristics of the city, which is followed by an overview of the crime and social disorder challenges as they existed in the city in the years leading up to the development of the community mobilization model. There are, for example, a number of factors that make the community of Prince Albert unique in the province. Prince Albert is situated near the center of the province and because of its geographical location is often referred to as a “gateway” city to the north. As a gateway city, Prince Albert has a number of commercial and charter services that fly into northern communities bringing passengers and goods into many distant and remote locations. Several major highway routes also intersect at Prince Albert and travelers can go to various points in the north through the city. Unfortunately, this also means that Prince Albert is the major thoroughfare for the movement of illegal drugs, alcohol and other contraband or illicit goods between southern and northern communities and with this activity, comes higher levels of crime, addictions and other forms of social disorder. Many of the northern communities that “feed” into Prince Albert, such as La Ronge, also have very high levels of police-reported property and violent crime (see: Allen & Perreault, 2015).

One of the distinctive aspects of responses to crime in Prince Albert was that a high proportion of arrests were of individuals who were not community residents. McFee and Taylor (2014) report that upwards of 40% of arrestees were from out-of-town, which

is many times the proportion in similar sized Saskatchewan communities, such as Moose Jaw. McFee and Taylor (2014) also note that the number of arrests between 1999 and 2008 increased by 128% with numbers projected to go higher in future years, while the population remained relatively stable. The reality of the impact on service providers in the city was demand for services that would be consistent with cities with a population of 60,000 rather than 40,000 residents (McFee & Taylor, 2014).

Not only was the PAPS experiencing an increasing demand on its services, but high levels of antisocial behaviour and crime also had a corrosive impact upon the educational, health, and social service systems: students were truant and having difficulties adjusting to school, the local emergency room was dealing with a growing number of injuries related to substance abuse and assaults, and an increasing number of children were being apprehended from their families by social service agencies (CMPA, 2012).


Not all disorder within a community requires a police response. Skogan (2012) states disorder ranges from that which is clearly criminal to behaviour that may simply be an annoyance. Criminal activities include offences such as robbery, prostitution and drug trafficking while forms of social disorder include behaviours such as littering or other non-serious, but disruptive behaviours, such as noisy groups of youth congregating in public areas. Despite the fact that social disorder represents relatively minor acts, it can contribute to neighbourhood instability, citizen fear of crime, and decreased quality of life (Gill et al., 2012), that are cornerstones of the social disorganization approach (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Cotter (2016, p. 5) identifies two types of disorder: physical, such as things that can be seen (e.g., litter, abandoned vehicles in yards, graffiti) and social,

which might include groups of youth being noisy, loud parties, individuals who are drunk in public, or people dealing drugs in the streets.

Ruddell and Jones (2014, p. 43) report that one of the challenges in responding to social disorder is that while a police response is not necessarily required citizens often call the police to deal with these acts. Similarly, not all calls for service in Prince Albert required a formal police response. In the business case for the establishment of CMPA (2010) it was reported that alternatives in Prince Albert were explored, including coordinated multi-agency responses. Skogan (2012) observes that “Disorder independently but always in tandem with other conventional crime, plays a role in determining the stability of urban neighbourhoods, undercutting natural processes of informal social control, discouraging investment, and stimulating fear of crime” (p. 187). When informal social control breaks down, there is a corresponding need for more formal social control, such as the police responding to restore order (Skogan, 2012).

There are a number of factors that might explain higher levels of crime and disorder in Prince Albert. The proximity of the city to the north creates challenges for service delivery and public safety issues that do not exist in other Saskatchewan communities. Because of its location as the major community accessible to the north, it has a high population of transient non-permanent residents that move between northern communities and Prince Albert (Solar North Systems, 2011). The city is also a preferred point of travel for northerners who come to Prince Albert for shopping, recreation as well as personal reasons, such as visiting with relatives. The city has a number of major businesses, shopping, and amenities unavailable to many northern residents. Prince

Albert is also an attractive travel destination for commercial and recreational travel for non-northerners such as hunters and fishers (Tourism Saskatchewan, 2016).



Being a gateway city and major access and travel point, Prince Albert has high rates of crime and the related social disorder that often accompanies crime. In 2009, according to Statistics Canada (2013), Prince Albert scored 265.56 on the Violent Crime Severity Index<sup>1</sup> (V/CSI) and 217.65 on the overall Crime Severity Index (CSI), compared to Saskatchewan V/CSI value of 155.23 and 148.15 for the CSI. The crime indices for 2010, months before the CMPA was introduced, were 255.26 for the V/CSI and 216.51 for the CSI, which was well above the Saskatchewan average (153.91 and 148.15 respectively). These totals were much higher than the national average of 87.9 and 93.7 for 2009 and they are presented in Figure 1.1, which was prior to the implementation of

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1. According to Statistics Canada (2013, p. 7) “The Crime Severity Index measures the changes in severity of crime in Canada from year to year. In the Index, all crimes are assigned a weight based on their seriousness. The level of seriousness is based on actual sentences handed down by the courts in all provinces and territories. More serious offences have a greater impact on changes to the index.”

the CMPA. According to Statistics Canada (2013), the CSI is calculated using incidents of police-reported crime through the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR). This data is provided to Statistics Canada by municipal, provincial, regional and RCMP police agencies.

Police calls for service in Prince Albert for the years prior to 2011 continued to rise at an increasing rate and conventional police and community responses to these offences were becoming unsustainable. Many of these calls were not crime related but rather ones related to social disorder. The police service conducted a study in 2008 and determined that only 24% of calls to the police were actually ones that required a police response; the other 76% were categorized as social disorder type calls (PAPS, 2008). In other words, although the police may have responded, the underlying root cause of the issue may have been one of addictions due to drug or alcohol abuse, relationship issues or some other problem that could be handled better by staff members working in a social service agency, community-based agencies that specialize in specific social problems (e.g., family violence) or addiction services provided through health agencies. The years 2007, 2008 and 2009, saw overall increases of 2.5%, 4.5% and 6.2% respectively in these calls, although the population remained relatively stable during that same era (Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, 2015).

Similarly, crimes of violence rose 27.1% between 2008 and 2009 and 6.2% the following year. The PAPS also gathers and reports statistics on general victimization and specific victimization for violent offences. In 2008, victimization for all occurrences rose by 3.8% and for offences against persons, by 4%. In 2009, general victimization increased by 13.3% and specific victimization for violence was 17.8% with the

proportions being 9.3% and 4.5% respectively for 2010. Additionally, overall calls for service to the police rose in the years 2008, 2009, 2010 by 39.9%, 21.4% and 3.8% (PAPS, 2010).

Although police statistics from the UCR provide one form of measuring crime, Canada has another source of national data on crime; the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS (Victimization) is administered every five years to a sample of Canadians aged 15 years and older, and asks respondents about whether they had been victimized and if those crimes were reported to the police. Although the GSS does not ask respondents about all crimes, it does provide an overview of victimization and includes a number of major offences, such as: assault, robbery, motor vehicle theft, and mischief. As a result, the GSS really counts the offences for which the public feels most at-risk or fearful. One of the major benefits of the GSS is that it captures information on victimization and crimes that are “not reported to the police” and thus gives us a better understanding of the true levels of criminal activities at the provincial or national levels. The last GSS (victimization) report was completed in 2014 and released in 2015. The results of the 2014 study reveals there has been a 10% reduction in violent incidents since 2004 (Perreault, 2015, p.5) and the current rate of violent incidents at 76 per 100,000 residents nationally. The province of Saskatchewan was considerably higher than the national average with a victimization incident rate of 180 per 100,000 residents. One limitation of the GSS, however, is that it does not provide specific information for individual cities of less than 100,000 residents, such as Prince Albert.

While the results of the GSS show that national-level victimization rates have declined between 2004 and 2015, these studies also reveal that a considerable amount of

victimization is never reported to the police. Therefore, these offences are not handled by the formal justice system and do not appear in the UCR statistical reports. Some criminologists refer to the differences between crimes reported to the police and those that go unreported by victims as “the dark figure of crime” (Biderman & Reiss, 1967). For example, according to Perreault (2015, p. 3), in 2014, “just under one-third (31%) of criminal incidents were reported to the police.” The reasons cited in the report for individuals not reporting their victimization are many and complex. In some instances victims lack confidence in the justice system, the crime was a personal matter, while some may be afraid to report victimization, or may simply feel the incident is simply not important enough to make a formal complaint to the police (Perreault, 2015, p. 20).

There is some controversy about whether crimes reported to the police are a very accurate indicator of criminality in a community. For example, Moulton (2012) asserts that many crimes are not discovered or brought before the courts due to the limited capacity of the justice system to manage the true extent of crime. He says there is a disconnection between crime statistic reporting in the UCR and the actual rates of victimization in Canada. As mentioned above, the UCR statistics clearly show a downward trend of crime since 1992. When examining the results of the 2009 GSS, Moulton (2012) notes that since 1999, violent crime victimization has climbed 6.3%, rates of household victimization have increased 8.7% and the theft of personal property increased 44%. It would appear that the UCR and GSS reports, both published by CCJS, appear to be somewhat contradictory, thus making it important to examine more than one source of data. However, Moulton (2012) explains that the findings of both studies are important to understanding the full extent of crime:

While it would seem impossible that both the police reported crime statistics downward trend and victimization study of statistics showing an upward trend can both be accurate the funnel theory provides a coherent explanation of the concurrent validity of both sets of statistics. (p. 222)

In explaining the funnel theory, Moulton (2012) posits that because the Canadian criminal justice system is limited in its capacity to respond to all crimes occurring, it does not confront the actual level of offending. As a result many offences are not being addressed by the formal justice system and are therefore not recorded by the police nor reported in the UCR. Moulton suggests the onerous reporting requirements on the police, the failure of the justice system to make full use of digital technology, court decisions that have impacted the ability of the Crown to successfully prosecute cases, and the limited capacity of the courts to deal with the true volume of crime as reasons why actual levels of crime are under reported. As a result, although the UCR statistics for Prince Albert show an increasing crime severity in the years preceding the CMPA implementation in February 2011, according to Perreault (2015) and Moulton (2012) the actual rates of offending were likely much higher than reported. In fact, anecdotal accounts suggest that human service providers and the police in Prince Albert were challenged to manage the demands for services to victims (Nilson, 2014).

In 2013, there were 80 municipal Prince Albert police officers serving a community of approximately 43,000 residents, or 1.86 officers per 1,000 community residents. This compares with 2.08 per 1,000 residents for the entire province of Saskatchewan, or 1.97 for the entire nation for the same year (Hutchins, 2014). As a result, despite the fact that the overall and violent crime severity in Prince Albert was

much more than the provincial or national averages they had fewer officers to confront these challenges. By the end of 2014 the PAPS had an authorized strength of 92 sworn officers (PAPS, 2015, p. 7), which works out to 2.14 officers per 1,000 residents (PAPS, 2015).

Altogether, the demands for health and addiction services, social services and policing in Prince Albert showed no signs of ending. In a report prepared for the Deputy Minister of Corrections, Public Safety and Policing, Taylor (2010) describes a number of indicators of the province's wellness, crime severity and fear of crime. Taylor (2010) advises that a large proportion of crimes can be associated with the province's growing "at-risk" marginalized Aboriginal population, and observes that:

The staggering economic, health, education and substance abuse statistics in aboriginal Communities, especially in the more remote areas of the province quite obviously place a significant number of the province's residents at risk among the standard determinants of criminality. These same factors render others highly vulnerable to victimization, especially, aboriginal women. Many of these same prevailing conditions and risk factors are widely out of step with similar indicators across the province's non-aboriginal population... While overall crime severity rates are generally decreasing across Canada and Saskatchewan, crime severity indicators in Regina, Saskatoon and Prince Albert reflect increasingly violent behaviour among young offenders and a continued and dramatic rise in arrests related to intoxication and substance abuse... For example, of total persons arrested in Prince Albert last year, almost 40% were not residents of the city. (pp. 11-13)

As noted by Taylor (2010) the reality of this growing at-risk population, faced with increasingly unsustainable demands on resources, the community of Prince Albert was facing a crisis.

### **1.3 Community Mobilization**

It was the practice of seeking solutions to reduce crime and offending that led Prince Albert Police Chief Dale McFee to examine different strategies to reduce social disorder and crime. Looking to mobilize community stakeholders to address the crime problem, he began leading a series of meetings with the leaders of health, education, and social service agencies in an attempt to find a solution. McFee looked for strategic alliances of resources and partners who were interested in finding a solution to community problems. He met with local senior human service agency officials and was elected to the local health board. Electing McFee to the board provided an opportunity to engage officials from the Ministry of Health on issues related to mental health and addictions, which are factors that contribute to offending and social disorder.

In searching for options for Prince Albert, McFee learned that in Glasgow, Scotland a preventative approach to crime reduction was showing success. This approach involved community service agencies focusing their efforts on at-risk individuals from marginalized populations. Rather than using an incident-driven intervention model, the approach was one of risk reduction. Community Safety Glasgow (CSG)<sup>2</sup> is a partnership of service agencies dedicated to creating a safer community. The

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<sup>2</sup> Community Safety Glasgow was expanded and restructured as a result of the Christie Report (2011) that was commissioned to conduct community consultations, receive submissions from special interest groups and hear community representations regarding crime. Recommendations from the report focused on the achievement of community safety through enhanced partnerships of service agencies.

fundamental concept for CSG, which was introduced in 2009, was to work toward public safety by forming partnerships with human service agencies. Rather than being strictly reactive, an intelligence led approach became a core practice and reduced the likelihood agencies would work in a fragmented and reactive manner. Intelligence led practice moved agencies away from disjointed interventions but promoted information sharing through protocols that reduced bureaucracy in order to improve service delivery to clients. Staff within the participating agencies began working with a range of stakeholders that included elected officials, community planners, the leaders of housing and social welfare agencies, alcohol and substance abuse workers and various bylaw enforcement managers (Community Safety Glasgow, 2014).

CSG promoted early intervention and integrated problem-solving as pillars of its approach to community safety. Its problem-solving model included looking at the victim, the location of the offence along with the characteristics of the offender. This method assumes that these three elements are inextricably linked and each element must be addressed as part of the problem-solving approach. Intelligence led problem-solving meant examining a broad base of issues across the community. This strategy included the identification of individuals involved in antisocial behaviour and identifying and addressing gaps in human service delivery. The collaborative outlook enabled CSG to foster broad partnerships by sharing information, enabling agencies to coordinate strategic priorities and service delivery (Community Safety Glasgow, 2014). In terms of success, CSG (2015) reports a crime reduction between 2004/05 and 2014/15 of 12% for domestic abuse incidents, 38% for overall violent crime, 41% for anti-social behaviour (ABS) and 49% for ABS incidents.

Through its partnership efforts, CSG has been able to address gaps in service delivery by agencies to address risk, remove high-level offenders from the streets and develop intervention services to support the reintegration of offenders into the community. Chief McFee and a number of stakeholders visited Scotland in 2009 to examine the CSG practices. That trip, in turn, led to discussions involving Prince Albert communities and stakeholders and the eventual formal introduction of CMPA in 2011 as a crime reduction strategy.

For years, crime prevention practitioners, agencies, government officials and researchers have discussed crime reduction by focusing broadly on societal risks such as inadequate parenting, poverty, illiteracy and educational failure. The approach taken by CSG, on the other hand, was distinctive in that it looked at specific at-risk individuals and/or families and integrated efforts to provide services that addressed their unmet needs and reduced their risks. Conceptually, this changes the nature of interventions from a broad focus on an entire community with specific programs, to the identification of specific risk categories which enables agency managers to direct their efforts more efficiently. Yet, there may also be some limitations with this approach, including the possibility that some populations, already marginalized, will be subject to more scrutiny (see Chapter 2).

#### **1.4 Significance of the Current Study**

Police and community safety practices have undergone significant changes in the past two decades. These changes have included moving from reactive police practices designed to apprehend offenders committing crimes, to targeting specific high crime areas and/or prolific offenders, or the use of community-based resources that target at-

risk groups and crimes using community policing approaches (Jamieson, 2008; Telep & Weisburd, 2011). Each of these programs has met with varying degrees of success. The success of these approaches depends somewhat upon the implementation of these interventions, and includes the individuals who championed these changes, the resources available for the interventions, as well as when and where they were introduced.

This study evaluates the risk-reduction approach to community safety that was introduced in Prince Albert. If the efficacy of this model can be validated these interventions may be replicated in other communities. Although Canadian police services have engaged in partnerships with community agencies in the past, the CMPA approach is a more formalized and long-term approach. The CMPA also steps more aggressively into involvement with individuals and families in situations of elevated risk by intervening early and providing a full range of services to meet their unmet needs. If by focusing crime prevention and reduction efforts on at-risk individuals brings about a sustainable reduction in crime, it will shift the paradigm from reactive suppression and intervention efforts, to one of identifying at-risk individuals early so interventions can be provided to prevent recidivism and perhaps, even offending in the first instance. If this approach is successful, future crime prevention programs might be designed to identify and address risky behaviours in at-risk individuals and families as opposed to responding to offenders in a purely reactive manner. A reduction in criminality results in less crime and victimization, and all of the direct and indirect costs associated with victimization (Easton et al., 2014, p. 96)

If the CMPA is indeed effective, the positive impacts for policing and community social service agencies would be considerable. Although the core functions of police to

investigate and respond to crime would remain, more resources could be dedicated to working in concert with other agencies in the identification of at-risk individuals and appropriate interventions carried out. Early analysis of overall crime and calls for service in Prince Albert shows promise that this approach may in fact lead to crime reduction (Nilson, 2014). This research examines the CMPA approach to community safety and crime reduction to determine whether this approach is a successful crime reduction strategy. As communities continue to seek ways to manage and reduce crime and offending, replication and application of the principles of CMPA may be helpful in addressing their specific needs. Examination of measures of crime, health, and social data will determine if this approach reduces antisocial behaviour and crime.

### **1.5 Research Questions**

After reviewing the extant literature on policing, theories of social disorganization, and community-based mobilization models, the following two research questions were developed:

1. What was the impact of the 2011 introduction of the CMPA on the following social issues in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan?
  - a. Police-reported crime rates (e.g., specific offences such as break, enter, and theft)
  - b. Police calls for service for non-criminal acts (e.g., antisocial behaviour and disorder)
2. Did the introduction of the CMPA reduce the costs of crime in Prince Albert?

Answering these questions will shed light on the efficacy of community mobilization approaches to reducing crime and social disorder, and the economic benefits of those efforts.

## **1.6 Summary and Conclusions**

This Chapter provides a brief overview of the conditions that led to the development of the community mobilization program in Prince Albert Saskatchewan that was championed by the PAPS. In addition, a short description of the contextual conditions in Prince Albert was presented. An overview of the community mobilization program was provided, as well as the rationale for this study and the research questions that guide the thesis.

In terms of the remainder of the thesis, Chapter two presents a comprehensive description of the community mobilization model, and a full description of how this approach was introduced in Prince Albert in 2011. The third Chapter provides an overview of social disorganization theory and how that theoretical approach can inform efforts at community mobilization. In addition, a number of theories of police organization and approaches are also introduced to shed light on how these practices are currently evolving into more proactive models of crime reduction. In Chapter four the types of data used in this study are described and the analytical strategies used to examine those indicators. This is followed by the results which are presented in Chapter five. Implications for policy, practice, and further research are highlighted in Chapter six.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Community Mobilization Prince Albert**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an overview of the community mobilization model that was formally introduced in Prince Albert in 2011. In the pages that follow, the multi-agency approach adopted by Prince Albert is discussed in detail. The genesis for the Prince Albert model was on a similar approach adopted in Scotland; however, the Prince Albert model is specifically adapted to meet the specific needs of the community partners and at-risk populations. This chapter describes the process that led to the development and funding of the CMPA with an emphasis on its long-term goals. An overview of the operational component and composition of this approach is described with an emphasis on the operational aspects. Further, the model that was adapted for governance of the CMPA is followed by a description of the types of cases brought for resolution.

#### **2.2 Community Mobilization Prince Albert (CMPA) Model**

CMPA is an integrated multi-agency committee that has a goal of building safer and healthier communities by enhancing the delivery and responsiveness of human service agencies. The goal of these interventions is to target at-risk individuals and families with the greatest number of unmet needs. That goal is accomplished by mobilizing community resources to address cases with elevated levels of risk as recognized and identified by service providers. Although reducing risk is one goal, the committee also has a broader focus on creating a healthier community over the long-term. The mission statement as outlined by CMPA (2012) is as follows:

Community Mobilization Prince Albert (CMPA) has the vision that Prince Albert and region will achieve dramatic and ongoing reductions in the levels of crime and victimization. Our individual citizens and families at risk will gain the supports they need to build positive and healthy lives, our young people will grow and be educated in environments free from fear and risk, and our businesses will operate in a safe and positive marketplace. CMPA is an effective, integrated multi-agency team, building safer and healthier communities, reducing crime and victimization; accomplished through the mobilization of existing resources to address individuals/families with acutely elevated levels of risk as recognized across a range of service providers, a broader focus on long-term community goals and initiatives, and possible systemic recommendations arrived at via experience, research and analysis. CMPA is carrying out its mission by two key components: The HUB discussion and the Center of Responsibility (COR). The HUB discussion focuses on providing immediate responses to acutely elevated risk as expediently as possible; typically within 24 to 48 or 72 hours. The COR in support of the HUB is a full time centre for research, analysis, and long-term solutions to systemic issues, and root causes of social problems. (p. 6)

In its business case presented to the Saskatchewan Ministry of Corrections, Public Safety and Policing in early 2010, the Executive Director of CMPA defined the goals for the program as identification of at-risk individuals and families and a cross-sector, community-based approach to reducing their risk. Through the active involvement of the

partners the highest risk cases are identified and provided with interventions and services that are designed to reduce their risk.

CMPA (2012) outlines its vision that Prince Albert and the surrounding region will achieve reductions in the levels of crime and victimization through this multi-agency partnership. In its vision, individual citizens and families at-risk are provided with the supports they need to build positive and healthy lives, young people will grow and be educated in environments free from fear and risk, and businesses will operate in a safe and positive environment. In order to achieve these goals, CMPA operates under the proposition that crime is a complex and entrenched social problem and that no one agency has all of the resources or expertise to effectively respond to the social issues facing the Prince Albert region in particular, northern Saskatchewan, more broadly.

Many of the families and individuals with the highest needs for intervention are often the least likely to access the services they need (Nilson, 2014). This may be based on their perceptions that many parts of the system appear to be more oriented toward enforcement, and the staff of these agencies less concerned about the supports their clients need. As part of their vision, the staff members employed within these agencies see themselves as working collectively and collaboratively in a concentrated effort to undertake systemic change. Solutions to facilitate this change may range from responding to an individual or family's unmet needs to holistic community needs that are often rooted in economic deprivation (CMPA, 2012). The committee believes that by enhancing both the effectiveness and responsiveness of human services, its work will build safer and healthier individuals, families, neighbourhoods, businesses, schools and

community. The committee views the evolving forecasts as a “call to action” that requires time, information sharing and access to resources (CMPA, 2012).

More broadly, over the long-term, the CMPA business plan predicts seven key community benefits will result from the multi-agency work. According to Nilson (2014) those seven benefits include:

- diverse resources focused on the issue at hand;
- protective and efficient service delivery;
- better follow-up directed towards long-term change;
- enhanced frontline working relationships between agencies;
- service delivery that is focused on problems and not on ownership of the problems;
- information and expertise sharing geared towards long-term system needs; and,
- modeling emerging trends on a variety of evidence-based models in crime reduction and overall community safety and wellness. (p. 30)

Although the model selected for Prince Albert was viewed as the most appropriate model for intervention, Gilling (1999) offers a critique of crime prevention approaches, where specific communities are targeted for enforcement or prevention. He states the situational approach, which involved targeting high crime areas, has given way to crime prevention through various types of partnerships. Gilling (1999) notes that an intervention model which can be characterized as “a consensual social approach” could be considered by some people as being soft on crime because it is seen as moving to a model that ties community safety and crime control together, bypassing traditional crime control methods (p. 4). Further, he observes the possibility of marginalization of affected

families as a concern. Since crime control programs are focused in high crime areas (situational), he cautions that partnership methods may be viewed as a simple redistribution of welfare combined with community development. Gilling says this approach may be forced upon neighbourhoods due to external concerns from business or government agencies rather than concerns from within the neighbourhood. Further, Gilling (1999) points out that under this approach behaviour that was once considered pre-delinquent may now be considered as anti-social because of the perceptions of the partners as the focus on crime prevention becomes individual as opposed to situational (pp. 8-9).

These cautions posed by Gilling (1999) are worthy of note. Although the practical risk-reduction approach taken by CMPA does not have its focus on any individual neighbourhood, it does have its focus on individual(s) and family behaviour. However, there is a notable difference from the concerns expressed by Gilling (1999) and the CMPA model. The individuals and families being served by CMPA are determined by the committee to be at a stage of acutely elevated risk and services provided to the individual or family are short-term and consensual. The approach taken by CMPA is intended to minimize the possibility of further marginalization.

### **2.3 Origins of the CMPA in Scotland**

The HUB model adopted by CMPA is rooted in the Community Safety Glasgow (CSG) approach that was introduced to tackle community safety issues that were similar to those occurring in Prince Albert. Although some informal interventions with high risk families or individuals were made in 2010 due to escalating criminal activity, the HUB was formalized in February, 2011. In November, 2010 a group from Prince Albert that

included representatives from police, government and community agencies visited Glasgow. The visit was intended to examine, learn and compare similarities between Glasgow and Prince Albert to determine if such a model could be introduced in Saskatchewan.

The group found that many similarities existed between Glasgow and Prince Albert. Glasgow, for example, was faced with high rates of violent crime, marginalization and youth offending. Furthermore, the social problems were very similar in that both communities had high rates of substance abuse, poverty, a lack of employment opportunities, and high rates of educational failure. In effort to reduce violence and enhance community safety, Glasgow officials created a multi-agency approach to reducing crime. This committee identified and implemented the following four strategic objectives:

1. Improve Community Safety.
2. Support victims of gender-based violence.
3. Reduce environmental incivility.
4. Reduce offending and anti-social behaviour.

Upon returning to Prince Albert and reviewing Glasgow's model, the vision for the CMPA was created, and this was followed by the development of a rationale or business case for its formal establishment and implementation. Funds were obtained from the municipal and provincial governments to provide the resources needed to formally establish CMPA.

## 2.4 The HUB as an Operational Committee

Building on the CSG model from Scotland, CMPA stakeholders recognized the value of forming strong operational partnerships. The HUB, as named by the stakeholders, became the forum around which all participants could hold discussions regarding individuals who came to the attention of agency staff due to their involvement in risky, destructive or otherwise unhealthy situations. Examples might include a youth engaged in substance abuse, a family with children out of parental control, or incidents of family violence. The committee holds discussions amongst agencies in the human services sector and meets to discuss and address situations of *acutely-elevated risk*. According to Nilson (2014, p. 44) acutely elevated risk is defined by CMPA as (a) significant interest at stake; (b) probability of harm occurring; (c) severe intensity of harm, and (d) multi-disciplinary nature of elevated risk.

The committee meets twice weekly for one to two hours. This group does not have any actual case management role or authority, but rather meets to problem-solve and discuss cases that have come to the attention of any agency. The case management and the actual service delivery responsibility remain with the appropriate agency or group of agencies. The focus of these meetings is to identify individuals or families whose risk cannot be minimized by any one agency acting alone. Any of the participating agencies may identify a risk situation that has come to its attention. As each case is discussed amongst the member agencies, the most appropriate human services are identified and staff members from those agencies become engaged in a planned intervention to mitigate the situation. After identifying the agencies responsible for the intervention, it is up to them to refine their plan, determine the most appropriate time to stage an intervention and

report back to the group on the outcomes of their efforts. The goal of the HUB participants is to stage an intervention within 24 to 48 hours of the matter being brought to their attention (Nilson, 2014).

Although the HUB was well received by community members there have been some concerns about the approach, including protecting the privacy of potential clients. The confidential discussion process and information sharing amongst the HUB participants, however, enables planned interventions to connect individuals and families with the appropriate service delivery agencies and programs (Nilson, 2014). Effective January 15, 2015, the following agencies participated in the HUB:

- Saskatchewan Social Services (e.g., Child protection and income assistance),
- Prince Albert Parkland Health Region (e.g., Mental health, addiction services, public health, acute care, patient care),
- Prince Albert Police Service (policing, bylaw and victim services),
- Prince Albert Roman Catholic Separate School Division,
- Saskatchewan Rivers Public School Division,
- Prince Albert Grand Council, a federation of 12 First Nations,
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
- Mobile Crisis, an agency that responds to family and community emergencies after regular business hours, and;
- Ministry of Justice – Corrections and Policing (Adult and youth probation and policing services).

The agency membership at the PA HUB has expanded since its formal inception in February, 2011, but it is limited to the attendance of organizations that most frequently contribute to resolving the issues raised by the HUB stakeholders.

As noted above, the purpose and intent of the HUB meetings is to mobilize existing resources with the expectation that early intervention will help an at-risk individual or family by responding to their unmet needs. This is intended to reduce the possibility of more significant problems emerging that may require a more formal intervention from the police or other partner agencies. The HUB participants identify the specific tasks to be undertaken by one or more agencies in order to address the conditions that led to elevated risk. The tasks are identified by the participating agencies based on the nature of the situation. If the initial intervention is not effective, and does not result in a reduction of the risk, further collaboration and problem-solving amongst the committee members is undertaken.

A phrase that is frequently used to describe this approach is that “the HUB is a discussion.” This in itself is an important concept in that it distinguishes the HUB from other existing and more formal interventions that might undertake similar work. The HUB is not an institution, nor is it intended to replace or duplicate work done by other agencies or partnerships. Rather, the HUB offers a new way for the partner agencies to achieve more effective integration in their services, leading to more rapid and effective interventions. Perhaps most importantly, the HUB is intended to take a more proactive role, rather than the typical incident-driven and reactive measures. This approach addresses in real time the recognized conditions that have placed individuals, families

and/or neighbourhoods within a heightened probability of harm, disorder or conflict with the law (CMPA, 2012).

The intent of the HUB is to deal with each case as soon as possible after discussion. As each case is reviewed during a meeting, the outstanding actions are reviewed and if completed, the case is closed. If the situation of acutely elevated risk remains and additional actions are required, a new intervention is undertaken and the results reviewed at a future meeting. As the committee reviews existing matters or situations, new cases may be introduced for discussion by any of the committee participants. The discussions occur in a roundtable format and allow participants from each agency the opportunity to respond.

The HUB is not intended to be a forum for discussion of any or all situations where individuals or communities may require some form of help or assistance from human service providers. Rather, the HUB is designed to be a discussion reserved for situations requiring a coordinated response before a situation deteriorates and requires a traditional and often punitive response from the formal justice system (e.g., providing supports to a case of family dysfunction before the circumstances escalate into violence).

Actions as a result of a HUB discussion are often under taken by one or more agencies working together to offer services. The offer of services often involves a visit to an individual or family deemed to be in need of services. Representatives from the agency(s) involved offer to provide a service and, if accepted, the services are delivered by the individual agencies as part of the mandates of those organization(s). This approach is thought to increase inter-agency cooperation and more effective integration of services.

Nilson (2014) reports that between February 2011 and May 2014 about 600 cases were reviewed by the HUB. The 2012 CMPA annual report provides a one-year (June 1, 2011 – May 31, 2012) analysis of 258 situations brought before the HUB for formal discussion. Most of them required more than one discussion, averaging 5.6 discussions per situation and the average time for each discussion was about 6 ½ minutes. As a result of the HUB discussion 694 tasks were defined, assigned and carried out by the agencies, often in a cooperative manner. Twelve percent of the situations were viewed by the committee as chronic and required the highest intensity of service.

According to the CMPA (2012), almost three-quarters (71%) of the situations were brought to the HUB discussion table by one of three agencies, social services (19%), education (21%) and the PAPS (31%). Fourteen percent of the situations discussed required intervention from health services. Of the situations brought forward for discussion, child related issues comprised 37% of the cases, while addictions accounted for 20% and mental health services 60%. The top risk factor that led to interventions were substance abuse (57%), which was followed by criminality (56%), victimization (41%), mental health issues (30%), missing person cases (28%), parenting issues (19%), and truancy (14%). With respect to the effectiveness of these interventions, the CMPA (2012) reports that:

The range of positive effects of the HUB discussion was found to be wide. The results often would not have been obtainable to the same extent without the collaborative approach. The HUB mitigated acutely elevated risk situations to the benefit of the individual, his/her family, and the community at large. It increased community safety and wellness, the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of our

human services delivery system by mobilizing existing resources, enabling service delivery, and making it take place at an earlier point in time. Also, it allowed for the identification of systemic issues and gaps. (pp. 2-3)

## **2.5 HUB Case Example**

As mentioned earlier, cases may be formally brought before the HUB for discussion by any of the partner agencies. The usual pathway to involvement in the HUB starts with one of the agencies becoming engaged with an individual(s) in a situation of risk. For example, the PAPS brought a case forward for discussion at the HUB in the winter of 2011. In describing the circumstances, it was revealed that a 13 year-old girl had become the subject of police attention. She had been discovered in the early morning hours highly intoxicated laying in a snow bank. She was subsequently taken into custody and turned over to youth workers to ensure her safety. In a discussion at the HUB, it was revealed that she had very recently started to exhibit uncharacteristic and self-destructive behaviours. The representative from the Ministry of Education informed the HUB partners that the girl's teacher noted a very recent change in her behaviour in the classroom. A previously engaged and attentive student, she began to display disinterest in school and was disruptive. These circumstances, coupled with the report of the recent intoxication displayed by this youth lead the HUB participants to conclude these circumstances posed an "elevated risk" and the case was brought forward for further discussion, assignment of agency responsibility, intervention and the case was diarized for formal reporting back to the HUB. It was determined that a home visit by Social Services and PAPS was the most appropriate and immediate way to assess the situation, determine the actions required from the HUB agencies and what intervention services

could be offered to the family. Clearly, the cooperation of the family and appropriateness of services would influence the success of the intervention.

Upon visiting the home, the staff learned there had recently been changes within the family structure. Previously, the single mother had lived in the home with her children. These youth were all in school and the mother had recently enrolled in community college. Several weeks prior to the incident where the girl was discovered in a snow bank the mother had started a relationship with an abusive man. He had recently moved into the home and his actions were beginning to have a destructive impact on the family. For example, the youth's mother had stopped attending night classes and was beginning to miss work. The other children in the home were also missing school with the greatest impact being on the eldest daughter. HUB intervention in this case was simplified because the man who moved into the home was the subject of an arrest warrant. As a result, he was arrested and removed from the home. The agencies were then able to work with the family to bring about immediate changes and restore the family to its previous condition.

This example is typical of the type of cases that are brought before the HUB. One of the agencies learned of risky behaviour and the circumstances were brought to the group where it was determined that an intervention was required. Upon determining there was an "acutely elevated risk" the appropriate agencies were identified, the intervention approach determined, and services provided. It is plausible that had an intervention not taken place, there could have been any number of unfortunate developments in the lives of his family.

## **2.6 Governance**

The CMPA is overseen by an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) consisting of senior agency leaders from local, regional and provincial agencies and has representatives from the PAPS and RCMP, health, social services, education, adult and youth corrections, Prince Albert Grand Council and the local government. The ESC meets twice annually to set and monitor goals and priorities. There is also an Operational COR Committee (OCC) consisting of senior decision makers from the participating agencies. The OCC meets monthly and, while attempting to develop and implement a broader strategic view, also prioritize their focus on the day-to-day operational matters of the HUB.

CMPA acts on its mission through two key components: The HUB discussion and the COR. The HUB discussion focuses on providing timely responses to individual cases as expediently as possible; typically within 24 to 48 hours. The COR, by contrast, acts in support of the HUB as a full time centre for research, analysis, and developing long-term solutions to systemic issues and the root causes of social problems, such as poverty, unemployment and addictions.

## **2.7 The Centre of Responsibility (COR)**

Although the HUB's activities focus on interventions with individuals, through its work the staff members also identify systemic issues that are brought forward to the COR, which has taken on the responsibility to deal with the institutional challenges regarding service delivery amongst the partnering agencies. While the HUB focuses on rapid response and short-term issues, the COR is a full-time dedicated operation with a mandate to resolve longer-term systemic solutions to community dysfunction, including

responding to disorder and crime. The COR's focus is on the broader notion of community safety and wellness while seeking longer-term community goals and initiatives that are guided by research and analysis.

Effective January 1, 2015, the COR includes representatives from the following community organizations:

- COR staff (n=4)
- Prince Albert Police Service (n=2)
- Ministry of Social Services (n=2)
- Prince Albert Parkland Health Region (n=2)
- Corrections and Policing (n=2)
- Saskatchewan Rivers Public School Division (n=1)
- Prince Albert Roman Catholic Separate School Division (n=1)
- RCMP (n=1)
- Prince Albert Grand Council (n=1)

Altogether, the COR is staffed by a group of human service professionals who are seconded away from their regular agency positions on a temporary basis to work in this collaborative environment. These personnel tend to have considerable seniority within their organizations (e.g., senior caseworkers) although there is no formal requirement for prior experiences (see Nilson, 2015). The staff members working within the COR have been able to engage in relationships within the HUB and together, they have developed opportunities for collaboration and information sharing. The COR engages in outreach by providing learning and information sharing opportunities to government leaders,

human service professionals and other interested parties about CMPA and its efforts to increase community well being and reduce crime.

COR staff members also collect and analyze data, and evaluate the efficacy of CMPA by measuring the outcomes associated with the program. The COR is also responsible to research community engagement and communication with the HUB participants to identify systemic problems. To accomplish this goal the participants have held community meetings, met and corresponded with senior government officials and spearheaded the development of strategies that are designed to overcome these challenges. The COR is also tasked with evaluating whether the work of the HUB is carried out effectively. As noted by Nilson (2014) “although the HUB in Prince Albert could function independent of the COR, its overall level of functioning has been greatly enhanced by its immediate proximity to the COR” (p. 37). Clearly, the work of the COR is integral to the goals and long-term strategic work of CMPA (Nilson, 2014).

In 2015, Nilson conducted an evaluation of the COR in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of its roles and functions. At the time of the review the COR had been operational for about four years and the review was intended to evaluate its purpose and structure to ensure it continues to evolve in a manner that ensures its success. Specifically, Nilson (2015) noted that by examining its purpose and structure as well as its strengths and limitations the review provides direction for improvements to meet its mandate.

Nilson noted a number of challenges have to be overcome in the areas of leadership, information sharing and active engagement of all sector partners. As a result of the review Nilson (2015) identified eleven key ingredients to an effective COR:

- Strong sector specialists with appropriate qualities for engagement at the COR.
- Analysts and academics to conduct research, and evaluate and analyze data for the COR.
- Strong and dynamic executive director with a vision, persistence, management skills, and an ability to mobilize others.
- The executive director must also recognize diverse interests and limitations of partners while also fostering a shared sense of responsibility and action among the partners.
- Strong executive assistant to support operations of the COR.
- Agency partners need to be actively involved in community mobilization, including supporting the COR's initiatives and contributing to the identification of systemic issues and collaborative solutions. Agency leaders themselves need to collaborate at the leadership table to provide priority areas and strategic direction for the COR.
- The COR team itself must be courageous, interconnected, driven, project-oriented and have a consolidated front.
- Government must lay out an agreement among partner agencies that spells out the obligations and expectations of the partnership.
- Government must provide financial resources to support secondments of sector specialists; cover operational and staff expenses; and promote research and evaluation.
- There must be a direct line of communication between the COR and the two governance committees (regional and provincial).

- There must be a strong appetite for evidence-based collaboration to influence both practice and alignment of human service supports in ways that better serve the community needs. (p. 11)

Nilson noted that one of the challenges facing the COR was ensuring that recommendations for systemic changes included all service delivery sectors. One of the challenges that the Prince Albert COR faced was ensuring that its function was not limited to a mandate of crime reduction alone. Nilson (2015, p. 41) suggested that a rotating Chair would be key to ensuring the mandate of each of the partner agencies was fully considered in the operations of the COR. Altogether, the changes suggested by Nilson (2014; 2015) indicate that this program is evolving as it strives to meet its mandate of community safety and crime reduction.

In the past several years, scholars, government policymakers and representatives from community service agencies have begun looking at innovative approaches to reduce crime. A review of the literature demonstrates a growing emergence of situational crime prevention approaches. Welch (2010) discusses developmental and situational crime prevention in terms of three categories of prevention and intervention: primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary prevention focuses on the well-being of all individuals in the community. Secondary prevention, by contrast, are interventions with individuals or families who are at risk of offending, while tertiary prevention involves measures to deal with offenders and victims (Welch, 2010, p. 2).

The CMPA model engages all of the agencies mandated to carry out these three intervention approaches. The COR advocates for primary prevention through the development of holistic programs to promote community well being. Secondary and

tertiary prevention, by contrast, are undertaken by the HUB, as it intervenes and provides services to at-risk families and individuals, as well as those who have become involved with youth or adult justice systems as offenders or victims. Although the HUB does respond to offenders and victims the goal of the CMPA is to intervene before crimes occur.

## **2.8 Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter described the conditions that led a contingent of Prince Albert stakeholders to seek alternative solutions to reduce high rates of disorder and criminal offending in that city. After an examination of the CSG approach CMPA was created with a specific goal to enhance public safety and reduce disorder. CMPA produced a business case for the Province of Saskatchewan that outlined its goal of a community-based, risk-reduction interagency model that employed community partnerships amongst the human service providers within the city. PAPS Chief McFee was able to muster community and provincial resources in order to establish the CMPA and it has subsequently been exported to other Saskatchewan communities.

As CMPA continues to evolve a number of measures have been put in place to determine the effectiveness of their intervention services and to determine whether its goal to reduce community safety by using a risk-reduction approach is effective. One limitation in our knowledge, however, is that we lack a full understanding of the effectiveness of the CMPA model in reducing antisocial behaviour, disorder, and crime. Those efforts may be informed by an external examination of their program and in order to carry out this research, Chapter 3 provides the theoretical context for the study by highlighting two key issues. First, the concept of social disorganization is introduced and

the concept of crime reduction through social development is described. Second, the emergence of a proactive approach to policing is described and how this approach relates to CMPA.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Literature Review**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Scholars long ago examined the relationships between high levels of social disorder and crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942). It has been suggested that antisocial behaviour, community disorder and crime could be reduced by reducing levels of social disorganization in neighbourhoods (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993). This chapter outlines the theory of social disorganization and its application to Prince Albert and surrounding areas. Social disorganization provides a theoretical explanation for community dysfunction, including antisocial behaviour, youth delinquency and crime. In order to provide a context for social disorganization this chapter also includes an overview of the community context for Prince Albert, a small city with high rates of concentrated poverty, population instability, a very young and marginalized population and high rates of community dysfunction, as demonstrated by high rates of substance abuse, police calls for service, and crime (Fenno, 2013; McFee & Taylor, 2014).

The second part of this chapter examines the changing philosophies of policing that have occurred throughout North America. Policing has tended to be reactive—responding to crimes that have already occurred. Many police organizations, however, are moving toward a more proactive approach where crime reduction is prioritized over a strict focus on reacting to crimes. Introducing changes to the status quo, however, have not always been successful as there has been some resistance to these changes by front-line police officers. Murray (2000), past director of the Canadian Police College, outlines the various factors that must be considered when making cultural and operational changes

within police organizations. These changes range from dealing with personalities, to empowerment of individuals and collective problem solving within the paramilitary police organization. Murray (2000) states that clear goals, strategy development, dynamic leadership, accountability and training are the necessary considerations when overcoming resistance to change.

### **3.2 Social Disorganization Theory**

As noted earlier, Prince Albert is referred to as a gateway city and is the entry point for several major routes into northern Saskatchewan and thus acts as a corridor for the movement of contraband from the south to the north. The city has also become home to a large number of transient and displaced persons from other communities including the north. In advancing their theory of social disorganization, Shaw and McKay (1942) note that delinquency increases in areas where poverty and high levels of social change exists. Social change included such factors as residential instability (where people moved frequently) as indicated by high levels of population turnover. Shaw and McKay also reported that a high proportion of racial heterogeneity also contributed to crime. Constant change, these scholars speculated, results in the conventional social institutions becoming weak and a value system that supports crime is nurtured. As the pro-criminal influences become strong and take hold they are transmitted from one generation to the next through peer interactions.

Cullen and Agnew (2011) note how Shaw and McKay (1942) found that delinquency in urban settings was directly related to community dynamics. As families moved from inner city communities into suburban areas marginalized residents were often left behind. In most cases, the traditional forms of social support that had existed

within the community were also exported to the suburbs. This change resulted in the traditional forms of social control weakening in the inner city. By reducing traditional social control crime and antisocial behaviour increased. Cullen and Agnew (2011) also noted that once pro-criminal behaviours become entrenched in a community, it is very difficult to bring about changes. They describe these value changes as “differential systems of values” and state that delinquency develops strong forces in a delinquent’s life because the benefits of crime bring about economic rewards and social prestige (Cullen & Agnew, 2011, p.99).

Shaw and McKay (1942) also concluded that incarceration can contribute to neighbourhood and family disruption. They found higher delinquency and offending rates amongst families where one of the parents – in most cases, the male – was not present in the home. This observation has been made by subsequent scholars and Rose and Clear (1998, p. 441) found that “overreliance on incarceration as a formal control may hinder the ability of some communities to foster other forms of control because they weaken family and community structures” which in turn increases rather than reduces social disorganization. Thus, the interventions of the justice system might contribute to higher crime rates.

Shaw and McKay drew upon the scholarship of Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925) who also carried out research in Chicago about the origins of crime. Since Shaw and McKay advanced the social disorganization approach additional research has extended their early work. For example, the relationship between crime rates and indicators of social disorganization was made by Kooi and Patchin (2008) when they compared delinquency rates to weak (or a lack) of effective social support structures.

Schreck et al. (2009) also found that poverty and residential mobility are factors associated with urban crime. Fenno (2013) identified high rates of residential mobility amongst Prince Albert youth both within the urban area, but also from surrounding rural locations as one possible cause for high rates of substance abuse. Accordingly, the link between high levels of social mobility and weakening social structures may factor into delinquency.

As neighbourhoods break down and factors such as poverty, residential instability and broken homes prevail, the community also loses the positive influences of collective efficacy. Cullen and Agnew (2011), outline the work of Sampson and colleagues (2006), who found that neighbourhoods affected by social disorganization had lower levels of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is described as a form of informal social control where the willingness of neighbours to intervene in wrongdoing and to support each other had a positive influence in behaviour. The lack of collective efficacy within a community has been associated with increases in crime and disorder. Sampson et al. (1999, p. 113) note that the lack of collective efficacy in Chicago neighbourhoods is related to high crime rates.

Sampson and Groves (1989) posited that if communities lacking social controls experienced higher rates of delinquency and crime, then in communities where social cohesion is strong crime rates should be lower. In a study of Chicago neighbourhoods, they found areas with higher levels of poverty and residential mobility had significantly higher crime rates than those with lower levels of these characteristics. Their findings revealed that neighbourhoods in which residents have a longer tenure tend to have a sense of stronger commitment to neighbourhood well being. Long term neighbourhood

residents tend to be more willing to become engaged in community activities, notice and respond to unusual activities. This type of collective efficacy demonstrates that stable neighbourhoods have an impact on reducing delinquency and offending.

McNeeley (2014) states poverty and social isolation are principle factors contributing to social disorganization. These factors create a lack of opportunity to achieve conventional goals in traditional ways, such as obtaining legitimate employment and starting a family. Because of a lack of opportunities, residents within disadvantaged neighbourhoods adopt their own codes about what is normal and reject traditional values and set informal rules regarding behavior (McNeeley, 2014, p. 3).

In a longitudinal study Steenbeek and colleagues (2011) examined 74 neighbourhoods in the Netherlands over a ten-year period in order to analyse the impact of social control on community well being. They found that neighbourhoods with high levels of disorder also had high levels of residential instability (turnover). Due to this transient population, residents tended to have a minimum involvement in the community, did little to improve the neighbourhoods, and failed to take action to improve community safety, resulting in weakened social control. Their work highlights the dynamic nature of social disorganization within a community and shows the difficulty in implementing formal social controls (Steenbeck et al., 2011, p. 864). Not only were high levels of social disorganization associated with crime and disorder, but these scholars also found that it was very difficult to introduce positive changes in these communities.

Cullen and Agnew (2011) add to the discussion of social disorganization by observing that as cities grow and businesses and residential areas expand, the areas vacated become zones of transition. It is in the zones of transition where newcomers or

transients often settle. They note the findings of Bursik and Grasmik (1993), who suggest that social disorganization occurs after the breakdown of neighbourhood social institutions. As the social institutions or structures within neighbourhoods break down, families are disrupted and disorder reaches into the communities and schools. As a result, adult supervised activities for youth diminish and the influence of churches and political groups becomes less effective. Resulting from this “pervasive breakdown” adults are less able to control youth and criminal influences strengthen. This highly criminogenic atmosphere results in the transmission of pro-criminal attitudes and pro-criminal thinking (Cullen & Agnew, 2011, pp. 90-91).

Cullen and Agnew (2011) also summarize their own research findings that suggest the characteristics of the community as opposed to the kinds of individuals living in the area regulate or influence levels of crime and delinquency. They also found that higher crime rates were associated in the zones of transition and became progressively lower as one moved toward the outer suburbs of a city. This finding further supports the notion that social disorganization is associated with delinquency.

The demographic characteristics of Prince Albert show that it has a high youth population, and rates of divorced and single parent headed households along with unemployment and poverty higher than the provincial or national averages (Fenno, 2013). Bernard and Kurlychek (2010) observe that young people, especially young males, aged 15 – 24 years, have a higher involvement in crimes when compared to the overall general population. Given those observations, it is understandable that crime rates in Prince Albert are also going to be higher than the provincial or national averages.

Levitt and Lochner (2001) also report that gender is the best predictor of crime, and cite that involvement in violence is highest amongst young males as offenders and victims (see Perreault, 2015). However, these investigators also suggest there are a number of social factors that act as precursors to criminal activity. The proportion of female-headed households in a community is one of the strongest predictors of delinquency; often because the income of single-parent homes tends to be lower than average, thereby increasing the attractiveness of crime as a means to generate income (Levitt & Lochner, 2001, p. 334). Moreover, single parents often find it difficult to provide as much support and supervision to their children as two-parent families.

Fenno (2013) provides a comprehensive overview of Prince Albert's demographic, economic, social and educational characteristics. He states that the percentage of divorced and/or separated residents in Prince Albert is higher than both the provincial and national averages. Prince Albert also has a high youth population with residents aged 15 to 24 years being the fastest growing segment of the population. As Fenno notes, Prince Albert high school students had higher levels of self-reported substance abuse than their provincial or national counterparts. As a result, they placed high demands on community services such as addictions, health, and other social services. This age group also tends to be overrepresented in the justice system (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010). Fenno (2013) also notes that high unemployment rates and poverty are also associated with social disorganization. The unemployment rates for P.A. youth and young adults aged from 15 to 24 years are higher than the national and provincial averages for both males and females. This finding suggests that there is an economic disadvantage for the fastest growing segment of the city's population.

Wong (2012) examined rates of violence and family disruption in 483 Canadian neighbourhoods. His research examined the involvement of 12 to 17 year-olds in police-reported crime. This investigator compared five indicators of social disorganization (low-income, population mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, divorce and single parent families). The findings indicated that all of these factors alone or in combination contributed to higher delinquency rates. Wong (2012) also found that a stronger relationship with crime and delinquency existed where there was a higher percentage of single-parent households. Interestingly, Wong reported that delinquency in single-parent families was higher than delinquency in divorced families, illustrating the importance of two parents in the lives of youths. Furthermore, youth crime was found to be higher in small municipalities that have a higher proportion of low-income earners, ethnic heterogeneity and mobility rates. Wong (2012, pp. 31-32) also speculates that residents in smaller communities, such as Prince Albert, may be more vulnerable to negative social influences of transient and ethnically diverse populations.

Levitt and Lochner (2011) make several observations regarding youth crime. First, they state that family background is an important determinant in crime and adolescents raised in two-parent families are less likely to engage in crime than youth raised in single-parent homes. Second, they contend that property crime rates are higher among males living in areas with high unemployment rates. Such findings further reinforce the relationships between indicators of social disorganization and crime.

As noted in Chapter 2, Prince Albert has a high population of transient non-permanent residents who move between the northern and Aboriginal communities and the city. This population turnover or residential instability can contribute to higher rates

of crime. Over 76% of the PAPS calls for service, for example, had underlying social issues that involved drug and alcohol use, victimization and conflict (PAPS, 2014). The demographic characteristics and social conditions coupled with the growing and often transient or disenfranchised segment of the population fit the framework of the social disorganization theory.

Although the social disorganization theory best describes the existing criminogenic conditions in Prince Albert, Bursik and Grasmick (1993) outline a number of shortcomings in the social disorganization proposition as originally advanced by Shaw and McKay, and provide a number of suggestions for strengthening communities with high levels of disorganization:

- Bureaucracies exerting more control over zoning and housing regulations,
- Grants and/or incentives provided to businesses and individuals along with rent controls,
- Supporting neighbourhood cultural and symbolic factors,
- Supporting social control at the neighbourhood level, and;
- Crime reduction policies such as crime prevention and intervention programs.

Bursik and Grasmick (1993) also outline a number of areas where further research could extend social disorganization theory, including a closer examination of crime rates to ensure that they have not been manipulated for political advantage. These scholars contend that our knowledge about neighbourhoods is sometimes underdeveloped, especially as it relates to the demographic conditions at the neighbourhood level. Bursik and Grasmick also argue that we need better measures of residential stability and

neighbourhood networks. Last, they find that our knowledge of the efficacy of community policing in crime reduction needs to be further investigated.

In advancing these areas for examination Bursik and Grasmick (1993) make the following observation:

This did not mean that Shaw and McKay were wrong; in fact, we are continually astonished by the richness of the theoretical insights presented by these criminologists, some of which have yet to be fully explored. [and] The most fully developed aspects of their model, which focused on the internal dynamics of local communities and the capacity of local residents to regulate the behaviour of their fellow neighbors, continue to be significantly related to neighborhood variations in crime rates (p. x).

This thesis responds to Bursik and Grasmick's (1993) call for research that takes a closer look at neighbourhood dysfunction and how the police can play a role in strengthening a community's mechanisms of informal social control. The thesis research is also timely as the interventions being carried out by CMPA are in their very early stages, and thus the results will provide stakeholders with additional information about the efficacy of their interventions.

### **3.3 Community Characteristics and Social Disorganization**

High levels of crime and disorder may also contribute to lower well being. The Community Well Being (CWB) Index<sup>3</sup> in 2006 revealed that Prince Albert had a value of 79 out of 100 but had increased to 81 in 2011 (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada,

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3. Community Well Being is an index with a maximum value of 100 that measures employment, housing, income and the educational status of a community. The CWB is produced using Statistics Canada data.

2015). By comparison, other Saskatchewan communities, such as Saskatoon and Swift Current were higher (86 and 84 respectively in 2011) (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2015). The CWB enables researchers to make comparisons amongst communities but these comparisons are also made by entrepreneurs and investors. It is important to acknowledge that community wellness, as seen through the eyes of commerce, provides an indicator of future investment potential. Factors such as the potential for economic development, social well being, a well educated workforce and social health are significant considerations of any potential investor or business owner wanting to establish businesses in cities such as Prince Albert. Companies looking to expand into northern Saskatchewan may be reluctant to invest where there is a low CWB. Moreover, these individuals and companies might also consider indicators of crime, such as the CSI, when basing decisions about investing in a community. It is plausible that investment interest is raised when communities are stable, healthy and have low crime rates.

Because Aboriginal peoples are over-represented in criminal and youth justice systems, there is growing interest in providing a range of health, educational and social services that would help them overcome their marginalized status. This is of special concern in the north, where populations of Aboriginal peoples are high. There are, for example, 70 First Nation (FN) communities located within Saskatchewan. Sixty percent of these FN communities are located north of Saskatoon and ten of them are located within 100 kilometres of Prince Albert. However, with only two access points to northern Saskatchewan, many of the residents from the northern geographically isolated

FN frequent Prince Albert as their main commerce point. Many of these northern Saskatchewan communities have very high levels of crime (Allen & Perreault, 2015).

It is very common for people living on First Nations to migrate between the city and their home communities (Environics Institute, 2010). Urban centers attract northern residents, including those living on FN, because they offer opportunities, services and a quality of life that are better than in their home communities. As a result, Prince Albert is the destination for an increasing number of young, Aboriginal transients who have moved from northern towns, villages and remote communities. Some of these young people lack marketable skills which results in them having difficulty in securing employment (Environics Institute, 2010). This places them at an increased risk to become engaged in criminal activity.

Statistics Canada (2011) reports that there were approximately 14,000 Aboriginal persons living in Prince Albert. Of this population, approximately half reported being of Métis ancestry and half were Status Indians. These figures suggest that about 30% of Prince Albert citizens are of Aboriginal ancestry, which is twice the proportion as the general population (15%) within the province. Statistics Canada (2011) also reports that the Aboriginal population living in Prince Albert is younger than the non-Aboriginal population with the mean age of 23.8 years, compared to 35.9 years for the non-Aboriginal population. In 2006, 55% of Aboriginal people were under the age of 25 years compared to 28% for non-Aboriginal people; one third of those being under the age of 19 years. Aboriginal children aged 14 years and under represented 35% of the 14 years and under population.

Statistics Canada (2011) reports that Aboriginal children in PA are more likely than non-Aboriginals to live with a single parent: less than one-half (48%) of Aboriginal children in Prince Albert aged 14 years and under lived with both parents. Similarly, Aboriginal youth and young adults aged 15 to 24 years living in Prince Albert had lower school attendance rates than non-Aboriginal youth (51% versus 59%). Statistics Canada (2013) also found that Aboriginal peoples experience higher rates of unemployment than non-Aboriginals. In 2011, for example, 33% of First Nations youth and young adults aged 15 to 24 years were unemployed compared to 12% of their non-Aboriginal counterparts. Employment participation for Métis youth is similar to that of First Nations youth.

According to Statistics Canada (2013) the Prince Albert population in 2011 was 42,675 residents, an increase from the 2006 population of 40,766. Of that number, in 2006, 34.1% self-identified as Aboriginal, which was up 16.5% from the 2001 census results. Of the Aboriginal population, many are young and individuals between the ages of 15-24 years accounted for almost one-half (44.9%) of that population. These statistics emphasize the fast-paced growth of this population. In addition, a high proportion of young males in the population, regardless of their race or ethnicity, tend to have a higher involvement in crime (Bernard & Kurlychek, 2010). The census results, however, might actually underestimate the true number of Aboriginal youth in the community due to the high number of transient people living in Prince Albert who might be not counted by Statistics Canada.

### **3.4 Crime Prevention Through Social Development**

Crime prevention through social development (CPTSD) seeks to reduce crime by improving access to safe and affordable housing, as well as increasing access to education and health, improving opportunities for employment, cutting child poverty, and responding to the unmet needs of at-risk populations. Previously many of these factors had been labeled as the “root causes” of crime (see Wilson, 2013). Many of the interventions associated with this approach to crime reduction are consistent with the community problems identified in the social disorganization model. As a result, the CPTSD approach is close to what the PAPS has undertaken in the CMPA in their efforts to take a holistic approach to crime reduction.

The Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) (2015) has carried out research that found empirical support for the CPTSD approach to reducing crime. Much of its work involves programs that are designed to counter the negative impacts of social disorganization. CCSD researchers have found that improving social conditions such as housing, family income and education reduce the negative factors present within at-risk neighbourhoods. The CCSD (2015) considers lowering risk factors in youth as the most important determinant to preventing crime. As a result, CCSD acts as a resource to national, provincial, and local governments to encourage community investments to reduce the social conditions that contribute to offending. Since the focus of CMPA is to identify individuals and families who are at risk there is a clear alignment in goals and approaches of CPTSD and CMPA.

Waller and Weiler (1984) propose a holistic approach to crime prevention through social development. They note the social factors that are linked to crime as well as

opportunity reduction and social development as key factors that should be focused on in efforts to reduce delinquency and offending. They view one of the pillars of crime reduction being the reduction of the opportunity for offending. Waller and Weiler suggest that reducing opportunity also reduces the temptation of delinquency. Although they maintain that interventions such as Neighbourhood Watch, Shoplift, and Block Parents are solid community-based programs that reduce opportunities for crime, they also argue that specific opportunity reduction programs for specific crimes be developed. For example, vandalism may be reduced by using building materials that are resistant to graffiti or destruction, and public education and incentives can be used to reduce motivation. They also suggest that improvements can be made to residential security by making vacant homes appear to be occupied and notifying police of suspicious activities are steps that further reduce both the opportunities to engage in crime and offender motivation (Waller & Weiler, 1984, pp. 12-13).

In the area of social development, Waller and Weller (1984, p. 19) suggest that strengthening families by supporting parents in the supervision of children and young adults along with ensuring adequate housing—which in turn increases residential stability—are social factors that need to be considered in any social development model. The areas outlined by Waller and Weller as key for the prevention of crime through social development are typical indicators of social disorganization. As noted earlier, when communities experience transient residents and a lack of strong social structures, they can experience social breakdown (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Cullen & Agnew, 2011; McNeeley, 2014). The approaches described in their work are measures designed

to strengthen communities through social development that counteracts the negative impacts of social disorganization.

Altogether, this section shows that many of the demographic, social, economic and household characteristics in Prince Albert are consistent with the social disorganization perspective. Clearly, the body of research conducted in the area of social disorganization provides a strong connection between the breakdown in conventional community and family structures and crime. By adopting a risk-based approach to reduce offending, the efforts of CMPA are consistent with emerging research demonstrating that crime reduction efforts should be focused on risk reduction. Several different approaches have been introduced to try and address social disorganization and CPTSD provides a theoretical framework that aligns with the CMPA model.

### **3.5 Police Roles and Responsibilities: The Saskatchewan Context**

Broadly speaking, society tends to look at the police to keep the peace as a core policing function and responsibility (Sparrow, 2015). In discharging their community safety mandate, the police investigate crime, arrest offenders and respond to emergencies. Consistent with those observations, Xu and colleagues (2005) define the core responsibilities of the police as responding to serious crimes, arresting offenders and arranging their entry into the formal criminal justice system. However, in addition to apprehending criminals, police have an additional responsibility to prevent crimes before they occur (see Council of Canadian Academics, 2014).

Under the provision of a Provincial Police Service Agreement, the province of Saskatchewan contracts with Public Safety Canada for the RCMP to provide provincial policing services. The RCMP also provides municipal policing on a contract basis to

eight mid-sized Saskatchewan communities, such as North Battleford and Swift Current. However, all of the largest municipalities, including the city of Prince Albert, have their own police services, which is authorized under Saskatchewan's *Police Act*, 1990.

Section 36(2) of *The Police Act, 1990*, outlines the duties and responsibilities for peace officers in the province and states specifically in sections 2 and 18,

(2) Unless otherwise indicated in his or her appointment, a member has the power and responsibility to:

- (a) perform all duties that are assigned to constables or peace officers in relation to:
  - (i) the preservation of peace;
  - (ii) the prevention of crime and offences against the laws in force in the municipality; and,
  - (iii) the apprehension of criminals, offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody. (p. 27)

Similarly, section 18 of the RCMP Act, authorizes RCMP members as peace officers and provides the legislative authority for performance of their duties,

18. It is the duty of members who are peace officers, subject to the orders of the Commissioner,

- (a) to perform all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of peace, the prevention of crime and of offences against the laws of Canada and the laws in force in any province in which they may be employed, and the apprehension of criminals and offenders and others who may be lawfully taken into custody;

(b) to execute all warrants, and perform all duties and services in relation thereto, that may, under this Act or the laws of Canada or the laws in force in any province, be lawfully executed and performed by peace officers;

(c) to perform all duties that may be lawfully performed by peace officers in relation to the escort and conveyance of convicts and other persons in custody to or from many courts, place of punishment or confinement, asylums or other places; and,

(d) to perform such other duties and functions as are prescribed by the governing Council or the Commissioner. (pp. 9-10)

Clearly, the intent of both the federal and provincial legislators in creating police services was to ensure that community safety and crime prevention were the core functions of the police. As a result, although popular opinion is that the core function of the police is to promote community safety through the arrest of criminals and solving crimes, the police also have a mandate that includes crime prevention and reduction as outlined within governing legislation and policy.

### **3.6 Traditional Approaches to Crime Reduction**

In order to fulfill their mandate police services have implemented or piloted numerous strategies and used innovative approaches designed to reduce crime (Robertson, 2012). According to Xu and colleagues (2005) the traditional measures of success for police have focused mainly on crime statistics as the most important measure. These researchers posit that the failure of policing strategies to affect crime and that using crime statistics alone as a measure of effectiveness is “problematic.” Other police scholars have also identified the limitations of measuring police performance based

solely on traditional measures such as the number of arrests, crime statistics, response times, and clearance rates (Coleman, 2012; Davis, 2012; Sparrow, 2015).

Xu and colleagues (2005) suggest that we should not focus entirely on these traditional measures of police performance because communities are complex social structures and crime statistics alone do not adequately account for police activities. These scholars believe that quality of life factors should also be used when evaluating successful crime prevention approaches and measures of fear of crime are important variables in assessing police performance (Davis, 2012). As a result, Xu and colleagues recommend that community involvement is essential in establishing goals and measuring community wellness and other indicators of success.

Research shows that there has been a change in police priorities from merely responding to crime toward more preventive or proactive approaches to community safety. In the 1970s, for example, the focus on crime reduction began to shift from purely reactive forms of policing responses to approaches founded on evidence. Sherman (2013) contends that previous to 1975 policing was delivered as a “one size fits all” model consisting of practices that attempted to reduce crime through random patrols and reduced response time. Police leaders believed that crime could be reduced if they were able to rapidly respond to offences and apprehend the offender during or shortly after the commission of a criminal offence. Sherman (2013, p. 2) observes that “There was almost no targeting of patterns or predictions for crime and disorder, no testing of what worked best to prevent or solve crimes and problems, or much tracking and managing of what police were doing, where, when and how, in relation to specific objectives” and he

acknowledges the evolving model of policing from one of being strictly reactive to one that is based upon the “triple-T approach of targeting, testing and tracking” (p. 3).

Davis (2012) describes how shrinking police budgets and the demands from civic leaders for measurable evidence of police performance and effectiveness have resulted in a new and innovative look at policing outcomes. Previously, police performance was typically measured only by outputs such as arrests, solve/clearance, and crime reduction rates, but they failed to measure other duties that the police carry out. In order to justify resources and funding police leaders have a stake in providing measurable evidence of quality performance. Traditionally, much of the work done by police in crime prevention, promoting traffic safety, responding to vehicle collisions, preventing social disorder and building community partnerships was not considered in traditional policing outcome measures (Coleman, 2012). Of equal importance to measuring these types of outcomes the police must also demonstrate that the law is being enforced fairly and equitably, that citizens arrested are treated fairly, that the police are protecting the rights of citizens and the police are accountable and their actions transparent to the public (Davis, 2012).

Davis (2012) outlines some of the work that has been done to capture the multidimensional and often conflicting goals of police agencies regarding the implementation of standard outcome metrics. Davis (2012) suggests measurement metrics may be developed in seven areas that tend to cover a broad spectrum of desired outcomes for the provision of police service and they include:

- the reduction of crime and victimization: reducing crime is the single most important function of the police;

- holding offenders accountable: this metric measures the number of arrests and solve rates of crime;
- reducing fear and enhancing security: the measurement of fear of crime, victimization and community well being;
- increasing safety and order in public spaces: a measurement of the reduction in traffic collisions, increase use of public spaces and public interaction in public spaces;
- police use of force: measure to show police use of force is fair and appropriate under the circumstances;
- efficient and fair use of public funds: measure of economic operations, efforts to control cost efficient use of public funds; and,
- enhance customer satisfaction: measures community satisfaction with policing (pp. 2-3).

It is suggested that developing metrics based on outcomes in these areas may be a more effective and efficient way for police commanders to demonstrate they are meeting the expectations of civic leaders and citizens receiving policing services (Davis, 2012).

Traditional measurements of police performance have not been able to show the full scope of police activities occurring within a community (Coleman, 2012; Sparrow, 2015). Although traditional measurements may have demonstrated that the police were busy making arrests and investigating crime, they failed to show the full range of police activities related to non-enforcement activities. Robertson (2012), for example, says that the time spent on social service activities by the police often outweighs the time spent in enforcement activities. In recent years, considerable work has been done in an attempt to capture and describe the full range of police activity to reduce crime and enhance

community safety. With these recent developments in mind, a more comprehensive picture of police performance and accountability will become available in the future.

### **3.7 The Evolution of Contemporary Policing**

The evolution of police models and practices over the past 40 years has led to efforts to create a valid evidence basis upon which policing can be based (Telep, 2016). There are even a number of scholars who are advancing the use of predictive analytical techniques that identify potential places and times crimes might occur and interventions to prevent those crimes (see Perry, McInnis, Price, Smith & Hollywood, 2013). Faced with fiscal challenges and high expectations from communities, many police leaders view the “triple-T” approach as the basis for a strategic approach to crime reduction. There is a broad empirically tested knowledge base that is emerging in support of crime reduction programs that are becoming increasingly available to police leaders. This evidence-based practice contrasts against the approaches of crime control in the 1970s, as there was very little empirical evidence upon which to design crime reduction strategies. Faced with rising crime rates and increasing racial tensions, policing and community safety were becoming political concerns (Sherman, 2013). Writing about the 1970s, Sherman (2013, p. 9) observes that “policing faced a kind of a Christmas tree of ideas for police reform, each idea, an ornament unconnected to the others.” Criminologists and public policy scholars felt that more research into police practices and analysis of successful strategies led to an interest in innovation and improvement, and how those practices are diffused (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003).

A number of strategies have emerged since the 1970s that have challenged conventional policing practices. One of the first policing strategies empirically examined

was the practice of random patrol in Kansas City (Sherman, 2013). Random patrols meant the police would be highly visible in patrolling communities and demonstrating their presence. Conceptually, it was felt that this police visibility would deter criminals from engaging in illegal activities. However, it was determined fairly quickly that random patrols had little short-term effect on crime (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & Brown, 1974). Patrols were often predictable and offences were committed in areas where patrols were absent or in some instances crime was displaced to other areas. However, as Sherman (2013) points out, the study itself was successful from the perspective that it opened police thinking to the concept that their practices could be examined for efficacy and this led to police and community leaders to look at alternative approaches to reducing crime and disorder.

First envisioned in the 1980s, community policing was viewed as an opportunity for community input into policing and provided a means to measure police effectiveness through the eyes of the community rather than from the perspective of the police, as had been the traditional practice (see Normandeau, 1993 for a Canadian overview). Simply stated, community policing involves the police and community working together to meet the community's needs and expectations for safety. This strategy was viewed as moving policing away from its traditional reactive approach to one of being comprehensive and inclusive with a goal of enhancing the quality of life (Xu et al., 2005). Under the umbrella of community policing, a number of strategies were implemented with varying degrees of success. The broken windows approach, for example, was a strategy designed to reduce crime and hold offenders accountable (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

The term “broken windows” is a metaphor that outlines the process of communities spiraling into decline (Cullen et al., 2011). According to Cullen and his colleagues, many inner-city communities fall victim to decline and as they do so, crimes such as aggressive panhandling, prostitution, and drug trafficking increase along with disorder and antisocial behaviour. As the community declines, many buildings fall into disrepair or become defaced and are marked with graffiti. “Disorder is a problem because, like a broken window, it conveys the message that nobody is home who cares enough to maintain order” (Cullen et al., 2011, p. 438). The police response within these neighbourhoods has been one of increased police presence, foot patrols and high enforcement. It was believed that these activities would curb offending. In examining the results of police responses in declining communities Xu and colleagues (2005) state that disorderly behaviour must be confronted before it creeps into communities and sets them on the path to decline. They argue that waiting for serious crimes to occur before intervening is too late. Once communities declined to the state where crime and disorder take over a significant investment in social intervention is required. In conclusion, although a response from the police is appropriate in dealing with serious crimes many other social elements require intervention before neighbourhoods in decline can be restored to peaceful existence (see Zimring, 2011).

As the evolution of evidence-based policing gained momentum, police leaders began looking at different models to predict where and when crimes would occur. Sherman (2013) observes that since the 1960s, police philosophies have evolved from the notion that random patrols, rapid response and reactive investigations would reduce crime to understanding the need for research to provide a solid evidence basis upon which to

develop and implement programs designed to reduce crime. Perry, McInnis, Price, Smith and Hollywood (2013, p. 1) view crime as being predictable and note that “predictive policing is the application of predictive techniques to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical predictions.” The model requires a number of dynamic factors in assessing risk and recommends strong programming to change offending behaviors.

Since the 1990s various crime prevention approaches have been evaluated to determine what types or kinds of programs successfully reduce crime. Most of these interventions have focused on specific kinds of interventions, and crimes. Tilly and Laycock (2002), for example, used research findings to guide burglary reduction efforts in the United Kingdom. Their scholarship provides recommendations to guide specific efforts for communities and police services to reduce crime. This work was ‘targeted’ toward achieving a reduction of crimes in a specific area and often concentrated resources focused on specific types of offending and aggressive enforcement as a means to reduce crime. Other targeted enforcement targeted order maintenance and those practices were based on the notion that by eliminating minor incivilities and disorder, more serious crimes would not occur (Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Rengifo, 2007).

Although the principal focus of the Weisburd and colleagues (2003) research was on the diffusion of the Compstat model of policing, it similarly discussed a unilateral approach to crime reduction, and those scholars noted that “Compstat has already been recognized as a major innovation in American policing” (p. 422). Again, this approach had its focus on identifying areas where crime was high and saturating police resources in those areas to reduce crime. Compstat relied on crime analysis to determine what

specific types of crimes were occurring and concentrated enforcement efforts in those areas. Arresting and incapacitating offenders was viewed as a solution to high crime rates.

Similarly, directed police patrols in areas of high crime were thought to be approaches that would result in crime prevention to reduce crime. In a report to the U.S. Congress in 1997, Sherman and his colleagues described directed patrols as being concentrated at the “hot spots” and the “hot times” of criminal activity and advocated that the results demonstrated crime reduction in those places and at those times.

Concentrating on hot spots of crime with a high visible presence of police patrols would curtail criminal activity and criminals would be apprehended leading to a reduction of criminal activity in the areas where the directed patrols had occurred (see also Telep & Weisburd, 2012). However, Sherman (2013) notes that as enforcement efforts were focused in particular areas of crime the resulting effect was often that the crime simply displaced, or moved elsewhere, although other police scholars challenge that notion (see Aos & Drake, 2013).

### **3.8 Community Mobilization**

With the disappointing findings emerging from the evaluations of crime specific and directed patrol efforts, practitioners began looking beyond programs focused on strict enforcement as a means to control crime and other more proactive practices emerged. Practitioners in some jurisdictions began looking more broadly at approaches involving partnerships and holistic approaches. One program designed to engage community stakeholders and bring together both enforcement and intervention efforts began to emerge as promising practices in what was termed community mobilization. An

evaluation of community mobilization carried out by Jamieson (2008) and research conducted by Green and Sakamoto-Cheung (1998) provide evidence that demonstrates crime prevention and crime reduction efforts prove most promising when community stakeholders mobilized together in efforts to identify local and neighbourhood solutions to crime related problems.

Green and Sakamoto-Cheung (1998) describe community mobilization as “a multi-disciplinary team approach to mobilize communities in addressing identified problems that exist in those communities” (p. 86). In her report for the National Crime Prevention Center Jamieson (2008) describes the practice of community mobilization as a promising response to preventing and reducing crime. Given the complex nature of crime, it is highly unlikely that any one organization or agency can significantly reduce its frequency. As a result, there is growing interest in multi-disciplinary, community-based crime prevention efforts and in evaluation research findings that determine whether the benefits of these approaches outweigh the costs. The community mobilization model is one approach that shows promise in grassroots organizing to combat crime.

The Jamieson (2008) and Sakamoto-Cheung (1998) studies show that community mobilization is a crime reduction approach that replaces concentrated police resources and high intensity patrols; approaches that may only have a marginal effect on reducing crime. Jamieson (2008) and Green and Sakamoto-Cheung (1998) maintain that community-based approaches involving multiple agencies are promising crime control strategies. Since 2010, there has been growing interest in crime reduction strategies using the community mobilization model. This approach to crime reduction bases the focus for crime reduction on risk and the reduction of risk. A model such as Prince

Albert's CMPA is an example of one form of a risk-reduction approach to crime reduction.

One of the focuses of community mobilization is early intervention with young people and Bottoms (2006) identifies the factors that contribute to youth offending. He observes that researchers have found a number of risk factors that help us predict whether youth will be in conflict with the justice system. These risk factors include impulsivity, poor school performance and poor parenting. As a result, Bottoms (2006) contends that these issues must be addressed in order to reduce youth crime. A similar approach is advocated in empirical work conducted by Griffiths, Dandurand and Murdoch (2007), who also identified the importance of reducing risk factors. Griffiths and colleagues (2007) found that a number of risk factors were associated with criminality, including low education, a lack of employment, substance abuse, mental health problems, illiteracy, a lack of supports and inadequate parenting. They further suggest that each of the factors must be assessed and services provided in all areas of risk to obtain successful outcomes with at-risk youth.

Research shows that undirected enforcement efforts cannot bring about meaningful reductions in crime (Aos & Drake, 2013). Rather a community mobilization approach that recognizes enforcement must be combined with other evidence-based approaches to reduce risk factors in order to reduce offending. Although there is not an overwhelming body of research supporting approaches such as CMPA, there is an emerging literature suggesting that crime reduction is best achieved through partnerships where the key goal is one of reducing risk. Similar to the research carried out by Griffiths and colleagues (2007), Bottoms (2006) speculates that early intervention in the

lives of youth at-risk results in crime reduction by changing their pro-criminal behaviours and attitudes. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010) also identify a similar set of factors that are associated with crime and violence such as: pro-criminal values, thoughts, beliefs, as well as social factors such as poverty, poor school attendance, and improper parenting.

Altogether, a review of the extant literature shows that since the 1990s conventional thinking amongst researchers and practitioners regarding crime reduction approaches has evolved from programs based principally on enforcement to a broader understanding of the social conditions and causal factors that increase the risk for offending. Recent scholarship suggests that changing these underlying factors presents the best opportunity to bring about long-term crime reduction (Jameson, 2008). Bringing about these changes, however, will take time and considerable effort and they will only be used widely if supported by empirical research. However, in the short-term, CMPA is a promising crime reduction approach that is beginning to show preliminary and immediate changes in offending patterns (Nilson, 2014). This has resulted in a steady reduction in crimes reported to the police and related social disorder in the community since 2011 (McFee & Taylor, 2014).

Based on a violence reduction approach implemented in Scotland in 2000, CMPA leaders and stakeholders have taken this concept and modified it into an intervention approach for crime reduction within the community based on responding to individuals and families with elevated risk levels. This approach brings together human service agencies, the police and other service providers, assesses citizens and families at risk, and seeks to intervene with the goal of providing services designed to reduce risk. Each of

the partnering agencies may bring a case or cases before the committee where the agency believes an individual or family is potentially at risk for offending.

### **3.9 Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter introduced the theory of social disorganization and how this approach can help us understand the conditions of crime and disorder present in Prince Albert. Traditional and innovative approaches to policing were described, along with outlining the legislated responsibility for the police in the prevention of crime. A review of the literature shows that policing has evolved in response to limitations in traditional models of policing to reduce crime. Since the 1980s there has been increased attention on researching and evaluating evidence-based or best practices in policing (Lum, Koper & Telep, 2011). Many successful crime reduction strategies have been implemented and refined, however there is growing awareness that the police cannot “go it alone” and require the support of other community agencies. Some communities, such as Prince Albert, have both high proportions of marginalized populations and conditions of deprivation, including unemployment and poverty. CPTSD seeks to change some of the social conditions while an innovative approach like CMPA seeks to look at individuals and families with the goal to reducing their risk to offend.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **Data and Methods**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This research examines a number of indicators of crime and disorder prior to the implementation of the CMPA, and after its introduction in 2011—what is called a pre-post research design. One of the limitations of evaluating the introduction of criminal justice interventions is that seldom do the organizations that introduce these reforms ever collect information on crime and disorder prior to their introduction. Moreover, very few programs that are introduced actually collect a comprehensive set of indicators of program outcomes once these crime reduction strategies are introduced. These limitations make it difficult to properly evaluate the effectiveness of a crime control intervention.

In the sections that follow, the data used in the analyses, as well as the methods of analyzing those data are described. In short, however, the research examines indicators of community functioning prior to the implementation of the CMPA in February 2011 and these are contrasted against the same indicators from that time until 2015. Altogether, the goal of this research is to determine if CMPA has reduced crime and disorder in the city of Prince Albert through its risk-reduction approach. A secondary goal of this study is to determine whether these interventions reduced the costs of crime.

#### **4.2 Data**

All of the data used in this study are secondary as it has been collected and reported by different local, provincial or federal agencies. In Chapter 1 the following indicators of crime and disorder were included in the first research question:

- a. Police-reported crime rates (e.g., specific offences such as break, enter, and theft)
- b. Police calls for service for non-criminal acts (e.g., antisocial behaviour and disorder).

When the thesis was initially proposed a number of other variables including indicators of youth truancy, child apprehensions, traffic collisions, and the size of probation caseloads were going to be examined. Obtaining this information, however, was not possible as the agencies responsible for collecting this information were reluctant to provide these data or it did not exist in a form that could be analysed in longitudinal analyses. This is a limitation of the study.

Although police-reported crime statistics shed light on one dimension of community well being, other indicators should be taken into account to provide a full understanding of the efficacy of the CMPA approach. The Canadian Index of Well Being (CIW) (2016) states that the well being of a community is measured by examining numerous factors that include: standard of living, health, the quality of the environment, education and skill levels, use of time, vitality of communities, participation in the democratic process and the state of our leisure and culture. In order to determine community well being, Statistics Canada (2015) examined overall health and surveyed Canadians to gauge life satisfaction. These factors describe overall community health by measuring a number of social and economic factors. The inter-relationship of crime cannot be discounted in any one of the factors being measured; however, its impact in each area is impossible to measure.

Due to the fact that a risk driven approach to crime reduction has only been operational for a short term there is a paucity of available research data. As a result, the study relies on secondary data acquired from the CMPA, who used these data for other purposes (e.g., reporting rates of crime to Statistics Canada as well as the municipality for factors such as calls for service).

Secondary analysis is the examination of data available from other researchers or organizations that have already collected the information. This approach involves the collection of information from others who have studied the results and gathered information from both internal and external sources (Maxfield & Babbie, 2001). Although community data has not been collected over a long period of time initial studies regarding the implementation, operation and impact of the CMPA are showing promising results (CMPA, 2012; McFee & Taylor, 2014, 2016; Nilson, 2014).

There are a number of advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data. Maxfield and Babbie (2001, p. 337) observe that this approach “is cheaper and faster than collecting original data.” As a result, analyzing data about police-reported crime that has already been collected is more cost effective than collecting Prince Albert’s crime statistics independently. The crime related data to carry out this study were obtained from PAPS and the CMPA. This is the same information that was submitted to Statistics Canada by the PAPS to compile the provincial and national crime statistics.

There is, however, some disadvantage to using secondary data. Maxfield and Babbie (2001, p. 337) note that “when one researcher collects data for one particular purpose, you have no assurance that those data will be appropriate to your research interests.” In other words, since the data has already been collected it might not

adequately answer the research questions. This is particularly the case when researchers use the results from surveys that have already been carried out. Moreover, researchers analyzing secondary data might not know the subtleties that might have influenced the outcomes (e.g., whether the time when a survey was conducted could have influenced the responses that were given).

The strengths and limitations of using police-reported crime statistics are described below and although they are commonly used in empirical research, they provide only one dimension of the crime problem. An additional problem, in terms of the calls for service data used in this study is that in some categories definitions changed over time and this can challenge the validity of the data (and made some categories unable to be analyzed longitudinally). Altogether, the difficulty with analyzing secondary data for this project is the risk of incomplete information and eliminating any unintended bias in the existing documentation (Prescott, 2008). In the current study, every effort was made to fully answer the research questions by ensuring an objective analysis of the data that were available to the investigator.

The crime-related and calls for service data for the pre-post analyses were examined in two ways. First the crime rate per 100,000 residents was analyzed and second, the actual number of occurrences was examined to determine if there are differences in the outcomes. Data were collected for each month and this provided enough cases to carry out a pre-post research design using t-tests. In the case of Prince Albert, the rate per 100,000 residents provides the most accurate picture of crime because it demonstrates the actual victimization rate on the population reflecting the actual incidents and the changing population over time.

As noted in Chapter 1 there are some limitations with official crime data as not all incidents of crime are reported to the police. As a result, the data provided by PAPS consists only of actual crime incidents reported to the police service. Consequently, the variables analysed in this research reflect the actual police incident reports received by the PAPS. This needs to be acknowledged prior to the analyses of the data. For example, Perreault (2014) compared overall self-reported victimization with the actual incidents reported to the police and he found that only a small proportion of crimes are ever reported to the police. Perreault (2014) states:

according to the GSS, just under one third (31%) of criminal incidents were brought to the attention of the police in 2014, the proportion slightly lower than 10 years earlier, when 34% of incidents were reported. The proportions of incidents reported to the police ranged from 50% for break-ins to as little as 5% for sexual assaults. (p. 5)

Within this study, the most serious crimes were categorized as crimes against persons and include offences such as, homicide, sexual assault, assault, and robbery. Although all crime results in victimization, these crimes are considered the most serious and they contribute to the public's fear of crime (Britto, 2015). The second classification of crimes was categorized as property crimes and included, break and entering, motor vehicle theft, and damage to property. The remaining crimes were categorized as "other" and they were grouped together and comprised one category. The other category includes less serious crimes such as vandalism, disturbances and mischief.

To simply report the rate of offending in raw numbers (e.g., the occurrences in a single month) without accounting for population changes is an inadequate measure of the

true rate of crime and victimization when it comes to making month-to-month comparisons. Taking into account the change in the rates of offending, which is based on the annual population, provides the most accurate accounting of crimes within the community. When the crime rate appears as simply a number without the context of comparison to population, the number fails to reflect the contribution of changing populations. For example, when examining the population growth for Prince Albert during the time frame of this crime study there was a population increase of 3,968 persons, from 41,020 in 1997 to 44,988 in 2014, which represents an increase of 9.7% (Saskatchewan Ministry of Health, 2015).

The investigator also examined the frequency of “calls for service.” PAPS collects data on each call received from the public when their service is requested. In many cases these calls could be considered noncriminal in nature and often indicate a need for intervention if the cause is related to social conditions rather than criminal matters. As noted in Chapter 1, the study of calls for service undertaken by the PAPS in 2008 revealed that only 24% of calls for service were actually criminal in nature. The remainder, although requiring a police response, were considered a social problem that could often be better handled by staff members of other agencies. However, since the reason for the intervention required in each call for service is tracked by PAPS, this research considered each call for service as indicators of community disorder, quality of life, and wellness. In other words, if the number of calls for service in categories such as disturbances, intoxicated persons or domestic violence were reduced during the post CMPA implementation it indicates an enhancement in community wellness and quality of life.

The crime-related data were obtained for the following dates: January 1, 2006 to June 31, 2015. The calls for service data, by contrast, were obtained for January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014 as data for the same time series as the police-reported crimes were not available. This enabled analysis of 106 months of crime data and 72 months of calls for service data.

#### **4.3 Estimating the Costs of Crime in Prince Albert**

A preferred method of evaluating the outcomes in any human service endeavor is to compare the costs of implementation contrasted against the benefits to society. With respect to cost-benefit analyses, Rossi and Freeman (1993, p. 371) note that this research involves “estimates of the benefits of a program, both tangible and intangible, and estimates of the costs of undertaking the program, both direct and indirect. Once specified, the benefits and costs are translated into a common measure, usually a monetary unit.” Program costs can be direct and indirect. For instance, the direct costs of the CMPA are well documented in that additional personnel were hired and there were operational costs associated with the introduction of the CMPA, such as rent and office supplies. It is more difficult, however, to properly account for indirect costs, such as the time and resources donated by other organizations. For instance, if a university researcher volunteered their time to support the CMPA by carrying out a study of Prince Albert youth, those costs would not be considered in a cost-benefit analysis.

Calculating the benefits of an intervention can be a very complex undertaking as it is often difficult to place a price on outcomes such as reduced crime (Lee, Aos, & Pennucci, 2015). Tonry (2015) describes many of the challenges involved in attempting to measure the real costs of crime. He says that many of the cost benefit studies that

have been completed have failed to accurately measure the true costs due to incomprehensive factors being measured, an inability to capture social costs and the true cost of victimization (Tonry, 2015, p. 655). In this research, the benefits are calculated in terms of crime reduction. The direct and indirect costs of crimes to society have been estimated by a number of U.S. scholars (McCollister, French & Fang, 2010; Heaton, 2010; McCollister,) and Canadian researchers (Andresen, 2012; Easton, Furness, & Brantingham, 2014; Zhang, 2011; Zhang, Hoddenbagh, McDonald & Scrim, 2013). Ruddell and Jones (2014) summarized these estimates and their measures are used as indicators of the costs of crime for the research.

There are a number of different ways to calculate the costs of crime and Dominguez and Raphael (2015) outline three methods; hedonic analysis, contingent valuation and the bottom up approach. Each approach considers a number of different factors that are intended to measure the actual costs to society of crime. Dominguez and Raphael (2015) state that victimization is not like a commodity that is purchased or sold, so values cannot be affixed in the same manner as goods and services.

Hedonic measures are based on estimating the costs of crime as they are related to housing values, which allows researchers to place an actual economic value on crime (Heaton, 2010). Dominguez and Raphael (2015, p. 605) observe that there is elevated risk when living in a high crime neighbourhood as opposed to living in one that is safer, so people will pay more to live in a safe neighbourhood. Although the hedonic approach attempts to estimate the relationship between crime rates and victimization it is very difficult to establish a accurate cost as other unsatisfactory neighbourhood characteristics also correlate with crime, such as the quality of education, unemployment and poverty

(Dominguez & Raphael 2015, p. 606). These scholars point out that most cost estimates using hedonic analysis have estimated the value of statistical life (VSL). Those formulas attempt to estimate society's willingness to pay to reduce deaths by affixing a cost based on an individual's potential earnings. Understandably, one of the weaknesses of this VSL model is agreeing on a formula to affix an economic value to variables such as human life or the cost of the decreased value of property in a high crime neighbourhood.

Contingent valuation studies, by contrast, attempt to place a value on the willingness to pay to live in a safe environment (Dominguez & Raphael, 2015). Using this approach, researchers have used surveys to ask participants to place a value on the costs of crime (e.g., their willingness to pay more tax dollars to reduce crime). There are a number of limitations in attempting to capture costs using contingent valuation.

Dominguez and Raphael (2015, pp. 614-617) describe these shortcomings, including the differences in regional views of crime and its costs, willingness to pay, disparity amongst different regions in the country and how savings are redistributed as factors that must be considered using this approach. Heaton (2010) adds that a further weakness is that individuals might overstate the amount of money that they would pay to reduce crime

The third strategy for estimating the cost of crime described by Dominguez and Raphael (2015) is the bottom-up method, which is also called accounting-based methods (Heaton, 2010). Using this method, researchers examine every possible cost that is associated with an outcome. With respect to crime, this approach attempts to capture the cost of investigations, medical expenses, loss of work and justice system costs such as operating courts, and carrying out prosecutions. By placing a dollar value on each, estimates are created for each category of crime. The most controversial aspect of this

approach is capturing the costs of victimization. For example, one question is whether these costs should be limited only to direct medical or out-of-pocket costs suffered by the victim, or should the estimates also include their pain and suffering (Dominguez & Raphael, 2015), which is very difficult to estimate.

Although providing rationale for the strengths and weaknesses for each of the three methods, Dominguez and Raphael (2015) do not provide a single recommendation that advances one approach over the other (pp. 626-628). Rather, by describing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, the researcher is left to determine which of these strategies best fits the particular research or evaluation project being conducted.

In considering each of the three approaches outlined by Dominguez and Raphael (2015) the bottom up approach, is used in this study as it captures more of the direct and measurable costs which provides the most promise in attempting to affix costs to crime. Although the costs of victimization are very difficult to measure, the direct costs associated with police, courts and other areas of the justice system have been captured by researchers and are available in a number of publications. For example, Ruddell and Jones' (2014) examination of the economics of policing provide a number of calculations that describe costs to crime and offending. Moreover, the study released by the Fraser Institute in 2014 entitled the *Cost of Crime in Canada* speaks to the overall costs of crime in Canada, but does not define the costs for various categories of crime (see Easton, Furness, & Brantingham, 2014). McCollister, French and Fang (2014) provide the most recent cost analysis of crime. Their estimates, which are presented in Table 4.1, are used to calculate the costs of crime in Prince Albert.

In their report for the Fraser Institute Easton et al., (2014) examine the costs of crime in Canada and attempt to capture the overall justice costs as well as the costs of victimization and they observe:

Our approach to estimating Canada's cost of crime places an emphasis on the victims of crime that is much greater than in our earlier work. We see the cost of crime as having two distinct components: the cost to the victim of criminal acts; and the cost to taxpayers of denouncing, punishing, and preventing criminal acts. However, the need for punishment and prevention (including deterrence and re-education) flows from the damage that bad acts cause. Consequently, the decision to spend resources on prevention, denunciation, incapacitation, and re-education is ultimately a result of the perceived harm to the victim. It is this causal asymmetry that leads us to focus more intently than in previous editions on the kinds of harm that criminal activity generates. While it is comparatively easy to count the monetary cost of the police, the courts, and the jails, without fully appreciating the cost to the victims, we will never be able to allocate anti-crime resources sensibly. Our assessment of the cost of crime to the victims gives weight to the case for prevention and punishment and helps to establish how much we are willing to spend to enforce the criminal law. (p. 4)

In their analysis, Easton et al. (2014) calculate the overall cost of crime in Canada considering the crime severity index, the distribution of crime, the costs of victimization and the costs associated with the fear of crime. They also undertake a comprehensive look at the entire Canadian criminal justice system and its expenditures. Their analysis of the justice system includes costs related to policing, corrections and the courts.

Altogether they estimate that the total cost of crime in Canada for the 2009/10 fiscal year was \$85.2 billion which decreased to \$81.5 billion in 2012 (Easton et al., 2014, p. 96).

The cost of crime research conducted by McCollister et al. (2010) is one of the most comprehensive studies as it considers the more specific costs related to crime. For example, this study estimates the economic costs associated with victimization, including medical care, lost earnings and property damage or loss. Those scholars attempt to capture costs associated with the criminal justice system that includes funds spent on policing, court costs, and the cost of corrections programs and facilities. Interestingly, their study also attempts to gather costs associated with lost opportunities to society by examining the cost of a criminal's choice to engage in unlawful rather than lawful enterprises. Lastly, these investigators also consider the issue of intangible costs. Intangible costs are often difficult to quantify and include factors such as, pain and suffering, decreased quality of life and psychological distress resulting from victimization (McCollister et al., 2010, p. 2).

**Table 4.1 Estimated Costs of Crime: Adjusted for 2013 Dollars**

| Crime Type          | Tangible Costs | Intangible Costs | Total (2008) | Adjusted for inflation (2013) |
|---------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| Homicide            | 1,285,146      | 8,442,000        | 8,982,907    | 9,746,213                     |
| Rape/Sexual Assault | 41,252         | 199,642          | 240,776      | 261,235                       |
| Aggravated Assault  | 19,472         | 95,023           | 107,020      | 116,113                       |
| Robbery             | 21,373         | 22,575           | 42,310       | 45,905                        |
| Arson               | 16,429         | 5,133            | 21,103       | 22,896                        |
| Motor Vehicle Theft | 10,534         | 262              | 10,772       | 11,687                        |
| Stolen Property     | 7,974          | NA               | 7,974        | 8,651                         |
| Household Burglary  | 6,169          | 321              | 6,462        | 7,011                         |
| Embezzlement        | 5,480          | NA               | 5,480        | 5,945                         |
| Forgery/Counterfeit | 5,265          | NA               | 5,265        | 5,712                         |
| Fraud               | 5,032          | NA               | 5,032        | 5,459                         |
| Vandalism           | 4,860          | NA               | 4,860        | 5,272                         |
| Larceny/Theft       | 3,523          | 10               | 3,532        | 3,832                         |

McCollister et al. (2010) argue that their costing methodology has distinct advantages because it uses standardized techniques and provides a comprehensive accounting of the costs of crime for the various crime categories. It estimates the cost of total crime considering both tangible and intangible components from a variety of perspectives. This technique provides a meaningful cost perspective as well as offering policymakers with a means to assess the cost benefit of crime reduction programs (McCollister et al. 2010, p. 12). Since CMPA's risk driven approach uses crime reduction as one of its fundamental outcomes, a comparison of the costs prior to its implementation and afterward provides a meaningful way to measure cost savings. As the McCollister and colleagues research did not provide an estimate for common assaults, the estimate prepared by Easton et al. (2014, p. 39) of \$6,789 was used in this study.

In recent years there has been more attention paid to defining the costs and benefits of policing and crime reduction practices. In order to justify funds for crime reduction programs and increases in public safety budgets more emphasis has been placed on demonstrating the efficacy of policing and crime reduction programs. RAND (2012, p.1) observes that because of tight budgets and cuts in services local officials are demanding measurable evidence of quality improvement including documented evidence that focuses on value for money including statements of costs and benefits before further budgets are approved. The Centre for American Progress (2012, p. 3) states that tight fiscal and economic conditions are causing government officials to search for ways to reduce spending as they seek to sustain existing services. A number of agencies have specialized in applying these methodologies in cost-benefit analyses, including the Washington State Institute of Public Policy (see Aos & Drake, 2013).

Being able to demonstrate the economic benefits in reducing crime can help policymakers to generate savings in justice system costs, reduce costs for community residents and enhance community safety by using interventions that produce the best return on investment in taxpayer dollars. However, as noted by Ruddell and Jones (2014) weighing the economic costs of differing policy approaches poses many challenges. They note the ease of calculating direct intervention costs, such as the cost of adding police officers, are easy to calculate however, it is difficult to accurately measure the benefits of those interventions. The Centre for American Progress (2012) examined the economic benefits of reducing violent crime in a study of eight American cities. This study revealed that the four main types of violent crime (murder, rape, assault and robbery) cost Americans more than \$42 billion in direct costs or \$137 per U.S. resident in 2010. The results of this study demonstrated significant savings in a number of areas for the eight urban areas examined when criminal justice practices were changed. As an example a 10% reduction in violent crime would save the city of Boston \$5 million, reduce direct costs to victims by more than \$7 million and avert more than \$73 million in annual intangible costs to victims a cost-benefit average of \$1.45 per resident for every dollar spent. Similar cost-benefit savings were noted for the other seven communities examined in this study. Certainly, there is a benefit from demonstrating that efforts to reduce crime are effective.

Because of a lack of information pertaining to all crimes reported to the police (e.g., public order offences) and the lack of a valuation on most non-violent offences a true cost-benefit analysis could not be undertaken in the thesis research. As a result, the

focus of the analyses will be on estimating the cost savings to society in terms of reduced costs per month prior to and after the implementation of the CMPA.

#### **4.4 Methodology**

The study uses a pre- and post-implementation methodology, meaning that indicators such as crime rates are examined prior to the introduction of the CMPA and for a number of years afterward. CMPA formally became an operational model in February 2011, though there is no widely accepted date of when the intervention actually started as it was a gradual and informal process that began several months earlier. As a result, the analyses carried out in Chapter 5 focuses on two timeframes. The first is the five years immediately preceding implementation (January 1, 2006 to January 1, 2011) and three years following the CMPA implementation in February 2011 (2011-2015) and these analyses excludes six months (February 2011 to July 2011) altogether. A second series of analyses examines that includes all of the 2011 cases is also examined. The goal underlying this approach is to examine monthly data and describe changes that have occurred over the eight year time frame.

The data used in this study were placed into a monthly format and t-tests are used to describe program outcomes (e.g., average rates of crime prior to the implementation of the CMPA and afterwards), and this will enable the researcher to make inferences about the successes and failures of the CMPA approach in reducing crime in Prince Albert.

A t-test compares one sample's score distribution to another sample's score distribution to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups (Soderstrom, 2008, p.83). Weinbeck and Grinnell (1987) advise that the t-test fulfills the need for research studies to evaluate the effectiveness of differing intervention

approaches and is ideal when there is a two-category dependent variable (p. 158). The advantage of using the t-test is that it compares the two mean scores to determine whether the difference between the two groups is large enough that it is unlikely to be the work of chance (Weinbeck & Grinnel, 1987, p. 160). This strategy has recently been used by police scholars examining the pre- and post-impacts of police worn body cameras (Jennings, Lynch, & Fridell, 2015) and after the introduction of gunshot detection systems (Choi, Librett, & Collins, 2014).

As part of the study, the changes in the levels of crime after the introduction of the CMPA are determined. Those figures, in turn, are used to assess the crime reduction benefits of the CMPA interventions and these results are reported in dollars. Because data about operational costs—and especially the indirect costs—are not available, the cost analyses will examine only the savings realized to society in the examination of seven crimes for which there are cost estimates: Murder, sexual assault, robbery, assault, break and enter, motor vehicle theft, and fraud.

#### **4.5 Summary and Conclusions**

With respect to the first research question, pre-post research designs enable the researcher to examine changes over time after an intervention is introduced and they are commonly used in evaluation research (Quinn Patton, 1997). This project, however, does not lend itself to other forms of quantitative analyses due to the limited number of cases to observe and the nature of the data that were collected and published by the police. As a result, many cross-sectional research designs, such as ordinary least square regression, cannot be used.

Addressing the second research question regarding cost-benefit analysis also poses some challenges as it is difficult to account for some indirect costs. It is also a limitation when other benefits of the CMPA to the community are not considered (e.g., reduced child apprehensions). Although it would be desirable to examine other indicators of community disorder, such as changes in truancy, hospital admissions due to violence, and referrals to substance abuse programs those data were not available. Reductions in crime and community dysfunction can also increase the attractiveness of a city to investments, such as establishing new businesses, and since these decisions are rarely publicized, they are almost impossible to quantify using dollar values (Heaton, 2010). Nonetheless, despite these limitations, examining potential cost savings is important in order that we can fully understand the economic benefits of a given intervention (Lee et al., 2015).

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Analyses

#### 5.1 Introduction

Part one of this chapter presents the results from the analysis of changes in police reported crime and calls for service before and after CMPA implementation. Four series of analyses were carried out on: (a) crime rates and calls for service per 100,000 residents from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2015 and (b) crime and calls for service occurrences from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2015. These analyses were repeated using the entire data set, but did not exclude any cases, and examined two temporal eras: January 2008 to January 30, 2011 and August 1, 2011 to June 30, 2015. In addition to examining crime rates the actual number of occurrences was also considered in this study.

The second series of analyses estimated the costs of crime that focuses only on the cost savings achieved by implementing the CMPA approach. These analyses examined only the costs of seven major offences before and after the implementation of the CMPA. Similar to the pre-post analyses that examined different temporal eras two series of analyses are presented. Altogether, these analyses shed light on the efficacy of the CMPA crime reduction approach and the savings realized by implementing this model.

#### 5.2 Police Data

Monthly crime data were collected from the Prince Albert Police Service from the time period of January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2015. The indicators used in the analyses reported below included the following classifications:

- crimes of violence (murder, sexual assault, assaults, robbery and other crimes against persons),

- property crimes (break and entering, motor vehicle theft, fraud, and,
- “other” offences, which includes lesser serious criminal offences that do not fit in the violent or property crime categories and includes crimes such as wilful damage or impaired driving.

Implementation of CMPA started on a very informal basis in 2010 and was formally initiated on Feb. 1, 2011. Therefore, in the first series of analyses, all cases between Feb. 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011 were excluded from the analysis to account for the fact that the start-up of CMPA was an evolutionary process and that we should not expect immediate results (e.g., start a crime reduction strategy on February 1 and expect a meaningful change by March 1).

Calls for service both pre-and post-implementation of CMPA were also examined. The time frame differed somewhat due to the fact that Prince Albert Police Service were only able to supply the information for a reduced period, and only cases from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014 were available. Six types of calls for service, that are all indicators of community dysfunction, were examined:

- loud parties,
- calls regarding domestic violence,
- assistance to Ministry of Social Services (MSS) mobile crisis intervention,
- disturbance calls,
- harassment; and,
- intoxication.

These types of calls all reflect indicators of social disorder as defined by Cotter (2016). Other calls for service indicators were available (e.g., concerns about traffic) but these

indicators were not examined as they had no theoretical association with CMPA efforts. One limitation of the calls for service data was that calls about municipal bylaws that might reflect physical disorder (e.g., littering) were not available for the entire series. Several of these variables are theoretically associated with the social disorganization proposition. Skogan (2012) states social disorder in tandem with other crime undermines the stability of neighbourhoods. He observes that because disorder plays such an important role in the well being of a community researchers are now expanding their definitions regarding the concept of community well being includes many factors in addition to criminality that can contribute to the decline and destabilization of neighbourhoods (Skogan, 2012, p. 174).

Before any statistical tests were carried out descriptive statistics were first conducted including the minimum and maximum values, means and standard deviations for each of the variables. T-tests were then used to examine the pre- and post-implementation of the CMPA. Weinbach and Grinnell (1987) note how the *t*-test:

is used to help determine whether an apparent relationship between two variables is a true relationship that exists within a population or is a work of chance. With *t*, this determination is accomplished by comparison of means. The samples divided into two groups (sub-samples) based on the value of each case for its two category, nominal level variable. (p. 159)

Soderstrom (2008, p. 83) writes that the *t*-test refers to comparing one sample's score distribution to another sample's score distribution to make a determination regarding statistical differences. The test involves comparing the means of two samples on an

interval-ratio dependent variable. This test yields results to indicate whether the two means of the two samples are significantly different from each other.

**Table 5.1 Prince Albert Crime Occurrences, Pre- and Post-Implementation January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2015**

|   | Months | Mean   | S.D.  | Pre and post test $p$ value |
|---|--------|--------|-------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Crime</b>  |        |        |       |                             |
| • Violent   | 106    | 86.3   | 19.36 | ---                         |
| • Property  | 106    | 274.3  | 69.74 | ---                         |
| • Other   | 106    | 225.59 | 40.07 | ---                         |
|   |        |        |       |                             |
| <b>Pre-implementation 09/2006 to 01/2011</b>                            |        |        |       |                             |
| • Violent   | 53     | 90.43  | 18.08 | ---                         |
| • Property  | 53     | 285.94 | 70.28 | ---                         |
| • Other   | 53     | 216.94 | 38.69 | ---                         |
|   |        |        |       |                             |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 06/2015</b>                           |        |        |       |                             |
| • Violent   | 53     | 82.83  | 18.34 | .043*                       |
| • Property  | 53     | 262.66 | 67.12 | .086                        |
| • Other   | 53     | 234.25 | 41.42 | .026*                       |
|   |        |        |       |                             |
| <b>Pre-implementation 09/2006 to 01/2011</b>                            |        |        |       |                             |
| • Violent   | 53     | 90.43  | 18.08 | ---                         |
| • Property  | 53     | 285.94 | 70.28 | ---                         |
| • Other   | 53     | 216.94 | 38.69 | ---                         |
|   |        |        |       |                             |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 06/2015 (Exclude 02/2011-07/2011)</b> |        |        |       |                             |
| • Violent   | 47     | 79.68  | 18.34 | .004*                       |
| • Property  | 47     | 258.47 | 67.12 | .048*                       |
| • Other   | 47     | 235.47 | 41.42 | .024*                       |

\*  $p \leq .05$

Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the  $t$ -test that examined: violent, property, and other crime using the actual number of occurrences reported to the police (not adjusted for population). Panel one in the table reveals the descriptive statistics for the entire 106 months as no cases were excluded from the

analyses. Panels two and three present the descriptive statistics pre-implementation (53 months) and post-implementation (47 months). The results of the t-test are presented in panel three and they reveal that there were no statistically significant differences between the pre- and post-implementation eras. The results for the pre- and post-implementation are also presented excluding all cases from February 1, 2011 to July 30, 2011. This analysis shows that there was a statistically significant reduction in violent crime ( $p = .004$ ), property crime ( $p = .049$ ) although inconsistent with expectations, there was a slight increase in other crimes ( $p = .024$ ) after the implementation of CMPA.

Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the *t*-tests that examined three categories of crime: violent, property, and other using the rate per 100,000 Prince Albert residents. Panel one in the table reveals the descriptive statistics for the entire 106 months. Panels two and three present the descriptive statistics for the pre-implementation (53 months) and post-implementation (53 months). In this series of analyses no cases were excluded. The results of the t-test are presented in panel three and they reveal that there was a statistically significant reduction after the introduction of CMPA in two crime categories. Violent crime showed a statistically significant decrease ( $p = .002$ ), as did property offences ( $p = .011$ ). The results for the pre-and post-implementation are also presented excluding all cases from February 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011. These findings show that there was a statistically significant reduction in two crime categories identified above: Violent crime ( $p = .000$ ) and property crime ( $p = .005$ ), but there was no significant change in other crimes.

**Table 5.2 Prince Albert Crime (Rate per 100,000 Residents),  
Pre- and Post-Implementation, January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2015**

|  | Months | Mean    | S.D.   | <i>p</i> value |
|--|--------|---------|--------|----------------|
| <b>Crime</b>   |        |         |        |                |
| • Violent  | 106    | 200.48  | 44.33  | ---            |
| • Property   | 106    | 635.79  | 164.87 | ---            |
| • Other  | 106    | 521.71  | 89.36  | ---            |
|  |        |         |        |                |
| <b>Pre-implementation<br/>09/2006 to 01/2011</b>                                   |        |         |        |                |
| • Violent  | 53     | 213.32  | 39.62  | ---            |
| • Property   | 53     | 676.23  | 166.82 | ---            |
| • Other  | 53     | 513.21  | 91.67  | ---            |
|  |        |         |        |                |
| <b>Post-implementation<br/>07/2010 to 06/2015</b>                                  |        |         |        |                |
| • Violent  | 53     | 187.64  | 45.41  | .002*          |
| • Property   | 53     | 595.34  | 154.02 | .011*          |
| • Other  | 53     | 530.22  | 87.02  | .330           |
|  |        |         |        |                |
| <b>Pre-implementation<br/>09/2006 to 01/2011</b>                                   |        |         |        |                |
| • Violent  | 53     | 213.32  | 39.62  | ---            |
| • Property   | 53     | 676.232 | 166.82 | ---            |
| • Other  | 53     | 513.21  | 91.67  | ---            |
|  |        |         |        |                |
| <b>Post-implementation<br/>02/2011 to 06/2015<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b> |        |         |        |                |
| • Violent  | 47     | 180.00  | 40.80  | .000*          |
| • Property   | 47     | 584.49  | 151.28 | .005*          |
| • Other  | 47     | 531.87  | 90.30  | .309*          |

\*  $p \leq .05$

Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics and the results of the *t*-test that examined six types of police calls for service from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014: Assistance to Mobile Crisis/Social Services, disturbances, domestic violence, harassment, intoxicated persons, and loud parties. As noted above, there were fewer observations for the calls for service data. Panel one in the table reveals the descriptive statistics for the actual number of occurrences for the entire 72 months considered in the

**Table 5.3 Prince Albert Police Calls for Service: Occurrences  
Pre- and Post- Implementation, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014**

|  | Months | Mean   | S.D.  | <i>p</i> value |
|--|--------|--------|-------|----------------|
| <b>Calls for service</b>   |        |        |       | ---            |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 72     | 32.00  | 8.39  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 72     | 230.88 | 55.83 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 72     | 145.44 | 22.46 | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 72     | 11.32  | 3.60  | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 72     | 330.69 | 75.00 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 72     | 60.79  | 26.08 | ---            |
| <b>Pre-implementation 01/2009 to 02/2011</b>                                   |        |        |       |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 25     | 30.52  | 8.73  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 25     | 235.48 | 54.48 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 25     | 140.00 | 16.79 | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 25     | 12.40  | 4.34  | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 25     | 307.40 | 69.14 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 25     | 69.84  | 29.31 | ---            |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 12/2014</b>                                  |        |        |       |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 47     | 32.79  | 8.20  | .289           |
| • Disturbances   | 47     | 228.43 | 56.97 | .609           |
| • Domestic violence  | 47     | 148.34 | 24.63 | .095           |
| • Harassment   | 47     | 10.74  | 3.03  | .098           |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 47     | 343.09 | 75.74 | .049*          |
| • Loud parties   | 47     | 55.98  | 23.10 | .047*          |
| <b>Pre-implementation 01/2009 to 01/2011<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b>  |        |        |       |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 25     | 30.52  | 8.73  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 25     | 235.48 | 54.48 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 25     | 140.00 | 16.79 | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 25     | 12.40  | 4.30  | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 25     | 307.40 | 69.14 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 25     | 69.84  | 29.31 | ---            |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 12/2014<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b> |        |        |       |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 41     | 33.00  | 8.27  | .259           |
| • Disturbances   | 41     | 225.29 | 55.45 | .468           |
| • Domestic violence  | 41     | 152.46 | 21.46 | .011*          |
| • Harassment   | 41     | 10.56  | 3.13  | .072           |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 41     | 347.12 | 73.68 | .032*          |
| • Loud parties   | 41     | 54.15  | 22.29 | .027*          |

\*  $p \leq .05$

analyses. Panels two and three present the descriptive statistics pre-implementation (25 months) and post-implementation (47 months). In this series of analysis no cases were excluded. The results of the t-test are presented in panel three and they reveal there was a

statistically significant decrease between the pre-and post-implementation eras in one category: loud parties ( $p=.047$ ). Inconsistent with expectations, there was a significant increase in the mean calls for service for intoxicated persons after the implementation of the CMPA ( $p=.049$ ).

Panels four (25 months) and five (41 months) in Table 5.3 represent the pre-implementation period January 1, 2009 to January 31, 2011 compared to post-implementation period of February 1, 2011 to December 31, 2014, excluding six months (from Feb. 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011). These analyses revealed that after the CMPA implementation there was a statistically significant decrease in loud parties ( $p=.027$ ). There was, however, a statistically significant increase in calls for service for domestic violence ( $p=.011$ ) and intoxicated persons ( $p=.032$ ).

Table 5.4 presents the results of the t-tests using calls for service per 100,000 Prince Albert residents. Panel one shows the rate of occurrences reported to the police for the entire 72 months considered in the analyses. Panels two and three, by contrast, present the descriptive statistics pre-implementation (25 months) and post-implementation (47 months). In this series of analysis no cases were excluded. The results of these t-tests are presented in panel three and they reveal that there was one statistically significant decrease between the pre- and post-implementation eras: loud parties ( $p=.041$ ). Panels four and five reveals the changes between the pre- and post-implementation periods (excluding the six months from February 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011), and only one indicator, loud parties had a statistically significant reduction ( $p=.023$ ).

**Table 5.4 PA Police Calls for Service: Occurrences (Per 100,000 Residents)  
Pre- and Post- Implementation, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014**

|  | Months | mean   | SD     | <i>p</i> value |
|--|--------|--------|--------|----------------|
| <b>Calls for service</b>   |        |        |        |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 72     | 72.97  | 19.13  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 72     | 528.17 | 134.04 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 72     | 331.96 | 51.67  | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 72     | 25.94  | 8.62   | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 72     | 754.77 | 172.02 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 72     | 139.46 | 62.08  | ---            |
| <b>Pre-implementation 01/2009 to 01/2011</b>                                   |        |        |        |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 25     | 70.13  | 19.49  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 25     | 545.14 | 141.13 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 25     | 323.13 | 46.68  | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 25     | 28.81  | 10.72  | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 25     | 709.20 | 167.91 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 25     | 162.06 | 71.89  | ---            |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 12/2014</b>                                  |        |        |        |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 47     | 74.53  | 18.97  | .349           |
| • Disturbances   | 47     | 519.15 | 130.65 | .450           |
| • Domestic violence  | 47     | 336.67 | 54.47  | .274           |
| • Harassment   | 47     | 24.42  | 6.92   | .072           |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 47     | 779.01 | 170.99 | .101           |
| • Loud parties   | 47     | 127.45 | 53.18  | .041*          |
| <b>Pre-implementation 01/2009 to 01/2011<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b>  |        |        |        |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 25     | 70.01  | 19.49  | ---            |
| • Disturbances   | 25     | 545.14 | 141.33 | ---            |
| • Domestic violence  | 25     | 323.13 | 46.68  | ---            |
| • Harassment   | 25     | 28.81  | 10.72  | ---            |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 25     | 709.20 | 167.91 | ---            |
| • Loud parties   | 25     | 162.06 | 71.89  | ---            |
| <b>Post-implementation 02/2011 to 12/2014<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b> |        |        |        |                |
| • Assist: MC/SS  | 41     | 74.88  | 19.21  | .327           |
| • Disturbances   | 41     | 510.94 | 126.59 | .327           |
| • Domestic violence  | 41     | 345.44 | 47.53  | .067           |
| • Harassment   | 41     | 23.94  | 7.09   | .051           |
| • Intoxicated persons  | 41     | 786.71 | 166.26 | .074           |
| • Loud parties   | 41     | 123.02 | 51.18  | .023*          |

\*  $p \leq .05$

### 5.3 Summary of the Pre-Post Analyses

When interpreting the calls for service data in Tables 5.3 and 5.4—using the same criteria as considered in Tables 5.1 and 5.2—there were a number of similarities with

respect to decreases in crime categories that were statistically significant. First, overall crime (violent, property and “other”) all decreased after the implementation of the CMPA. Moreover, calls for service for loud parties which is an indicator of disorder declined after implementation of CMPA.

#### 5.4 Cost Impact of the CMPA

**Table 5.5 Cost Differences: Pre- and Post-Implementation  
All Crime Occurrences, Prince Albert. Jan 1, 2006 to June 30, 2015**

| <b>Offence – Occurrences<br/>Pre-Post Hub Implementation<br/>(106 Months)</b>                 | <b>Pre HUB<br/>(Mean)</b> | <b>Post HUB<br/>(Mean)</b> | <b>Difference</b> | <b>Cost per<br/>Offence</b> | <b>Monthly<br/>Savings</b> |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| • Murder  | .23                       | .25                        | -.02              | 9,746,213                   | -194,924                   |
| • Sexual Assault  | 7.40                      | 8.42                       | -1.02             | 261,235                     | -206,460                   |
| • Robbery   | 7.87                      | 7.13                       | .74               | 45,905                      | -37,331                    |
| • Assault   | 53.32                     | 48.83                      | 4.49              | 6,789                       | 30,482                     |
| • Break and Enter   | 39.15                     | 40.96                      | -1.81             | 7,011                       | - 12,684                   |
| • Motor Vehicle Theft   | 18.85                     | 18.02                      | .83               | 11,687                      | 9,700                      |
| • Fraud   | 8.51                      | 8.72                       | -.21              | 5,459                       | -1,045                     |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |                           |                            |                   |                             | <b>-\$413,262</b>          |
| <b>Offence – Occurrences<br/>Pre-Post Hub Implementation<br/>(Exclude 02/2011 to 07/2011)</b> | <b>Pre HUB<br/>(Mean)</b> | <b>Post HUB<br/>(Mean)</b> | <b>Difference</b> | <b>Cost per<br/>Offence</b> | <b>Monthly<br/>Savings</b> |
| • Murder  | .23                       | .21                        | .02               | 9,746,213                   | 194,924                    |
| • Sexual Assault  | 7.40                      | 7.94                       | -.55              | 26,1235                     | - 141,607                  |
| • Robbery   | 7.87                      | 7.19                       | .68               | 45,905                      | 31,215                     |
| • Assault   | 53.32                     | 46.94                      | 6.38              | 6,789                       | 43,314                     |
| • Break and Enter   | 39.15                     | 41.70                      | -2.55             | 7,011                       | - 17,878                   |
| • Motor Vehicle Theft   | 18.85                     | 18.26                      | .59               | 11,687                      | 6,896                      |
| • Fraud   | 8.51                      | 8.77                       | -.26              | 5,459                       | - 1,418                    |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  |                           |                            |                   |                             | <b>\$115,446</b>           |

Table 5.5 provides an estimate of the cost savings realized resulting from the reduction in crime post-implementation of CMPA examining only seven types of crimes. Although the police respond to a far greater number of offences, cost estimates were only available for these seven crimes. The results in Panel 1 show that after the implementation of the CMPA there was an average monthly cost *increase* of \$413,262.

The analyses reported in Panel 2 exclude the six cases immediately after the implementation of the CMPS (Feb 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011). This series of analyses shows a monthly crime *reduction* of \$115,446 in the post-implementation era.

### **5.5 Cost Impact Analysis**

Like the outcomes of other empirical studies, the results of these cost analyses are sensitive to the era being examined. The results presented in Table 5.5, for example, demonstrated that the mean monthly costs of crime increased when all the cases were considered but decreased when the cases between February 1, 2011 and July 31, 2011 were excluded from the analyses. As noted in Chapter 4, it is difficult to estimate the true costs of crime because costs are both direct and indirect and are not necessarily captured by agencies as part of their core function. A number of scholars have been able to develop cost estimates by examining the direct and indirect costs of various types of crime categories. This study used the costs established by McCollister, French and Fang (2010) for six offences and the Easton et al. (2014) cost estimate for assaults, which has been used by other scholars (see Ruddell & Jones, 2013).

By excluding the cases between February 1, 2011 and July 31, 2011, the results presented in Table 5.5 suggest that substantial cost savings were realized after the implementation of the CMPS. There are a number of factors that might drive these results. Some offences, such as homicide, for example are very rare and reducing these crimes may be due to other factors than the CMPS, such as improved medical care for assault victims. In addition, the results showed an increase in the number of sexual assaults being reported in Prince Albert after 2011, which increased the costs of crime for the community. That outcome might be a result of survivors of these crimes who have a greater trust and confidence in the police after the implementation of the CMPS, and who

are then more likely to report these offences. The results from the 2014 GSS victimization survey show that sexual assault is the violent crime that is least likely to be reported (Perreault, 2015). As a result, the more accurate reporting of some types of offences could drive the results about cost-savings even though the rate of victimization may have been stable during the era examined.

Another factor that would have changed the monthly cost estimate is the fact that the cost for simple or common assaults was used for all assaults. This is a limitation of the results because although they occur less frequently, aggravated assaults are more costly to society (see McCollister et al., 2010). As a result, while showing a substantial cost savings, these results must be interpreted carefully as a number of factors external to the CMPA might be responsible for these outcomes.

## **5.6 Summary and Conclusions**

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of changes in police-reported crime and calls for service pre-and post-CMPA implementation. A series of four analyses were carried out using crime occurrences and calls for service and then making a comparison of each type based on the rate per 100,000 Prince Albert residents. Two different temporal areas were also examined to account for the fact that the CMPA did not have a precise start date.

When considering only the number of occurrences the results in Table 5.1 show a statistically significant decrease in the violent and other crime classifications over the first evaluation time frame. When the growth in population is factored in and the rate of offending per 100,000 residents is taken into account (Table 5.2) the analyses revealed a statistically significant reduction in violent and property offences. That result was consistent in both temporal eras examined: when all cases were considered and when the

February 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011 cases were excluded from the analyses. Similarly, when examining the calls for service—presented in Table 5.3—the results indicated a statistically significant reduction in the number of calls for loud parties, which is a strong indicator of social disorder.

Despite the fact that the crime reduction in the post-implementation period showed a statistically significant decrease, the number of crimes that were reduced on a monthly basis were relatively modest. Even though the crime reduction was modest, it provides a significant cost savings to society. The results in Table 5.5 indicate a total cost reduction of \$115,446 per month if the February 1, 2011 to July 31, 2011 cases were excluded, which shows the influence of the time frame being examined. Altogether, that results in a cost savings of approximately \$5.4 million to society. One limitation of the analyses, however, is that only seven of the most serious and therefore costly offences were considered and the costs associated with the other crimes were not considered this study. Had all police activity regarding crime been factored into the analysis, it is plausible the savings would have been greater.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **Implications for Research, Practice, and Policy**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the crime reduction impact of the CMPA that was formally introduced in Prince Albert in February, 2011. CMPA is a distinctive approach to policing as the municipal police service introduced a risk-reduction approach to reduce crime that involves an interagency partnership to address cases of acute elevated risk. In such cases, an agency is identified to take the lead in providing services to clients with assistance from other agencies who contribute services and resources designed to reduce the risk. Initially based on an approach used in Glasgow, Scotland, the intervention developed in Prince Albert has been exported to 13 other Saskatchewan communities by 2016 and is being implemented in over 75 Canadian cities (Taylor, 2016). For example, Community Mobilization Sudbury began formal operations in 2014. Similarly to CMPA, the Sudbury strategy partnership is mix of government and non-government partners with a focus on “high need families who are at risk” (Community Safety Sudbury, 2014, p. 2)

In terms of the thesis, Chapters 2 and 3 describe the challenges and approach taken by CMPA after its formal introduction in February 2011. This form of intervention that uses risk as its intervention point with its clients continues to evolve as challenges around its mandate, information sharing, funding, and leadership are resolved and implemented. This distinctive approach and the willingness of the partners to adapt and tailor their program for success have shown some promising initial results (Nilson, 2015).

The early leadership and the outcomes that the CMPA achieves in its founding stage may play a significant role in its future (King, 2009).

Chapter 4 describes the data used in the study and the methodological approach taken, with the findings described in Chapter 5. The results of the analyses reveal that there was a significantly significant crime reduction for violent, property and other crimes after the CMPA was implemented. Those changes were consistent across the two temporal eras examined. In addition, there was a statistically significant reduction in one indicator of social disorder, the calls for service for loud parties. Lastly, the CMPA showed a cost savings to society due to less crime when the six 2011 cases immediately after the implementation of the program were excluded from the analyses. In the pages that follow a number of implications for future research, policy, theoretical development and practice are presented.

## **6.2 Implications for Policy**

This research has demonstrated that a risk-reduction approach to crime reduction resulted in a statistically significant reduction in violent, property and other crimes. This is an encouraging finding that suggests the CMPA is a promising crime reduction strategy when only factors that were related to crime were considered. Thus, the results presented above suggest that police-led interventions that are based on social service principles show some promise. The Center for American Progress (2015) report that a 1997 meta-analysis found that practices such as family therapy, parent-training, effective interventions targeted towards at-risk pre-adolescence and vocational training, for certain groups of older ex-offenders, reduced the incidence of serious offences (p. 5). Understandably, the measurable impacts of these types of programs are most likely to be

revealed when examined using longitudinal approaches rather than cross-sectional methods. As a result, the short time frame available for the Prince Albert research and the limited number of indicators available for analysis precludes the investigator from making any definitive statements about the overall efficacy of the CMPA approach.

The results reported above show that modest crime reductions can result in considerable cost savings. Some of those cost savings, however, may be a consequence of the manner in which the cost per offence is calculated. In this study the McCollister and colleagues (2010) data were used that took direct and indirect costs into account, which results in higher dollar estimates than other methods. Notwithstanding that caveat, the findings in this research are consistent with others showing a positive crime reduction benefit from police interventions (Aos & Drake, 2013; Center for American Progress, 2015; Heaton, 2010; Ruddell & Jones, 2014). These reports provide empirical evidence that shows a significant cost saving through the reduction of crime.

The results of the analyses presented in Chapter 5 provides mixed empirical support for interagency interventions based on risk-reduction as a promising approach to crime reduction. Continued efforts to create policy for the seamless sharing of information at the front-line level so each agency can contribute fully to the partnership has the potential to enhance the quality of programming that is ultimately available to CMPA clients.

In September 2016 the risk-reduction approach used by CMPA is being replicated in 13 other locations within the province of Saskatchewan as well as 65 sites outside the province (Taylor, 2016). It is therefore important that the expansion in these programs be supported by empirical research to help agency leaders determine what elements of the

interventions are most effective, thus enabling them to get the most impact from their efforts. Once the efficacy of different aspects of the program is established, it can be implemented in a more effective manner in a larger number of locations.

One limitation in this study is that the other non-crime related outcomes were not included in this research. As mentioned in Chapter 4, those measures, such as the number of persons admitted to emergency rooms for injuries related to assaults, were not considered. Even if these indicators did exist, they are not easily quantified: how, for instance, does one place an economic value on lower truancy by high school students? Nilson (2015) indicates these agencies should begin a process that would enable them to show the benefits of their participation in risk-reduction interventions. Had that data been available for this study, the overall outcomes of the CMPA would be further informed.

In October 2014, Public Safety Canada (PSC) hosted a workshop with the support of the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers responsible for Justice. The goal of the workshop was to examine three key areas regarding community safety and policing areas: (a) efficiencies within policing, (b) new models of community safety, and (c) efficiencies within the broader justice system. The participants expressed interest in community mobilization, its successes and challenges, and they resolved to develop a guide to policy and/ or practice and present that information to the Ministers of Justice at a future date. One lesson learned from this research is that agencies considering community mobilization interventions as a method of crime control should consider collecting comprehensive data prior to introducing any changes, which would aid in their ability to carry out meaningful research and evaluation on these programs.

### **6.3 Limitations of the Study**

One of the challenges facing CMPA is its ability for agency partners to share information and statistical data on indicators of health, education and social services so that evaluators and/or researchers can establish the efficacy of the approach, and record the contributions of each agency. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the CMPA has reduced school truancy, child welfare apprehensions and emergency room visits for violence. Analysing data that captures this information would have informed our knowledge of the overall impact of CMPA. A number of these agencies were approached about obtaining their data, but none were willing to share their information. As a result the information provided by the Prince Albert Police Service on crime and calls for service were the only data available to the researcher. One important indicator of the overall volume and severity of crime, the crime severity index, might also be examined in future studies, but those data are not calculated in a monthly format.

There are a number of additional limitations in this research that must be acknowledged. With respect to the cost analysis, a complete accounting of the crime control benefits of the CMPA could not be undertaken as data were only available for seven types of crimes. As a result, other offences such as wilful damage and other public order crimes were not considered in the analysis. In addition, some of these forms of crime, such as homicide, might be sensitive to a number of factors apart from the influence of the CMPA. The delivery of prompt emergency medical care, for example might make the difference between a homicide that costs society \$9.7 million and an aggravated assault offence, which costs society much less.

A final limitation in this study is that since the implementation of the CMPA the current research demonstrates that crime decreased in the post-implementation period, and those results were statistically significant. There may, however, be other possible reasons for the drop in crime. Factors such as economic development, a lower unemployment rate or more stable family relationships could influence levels of crime irrespective of the activities of the police or CMPA. As a result it is important that follow-up studies include other indicators of community functioning.

#### **6.4 Implications for Further Research**

The focus of this thesis was to examine the risk-reduction approach to crime reduction in an agency's founding stage (see King, 2009). Currently, this approach is being examined in order to design a model that is effective and efficient and can be replicated in other sites. Although early indicators of some criminal justice programs tend to show promise, they are often based on anecdotal accounts or describe individual cases of success, which can be misleading, and may not reflect the overall success of an intervention. The current research examined only two outcomes of the CMPA, which were the impact on police calls for service and police recorded crime, and the cost savings that resulted from those changes. While there are limitations with both of those measures, the results show that the CMPA approach is promising. Consequently, this intervention provides fertile ground for further research and study. As noted by Nilson (2015) a number of challenges are evident, that once overcome, have the likelihood to enhance service delivery by CMPA and improve outcomes for its clients. Once all agencies have put measures into place to show the efficiencies and effectiveness of this

approach a more comprehensive longitudinal study would determine the sustainability of this approach to community safety.

With respect to investigating the impact of the CMPA, a number of different strategies could be undertaken. Qualitative methods could also be used to examine the operations and effectiveness of the CMPA. For example, interviews could be carried out with clients to gather their perceptions about their involvement in the program. To further inform an investigation of this impact, clients could provide perspective on the success and failures during implementation of the project. One area that has not been examined in the community mobilization literature is whether the individuals receiving these interventions feel pressured into participating, which might actually decrease their trust and confidence in the police and other social institutions.

A process evaluation of the implementation of the COR and HUB could also be carried out. Such an evaluation would also be informed by an examination of the operational, policy, funding and support related activities from the partner agencies. These areas of examination could inform the efforts of other agencies that are developing similar interventions. The establishment of a formal comprehensive data collection and sharing process developed by each agency would aid in evaluating an agency's success in meeting their stated objectives.

The results of the present study have implications for investigators examining the effectiveness of CMPA. One limitation in the current study was the lack of information from agencies other than the police. Investigators carrying out future studies should attempt to include indicators from health, education and social service agencies.

Incorporating information from these sources will provide a more comprehensive assessment about the effectiveness and impacts of the CMPA.

The current study used quantitative methods using secondary data. Future research might benefit from collecting data specifically for an evaluation of the CMPA. This approach would enable investigators to examine specific aspects of the CMPA effectiveness including:

- caseload impact on social agencies;
- impact on emergency room visits for violence;
- impact on school truancy rates;
- impact on child and youth apprehensions;
- impact on adult and youth probation caseloads; and
- impact on adult and youth crime severity index measures.

Fenno (2013) identified a number of potential areas for future research in his study of youth drug and alcohol use in Prince Albert. He suggested that structured interviews might aid in our understanding of social disorganization. Such interviews could provide insight into neighbourhood characteristics when income, neighbourhood cohesion, mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, divorce and single parent families were examined. Fenno (2013) also notes that researching these issues may provide a theoretical basis upon which new areas of intervention could be considered. Future research that considered these factors along with those outlined above has the potential to bring about a further reduction in crime and subsequent cost savings.

Qualitative methods could also inform our understanding of the impacts of community mobilization interventions on clients. Gilling (1999) contends that some recipients of crime prevention interventions, such as the CMPA, may feel stigmatized as a result of receiving services, which would contribute to their marginalization. Having a better understanding of what clients experience could guide both policy development and service delivery.

### **6.5 Implications for Theory**

Chapter 3 describes how two theoretical propositions are associated with the community mobilization model: social disorganization and crime prevention through social development. Both of these approaches outline how the social conditions within a community can contribute to reducing crime and social disorder. The approach taken by CMPA is intended to strengthen a community's ability to better regulate behaviour through developing more effective informal social controls. One of the favourable outcomes identified in this research was the reduction in social disorder (e.g., loud parties) occurrences that came to the attention of the police. As risk situations affecting individuals and families are reduced, stability will follow and an increase in collective efficacy will occur. Further research by scholars examining the outcomes of CMPA through the lens of social disorganization, crime prevention through social development and collective efficacy could contribute to theoretical development.

### **6.6 Conclusions**

Analysis of crime data from 2006 to 2015 suggests that the CMPA was effective in reducing crime and lowering the costs to society for crime in Prince Albert. Some of those findings, however, were sensitive to the measures or the temporal eras being

examined. Reducing crime and disorder may also lower levels of social disorganization which in turn might increase levels of informal social control. Higher levels of informal social control may further reduce crime.

The implementation of CMPA required the community, its social agencies and police to come together to implement a new and innovative approach to crime reduction. It has attracted significant interest from other communities wishing to reduce crime and has also attracted the interest of the academic research community (McFee & Taylor, 2014; Taylor, 2016). This approach has the potential for improved crime reduction as it evolves through self-examination and by carrying out evaluations and other independent examinations by stakeholders and the academic community.

While the community of Prince Albert continues to face high crime rates and the issues of social disorganization caused by a highly transient and diverse population, the manner in which the community service agencies, police, academia and political leadership have cooperated in the formation of the CMPA is commendable. Continuing funding and support by each of the partner agencies is essential to the future success of this innovative model. Altogether, this research shows that this innovative community-based crime reduction strategy has shown promising results.

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