COMPARING HOBBES’S GRATITUDE AND ARISTOTLE’S MAGNANIMITY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of

Master of Arts
in
Social and Political Thought
University of Regina

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Regina, Saskatchewan
July, 2018

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Taline Djoboulian, candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Social & Political Thought, has presented a thesis titled, *Comparing Hobbes's Gratitude and Aristotle's Magnanimity*, in an oral examination held on July 18, 2018. The following committee members have found the thesis acceptable in form and content, and that the candidate demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of the subject material.

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Abstract

Hobbes's natural law of gratitude needs to be brought back into perspective when reading his political works. Often when reading Hobbes, many use his depiction of human nature and natural rights to demonstrate the innate propensity toward unsociability. However, contrary to this presumption, Hobbes presents a collectivist dimension to his argument even within the state of nature. The natural law of gratitude demonstrates the importance of preserving sociability and collectivity. In both *On the Citizen* and *Leviathan*, gratitude creates and sustains sociability with utility-based friendships. Gratitude is preserved best in a monarchy, because it secures covenants that rely on gratitude; it secures voluntary action; and is rooted in natural equality. Hobbes's natural law of gratitude was influenced by Aristotle's virtue of magnanimity and friendships that accompany virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, Hobbes would problematize Aristotle’s magnanimous person (or the great-souled man) because they reject gratitude for their benefactions on the account that nothing seems great to them. Furthermore, the great-souled man worries that they may be perceived as a member of the inferior class which lowers their self-esteem that allows for their great benefactions. It will be argued that gratitude is needed to form the collective, and it is best preserved in Hobbes’s monarchy. For monarchy is rooted in natural equality, while timocracy is rooted in inequality.
Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Lee Ward, Dr. David Elliott and Dr. Ryan Doran for their patience and inspiration. In addition, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Ann Ward who shared her passion for Aristotle with me. I would like to thank Dr. Travis Smith, Dr. Harold Chorney and Dr. Gregory Koabel for their motivation and mentorship during my studies. I am grateful to the Nazarian and Djoboulian family for their unconditional love and support during my studies. I would have not made it this far without my family and the great friends I made at the University of Regina. Also, I am truly thankful toward the Vincent family for their encouragement.

Taline Djoboulian
Post Defence Acknowledgement

I thank the external examiner, Dr. Bruno Dupeyron for his advice.
Dedication

To my grandfather, Abraham Nazarian

(1932-2017)
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Introduction

The prominent academic literature on Thomas Hobbes presented by Charles Taylor, Quentin Skinner, Howard Warrender, C.B. Macpherson, Leo Strauss, and Gabriella Slomp, examine the terrors of unsociability. Each scholar presents a different reading of Hobbes’s political works on how to deal with unsociability. The focus of this thesis is to examine how Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude promotes sociability by allowing “trust and mutual help”.¹ With mutual help or aid, there will be mutual empowerment. The commonwealth is needed to secure the natural law of gratitude. Hence, sociability can only be secured in the political state. The natural law of gratitude needs to be brought back into focus when reading Hobbes’s political works. From the scholars listed, Warrender and Strauss provide a brief examination of the natural law of gratitude but do not provide a textual analysis exclusively on gratitude and its contribution to sociability. There are certain conditions needed for the natural law of gratitude to take place. It will be argued that the natural law of gratitude can only take place if these three conditions are met: first, a covenant must be made between two or more parties; second, it must be voluntary and without coercion from the sovereign; third, it requires the recognition of natural equality. These conditions demonstrate that Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude creates utility-based friendships.

First, gratitude depends on a covenant made between two or more consenting parties. If there is no covenant made, there is no reason to display gratitude. Since covenants rely on the reciprocation of gratitude, it sustains the social life of the member

of the commonwealth. The obligation to obey one’s covenants is described by Hobbes in two distinct ways: *in foro interno* (in conscience) and *in foro externo* (in civil law).² Both forms of obedience are required to promote the social life. Obligation *in foro interno* demonstrates that the natural law of gratitude binds in conscience with promise-keeping; and will be examined under the works of A.E. Taylor and Howard Warrender.³ Obligation *in foro externo* preserves the natural law of gratitude under civil law.

However, this section will demonstrate that depending on one’s reading of Hobbes’s state of nature, gratitude may seem impossible even with the political state. The first reading in which some scholars present Hobbes, is rather pessimistic. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes states that the state of nature is an awful solitary state: “No knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”⁴

Charles Taylor provides a reading of Hobbes that is atomistic and solitary. To demonstrate this argument, Charles Taylor utilizes the first reading of the state of nature as depicted, and more specifically the emphasis provided by Hobbes on natural rights. Charles Taylor blames both the contractarian and utilitarian thinkers for creating atomistic individuals. His thesis states that Hobbes, among many contractarians, does not provide any sense of sociability or community. Furthermore, for Charles Taylor, this atomistic and solitary individual depicted in the state of nature is carried forth into the

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⁴ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 76.
sovereign state. He bases this argument on Hobbes’s introduction to natural rights, or what he identifies as the “primacy-of-rights.”

His thesis does not simply critique Hobbes for advocating natural individual rights, but states Hobbes as being one of the many contractarians that have contributed to the establishment of unsociability as the basis of modern liberal theory. Charles Taylor greatly undermines Hobbes’s argument toward sociability. The second manner in which scholars have read Hobbes’s state of nature, demonstrates an optimistic outlook on the nature of man. This reading of Hobbes argues that while by nature individuals are “solitary,”

they have the innate potential for sociability. In On the Citizen, Hobbes argues that individuals by nature seek to be part of a community: “It is indeed perpetual solitude is hard for a man to bear by nature or as a man, i.e. as soon as he is born.”

Hence, prolonged unsociability is not desirable. Individuals want to belong to a certain community, which contradicts the atomistic argument present in current literature.

The second requirement for gratitude to develop is that it must be a “voluntary” action.

Hobbes’s voluntary action demonstrates the importance of making a choice amongst alternatives. John Branstetter’s reading of Hobbes states the importance of the cultivation of “individual judgment”.

Branstetter states the importance of Hobbes’s materialistic psychology.

In Leviathan, Hobbes introduces two types of motion: vital

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6 Hobbes, Leviathan, 76.
8 Hobbes, Leviathan, 95.
10 Ibid., 780.
(or physiological), and voluntary. These two forms of motions are examined together, demonstrating the importance of voluntary motion; but also, how vital motion may contribute to an individual’s unchanging nature. Hobbes emphasizes training with other members of the commonwealth to develop right reason toward gratitude. Gratitude, which is developed by right reason, embraces moderation and prudence. While self-training is beneficial; the sovereign is also needed to educate those, who cannot self-train toward right reason. Quentin Skinner argues that Hobbes emphasizes self-control over the passions.  

Hence, contrary to Taylor, human unsociability can be controlled through the self and the sovereign only acts when absolutely necessary. However, while gratitude is a voluntary action, Skinner downplays the importance of sovereign’s power in the formation and the enhancement of social qualities within individuals. Branstetter also provides a reading of Hobbes that demonstrates the importance of training toward right reason, however, he demonstrates that the sovereign plays the main role in educating toward right reason: “To be an educator, not a policeman.”

This section will demonstrate that both forms of training are necessary to guarantee a prominent social life. However, self-training needs to be encouraged by the members of the commonwealth, because with this form of training the individual will find themselves accommodating toward others embodying the commonwealth. The sovereign provides the motivation toward accommodation. Hobbes’s argument for individuals to accommodate to others in the commonwealth demonstrates that he was not a subjectivist, even though he

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emphasises the voluntary. The sovereign is needed to make ingratitude punishable. However, punishment does not object to voluntary motion because the individual wills his own punishment because of authorship. Furthermore, the capacity for the sovereign to punish does not necessarily mean that the sovereign will utilize this prerogative.

Third, Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude depends on natural equality in order to develop. While the political state is needed to secure gratitude, it is not an act of absolute sovereignty. Both the sovereign and the members of the commonwealth are equally obliged to obey the natural law of gratitude. Both Kinch Hoekstra and Leo Strauss argue that Hobbes’s natural equality demonstrates that the sovereign has an equal duty to its members.13 Furthermore, trust is secured because of equal vulnerability. The purpose of incorporating natural equality into the political state, is emphasizing the importance of benefiting others who are a second-self. Benefactors will enter into a covenant with those most similar to themselves, e.g. same status or with those they share similar values; because they feel more secure that they will receive gratitude for their goodwill. In other words, they feel less likely to “lose on their benefaction”.14 From this statement, it would seem that the sociability conduced from gratitude is reserved for those with similar values and interest. However, this section will not dismiss the importance of unequal individuals presented by Hobbes on account of their experience, passions, and so forth. While the natural law of gratitude relies on recalling our natural equality, the outcome of gratitude may be inequality.

14 Ibid.
In order for gratitude to develop, a covenant, voluntary motion, and natural equality must be present. In other words, in the state of nature the natural laws such as on gratitude, can only apply to a certain few. Hence, in the state of nature only few see the duty to obey natural law. While all three bases for gratitude can be found in the state of nature, they are not safeguarded and are sporadic in outcome until the political state is formed. The final section on Hobbes will demonstrate that these three bases of gratitude demonstrate the form of friendship Hobbes was addressing in his political works; and that Hobbesian friendship can only prosper under the political state. Here, the works of Nancy Stanlick and Gabriella Slomp will be examined to demonstrate the Hobbes’s friendship is necessary because individuals want to live well.\textsuperscript{15} Stanlick argues that friendship for Hobbes demonstrates the importance of commodious living.\textsuperscript{16} Individuals do not want to live a serious lifestyle and to concern themselves only with dodging death. Individuals want to be accompanied with friends who are similar to themselves. For Hobbes, friendship is not selfless and individuals must discover their own worth before they can become friends with others in their commonwealth. Gratitude that is preserved by the sovereign, promotes sociability with friends. For Gabriella Slomp, without the political state, friendships cannot exist. In the state of nature, there are only gatherings and no alliances: “Civil societies are not mere gatherings but alliances which require good faith and agreement for their making.”\textsuperscript{17} It will be argued that it is only with the formation of


\textsuperscript{17} Hobbes, On the Citizen, 24.
the commonwealth that alliances and friendships can flourish. While Hobbes does not state the form of friendship he is arguing for, it will be demonstrated that utility-based friendship suits his works best.

In the state of nature, Hobbes demonstrates the individual’s desire to belong to a community and to adapt a social lifestyle. In the commonwealth, the natural law of gratitude is what sustains sociability amongst its members, and between the sovereign and its members. It may be observed that Hobbes was not influenced by Aristotle’s political thought, on the grounds that for Aristotle individuals are social by nature. However, this thesis will demonstrate that Hobbes was well versed in Aristotle’s political philosophy; in which he observed the relationship between the benefactors and the recipients occupying the polis. The second chapter will demonstrate that Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude was influenced by Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity. This is not to say that their arguments were congruent; but rather, that Hobbes observed the great-souled man who holds the virtue of magnanimity, and was aware of their skepticism about accepting gratitude. While Hobbes would admire the great-souled man’s great benefaction, he cannot sustain sociability because it lacks mutual aid that is benefited with gratitude. For Aristotle, the great-souled man pays little attention to gratitude. Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity is held by the great-souled man who is a great benefactor. The great souled-man who holds this virtue knows his worth to society, and “deserves special consideration and extraordinary merit”.  

may cause him to reject gratitude. The great-souled man may also problematize gratitude on the account that it may lower his self-esteem which allows for his great-benefactions. However, Aristotle does state that the great-souled man may accept honors in exchange for his benefactions. However, gratitude will always be reluctant to be given because members of the *polis* would want the great benefactions to continue.

However, Aristotle’s account of friendship that accompanies virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is reflected in Hobbes’s account of friendship in both *On the Citizen* and *Leviathan*. Similarly to the concluding section of Hobbes in this thesis, the chapter on Aristotle ends with an account of friendship. Both Lorraine Pangle and Ann Ward examine the importance of friendship in Aristotle’s *Ethics*. Pangle argues that friendship cannot be carried in to the contemplative, or philosophizing, lifestyle.²⁰ Conversely to this argument, Ann Ward argues that friendship is needed within the philosophical life.²⁰ Timocratic friendships, or perfect friendships, should be pursued by the great-souled man. Perfect friendships allow for a social aspect in the life of philosophizing for the great-souled man. However, the great-souled man rejects gratitude that is needed amongst friends to sustain sociability.

While the first chapter of this thesis will examine how the natural law of gratitude promotes sociability through covenants, voluntary action, and natural equality; the second chapter examines Aristotle’s moral virtue of magnanimity held by the great-souled man found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle’s great-souled man will be discussed

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separately from Hobbes, to demonstrate how the lack of ingratitude contributes to unsociability. Chapter three will distinguish Hobbes’s natural moral law of gratitude from Aristotle’s moral virtue of magnanimity. This chapter will demonstrate that Hobbes’s characterization of gratitude as creating and sustaining friendships was influenced by Aristotle’s account of friendship. Furthermore, it will conclude by demonstrating while these two virtues can be found in a monarchy and timocracy, Hobbes’s monarchy is preferred because it secures sociability with gratitude. For Aristotle’s great-souled man does not seek gratitude which limits his social life and the benefits of sociability on a larger scale. Hobbes’s monarchy allows for gratitude because of natural equality. Furthermore, Aristotle does not mention having a duty or obligation against ingratitude or punishing ingratitude. Without securing gratitude, sociability may cease; and national identity cannot be sustained.
Chapter 1: Gratitude

1.1 Gratitude Begins with a Covenant

In both On the Citizen (1642) and Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes begins with the description of human beings in their natural state. Leviathan was written later during the English Civil War, and due to its historical context, it is taken as the more pessimistic of the two. However, this chapter will demonstrate that Hobbes was more optimistic than what some scholars may argue. Hobbes’s optimism is largely held in his argument on gratitude, which provides sociability between citizens and between the sovereign and the citizen. Leviathan seems to be the text that predominates the academic literature on Hobbes. Very few scholars examine On the Citizen alongside and in relation to the Leviathan. However, On the Citizen is an essential part of understanding the nature of human beings. By examining both texts together, it becomes clear how the nature of man influences the form of government he advocates for. The following examines On the Citizen and Leviathan together, as one being an extension of the other. An examination of these two texts together will allow for a better understanding of gratitude and its impact on shaping the social life. In On the Citizen Hobbes describes the natural law (lex naturalis) of gratitude as the third natural law and described it as the following:

“If someone has conferred a benefit on you, relying on your good faith, do not let him lose on it; or: no one should accept a benefit without the intention to try to ensure that the giver not have reason to be sorry he gave it. Without this precept it is against reason to confer a benefit which one sees will perish without effect;
all kindness and trust will thus be lost and all benevolence too; and there would be no mutual assistance nor initiative to win gratitude.”

In *Leviathan*, the natural law of gratitude is stated as the fourth law of nature:

“As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift: and it is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, *That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will*. For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; mandate men to Seek Peace. The breach of this Law, is called *Ingratitude*; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.”

Before presenting his natural law, Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, chapter XI, states that gratitude belongs to proper manner, or etiquette. Here, he introduces how an individual ought to act when receiving a benefaction. He argues that an individual who receives a benefit, becomes obliged. Hence, with the introduction of the natural laws, it is not surprising that Hobbes wants every covenant to be reciprocated with gratitude. When gratitude is given after a covenant is made, it sustains sociability with “mutual assistance,” and

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23 Ibid., 59.  
24 Ibid.  
provides mutual empowerment. The duty to follow the natural law of gratitude after a covenant is made, binds the individual in foro interno (conscience) and in foro externo (civil law).  

Natural laws are “eternal and immutable,”

because they bind within the conscience of the individual and are reflected in civil law. Howard Warrender and A. E. Taylor’s reading on Hobbes emphasize the importance of a citizen’s moral duty of in foro interno. They both examine the role of promise-keeping and avoiding bad faith within Hobbes’s political works. However, it will be argued that the natural law of gratitude, while antecedent to the political state, cannot be secured without civil law. Covenants must be safeguarded by the sovereign to ensure gratitude is given and sociability is secured in its process.

Covenants can exist in the state of nature, since it was a covenant that created the sovereign. Individuals had to gather and agree upon creating a power to secure peace. However, covenants made between individuals in the state of nature are tacit (unspoken, thus unbinding). While it was a covenant that created the sovereign; gratitude which secures sociability with mutual aid cannot be secured until the creation of the political state. In a political state, citizens are no longer living in fear because the sovereign guarantees their safety. Covenants are more likely to take place when a citizen feels safe. However, contrary to this argument, A.E. Taylor argues that the sovereign is not needed to secure safety or to form covenants. Taylor’s reading of Hobbes demonstrates that individuals can come together to form a covenant in the state of nature. The creation of the sovereign demonstrates the ability of individuals to create a covenant. The ability to

\[\text{26} \ \text{Hobbes, Leviathan, 99; On the Citizen, 54.}\]

\[\text{27} \ \text{Ibid.}\]
decide to form a covenant without a sovereign, demonstrates an internal duty within the individual that disregards the sovereign’s place in securing duty and obligation. Hence, Taylor provides a strict deontological and libertarian reading of Hobbes’s political works. Taylor argues that Hobbes, similarly to Kant, presents an “imperative character” to law because it is of right reason to follow them. The natural law of gratitude is followed, because it secures peace by guaranteeing self-preservation. It is illogical to act against right reason, because no individual wants to return to the state of war. However, Taylor’s thesis becomes problematic because he does not demonstrate how duty is safeguarded because of civil law. For Taylor, the antecedent quality of natural law demonstrates that there is little importance for a sovereign to illustrate the value of covenanting with others and keeping covenants. Taylor states that “the sovereign does nothing to create the obligation to keep covenants.” Hence, if ingratitude can never be lawful according to right reason, the sovereign becomes of little use in securing obligation. With Taylor’s reading, the sovereign has no power in deciding the content of the law. Taylor argues that the sovereign can use the power of “threatening to place a penalty”. However, the sovereign’s power of penalizing individuals does not create obligation because duty is antecedent to civil society. Hence, Taylor reading of Hobbes argues that the imperative character of law does not allow for the sovereign to decide what is considered as ingratitude. In other words, Hobbes does not allow the sovereign to provide a “legalist interpretation because it creates superfluous laws and inflicts unnecessary severities”.

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29 Ibid., 43.
30 Ibid., 41.
Taylor overlooks the importance of the sovereign’s role in securing covenants and one’s duty even if it does resonate in foro interno. The sovereign plays a role in creating obligation because contrary to Taylor, obligation relies on the sovereign’s interpretation of gratitude prescribed by natural law. The sovereign decides whether the covenant was followed with gratitude to preserve mutual aid.

However, the concept of in foro interno demonstrates its importance with the role of promise-keeping with every covenant. Howard Warrender argues that in order to secure any covenant, a promise alongside gratitude must be made: “There are always two principles operative in keeping covenants; that of keeping a promise and that of gratitude for the consideration involved.”\textsuperscript{32} Warrender was correct that Hobbes saw an obligation toward gratitude. If the benefactor fulfills the covenant, gratitude must be given for that benefaction or else the state of war can be resurrected. The benefactor entering into a covenant requires no prior recognition with the recipient. A promise can be declared on “momentary feelings”\textsuperscript{33} and based on their “goodwill.”\textsuperscript{34} Hence, Hobbes states that individuals should be able to change their mind if they do not want to make a benefaction.\textsuperscript{35} However, those who make continual promises and never fulfill them, Hobbes calls fickle and refers to them as a Doson – a reference to the king of Macedonia who never kept his promise.\textsuperscript{36} Since a promise is made with reference to future


\textsuperscript{32} Warrender, \textit{The Political Philosophy of Hobbes}, 233.


\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
performance, “I will give and grant,” it can be easy to not follow through the promise due to a variety of predicaments. If promises are continually broken, the recipient may become unwilling to display gratitude when they receive the benefaction. If the benefaction is never given after the promise, all trust is lost and so is gratitude.

In addition to natural law, Hobbes introduces natural right (jus naturalis). Natural right does not disregard obligation, but allows for covenants to form. Natural right does not act contrary to sociability, but rather enhances communal engagement. However, C.B. Macpherson argues the contrary by stating that Hobbes provides a “possessive market society,” of radical individualism where the individual “owes nothing to society.” In addition, Charles Taylor argues that social contract theorists can never provide a sense of community or sociability because of natural rights. Hobbes’s state of nature presents natural rights that will carry into civil society. Hobbes, while securing natural rights, does not promote unsociability or atomistic individuals. However, Taylor in his “Second Volume” of the Philosophical Papers argues the contrary. Taylor states that Hobbes’s political theory is purely atomistic, hence, provides no regard for the community. Taylor argues that atomism is directly related to social contract theory; hence, Hobbes and Locke perpetuate the atomistic issue with their political theory.

Taylor seems to argue that individualism is a falsified claim for being an atomist. He states that recent proponents of individualism such as Nozick should rather be called

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37 Hobbes, Leviathan, 83.
39 Ibid., 269. See Macpherson’s third precept on page 261.
atomists, but dislike the term.\textsuperscript{41} Taylor does not distinguish atomism from individualism and this can be problematic. The key difference between individualism and atomism is the asocial characteristic that is attached to atomism. Contra atomism, individualism focuses on individual rights and placing power and responsibilities onto the individual rather than having a strong sovereign that dictates action for the individual. In other words, Taylor fears that following individual desires overlooks the community as a whole.\textsuperscript{42} However, proponents of individualism should not be automatically ascribed to the formation of unsocial individuals where they are disengaged from political life because of individualistic self-interest.

\textit{Does ascribing the natural right of self-defence, or self-preservation, make the individual an asocial human being?} Taylor fears that presenting inalienable rights, or what he calls the “primacy-of-rights,”\textsuperscript{43} negates obligations that will help sustain society. However, Taylor overlooks the importance of Hobbes’s introduction to inalienable rights in preserving communal engagement. In \textit{On the Citizen} and \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes presents the natural right for self-defence as the first and primary law of nature which all other laws follow. In other words, allowing in Taylor’s words a “primacy-of-rights,”\textsuperscript{44} does not mean individuals will be asocial beings that resist communal engagement and have no obligations. Natural right becomes an essential part to every covenant. For individuals would not enter into a covenant without their right to self-preservation being preserved.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 201.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 188.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
However, Taylor does not acknowledge the important role of inalienable rights as a precondition for communal engagement.

1. 2 Gratitude as a Voluntary Action

While all covenants require gratitude, all covenants are freely chosen by the individual. Hence, the prior section discussed how both the sovereign and the members of a commonwealth have a duty toward gratitude that preserves the collective; this section argues that voluntary action is needed before any covenant is made. Hobbes preserves the freedom and liberty of the individual by describing gratitude within *Leviathan* as a “voluntary” action. Gratitude as a voluntary action will be described in three main points. First, it will be argued that Hobbes’ materialistic psychology allows gratitude to be considered a voluntary action. Second, that training with other members of the commonwealth is required to develop right reasoning toward gratitude – or else they may not see the benefits. While the importance of training toward right reason has been examined by Quentin Skinner and John Branstetter; the following analysis will demonstrate a narrowed discussion on the importance of training with other members of the commonwealth in order to secure gratitude. Third, that accommodating oneself to others in society is voluntary and beneficial to the main-tenance of the commonwealth. This section will conclude with an examination of Hobbes’s discussion on punishing ingratitude. It will argue that the sovereign’s capacities to punish ingratitude is limited by the natural law of pardon. However, the fear of punishing ingratitude ought to remain to prevent unsociability and on the account that individuals have the choice to choose the membership of which commonwealth they would like to belong to. Philip Pettit’s reading

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of Hobbes argues that fear does not hinder an individual’s liberty or freedom to choose. This demonstrates that the fear of punishment of ingratitude, in which ingratitude can never lawful, does not hinder the liberty of the individual.

Hobbes’s materialist psychology demonstrates the importance of voluntary motion-action. In the beginning of *Leviathan*, voluntary motion is one of the two motions identified. Hobbes states that the human body carries forth two different forms of motion. One is “vital motion,” which illustrates the physiology of the body. The second, is that of “voluntary motion, or animal motion.” John Branstetter states that Hobbes’s voluntary motion demonstrates his materialist psychology; in which “the physical stimuli of the external world press on animal bodies to create internal motion.” Voluntary motion concerns human desires and aversions. Individuals are attracted to things that provide the most pleasure, and avoid the elements that cause pain. Voluntary motion demonstrates the importance of personal deliberation, because the individual must decide which desires to pursue. During the process of voluntary motion, the individual is not obliged by a covenant and the sovereign cannot enforce an agreement. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes’ introduction to voluntary motion foreshadows his discussion on natural liberty and consent: “I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions.” Pettit calls this process of deliberation as the “freedom of non-commitment (freedom to decide”).

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48 Ibid.
Pettit argues that once deliberation begins, and the closer the individual comes to will something, the “freedom of non-commitment (freedom to decide)” gets closer to end.\textsuperscript{52} Once personal deliberation ends, the individual has an obligation. Similarly, to Warrender, Pettit argues that promises are binding, because they “are obligatory and end the freedom of non-commitment”\textsuperscript{53}. However, Warrender and Pettit disagree on the freedom that proceeds a promise or another form of covenant. Pettit identifies the freedom after deliberation as the “freedom of non-obstruction.”\textsuperscript{54} With the freedom of non-obstruction, the individual must be allowed to act on their choice made by deliberation. While the individual has the freedom of non-obstruction, this does not hinder the natural law of gratitude. Each individual can choose gratitude or ingratitude with personal deliberation, and can act according to their personal deliberation. The freedom to choose and to act, as described by Pettit, demonstrates why Hobbes introduces the importance of convention and norms with vital motion. Vital motion demonstrates the necessary desires and aversions that need to be safeguarded for peace with the sovereign’s role. The sovereign can protect vital motion by educating the commonwealth toward right reason, and with the fear of punishing ingratitude. The following will demonstrate that while vital motion demonstrates the importance of convention and norms, it does not disregard the liberty and freedom of the individual.

While Hobbes demonstrates the importance of voluntary motion and natural liberty, his argument does not make him open to subjectivism.\textsuperscript{55} His description of vital

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 134.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 137.
motion demonstrates the importance of convention and norms. Hence, the following will argue that Hobbes’s materialist psychology does not make him a proponent of nominalism. To state that Hobbes is a nominalist would mean that the individual is in continual change during his life and can never be unified with himself nor find commonality with others. If Hobbes argument stopped with voluntary motion, Hobbes’s demonstration of the political life would be retracted into an unsocial dimension. However, Hobbes avoids nominalism by introducing the importance of commonality with vital motions. Both voluntary and vital motion work together to form the social. Branstetter states that Hobbes provides an “unchanging nature because some appetites and aversion are derived from vital motions”. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes argues that some appetites and aversions are innate or intrinsic in human beings such as “appetite for food”. Vital motion should not be forced to change, nor attempted to change, because if pain can be avoided then it should. While vital motion demonstrating the importance of convention of norms, it must be combined with voluntary action. Branstetter argues that while there are fixed appetites and aversions, they do not explain all individual action. Hobbes states that some motions are interactive and require experience based on trial and error. Human beings can change depending on the environment in which they live and with age. Here, Hobbes wants individuals to be open to the possibilities of finding new appetites. In addition, perhaps different individuals may make individuals realize new appetites. Some benefactors will not know if pleasure can be derived from their

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benefaction, and while they should never be coerced to be benefactors they ought to engage in benefaction. By trying, they will acquire the pleasures of peace and benefits that come with gratitude. The recipient by accepting the pleasure that derives from the benefaction, reciprocates willfully and voluntarily with another pleasure.

For Hobbes, individuals must be trained in order to become social. In *On the Citizen*, Hobbes states: “Man is made fit for society not by mere nature, but by training.”\(^{59}\) The question becomes, *what form of training is Hobbes referring to?* The laws of nature which are the “dictates of reason,”\(^{60}\) can be achieved only by interacting with others. For Hobbes, the natural law of gratitude is first understood and followed within the family. While the family sets the basis for gratitude, the individual must self-train with others to continue their sociability outside the family. What becomes the indispensable duty of the child to demonstrate gratitude toward their parents, must become reflected toward the sovereign. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes states the following on the family’s role in bringing about gratitude:

> “The first instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition, and not only so, but that also afterward (as gratitude requireth) they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honour.”\(^{61}\)

John Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*, adapts Hobbes’s argument on gratitude in relation to paternal power:

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\(^{60}\) Ibid., 34.

“Honour and support, all that which Gratitude requires to return for the Benefits received by and from them is the indispensable Duty of the Child, and the proper Privilege of the Parents. (s.68).”

While for both Hobbes and Locke, gratitude begins within the family; it cannot end there. After the family, there are two forms of training, or education, that can take place to ensure sociability with gratitude: self-training and education by the sovereign. It will be argued that while the sovereign is needed to educate its members towards right reason, it is primarily the responsibility of the individual to self-train. Geoffrey Vaughan argues that the sovereign plays an important role in educating its members, and having them recognize their ignorance. While Vaughan was correct on the account that the sovereign must take a strong role in their education, the sovereign cannot infringe on natural rights. Branstetter states while the sovereign has a strong role in training individuals, the sovereign is not a policeman: “The Leviathan should be considered first and foremost an educator [of the practical deployment of reason], not a policeman.”

Contrary to both Vaughan and Branstetter reading of Hobbes’ education by the sovereign, Quentin Skinner argues self-training is important for sociability. With self-training, mistakes will be made and individuals will learn from their mistakes. Skinner reads Hobbes’s state of nature as providing asocial beings in which self-training will bring about sociability. He explains how Hobbes presents three principal elements of our

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64 Branstetter, “The Leviathan’s Conscience,” 779.
nature that lead to war: “Competiveness, associated lack of trust, thirst for glory.”

Skinner states that for Hobbes, “if any form of social life is to be possible, these destructive tendencies will obviously have to be curbed and controlled.” The responsibility falls upon the individual to practice gratitude. Hobbes states that individuals are obliged in their conscience, *in foro interno.* All obligations towards gratitude and sociability begin with the self, and are sustained with education by the sovereign.

While Hobbes argues for convention and accommodation to the rest, the premise is always voluntary. No individual is forced into being a member of the political state, rather one chooses to live within it voluntarily. Once an individual becomes a citizen of a political state, there is an obligation toward gratitude. The benefits received from the sovereign must be returned with gratitude, for instance, by following the laws of the given political state. As entering into any political state is voluntary, so is the covenants taken between citizens. Covenants between citizens within a political state cannot be coerced to make a promise toward benefaction – especially if they know they cannot keep it. Similarly, gratitude cannot be demanded by the benefactor. Benefactors ought to choose whom they want be giving their benefactions.

Membership within a political state, allows for the privilege to vote for their leader. Voting demonstrates the importance of voluntary action. Voting allows for members to become authors of their sovereign’s actions; and is depicted in *Leviathan.*

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66 Ibid.
chapter XVIII, with the concept of authorship.  

Arash Abizadeh argues that Hobbes’s statement of authorship demonstrates the importance of “self-authorization or self-binding”. In the political state, gratitude must be given to the sovereign because each member of the commonwealth is the author. In other words, each member has consented to be part of that sovereign. Since each is the “author of all the sovereign shall do,” gratitude becomes an obligation. Each member of the commonwealth is the author of the sovereign, “whether he voted for him or not;” and must demonstrate gratitude toward the sovereign whether or not they prefer that leader. The member, by enjoying the liberty to vote, and by accepting this benefaction on behalf of the sovereign; becomes obliged to show gratitude to the sovereign. Furthermore, each member is the “author of his own punishment.” By choosing to reside in a particular sovereign and enjoying the benefits thereof, e.g. such as the liberty to vote, one wills to follow the covenant will be lawfully punished for their ingratitude. It would be an act of ingratitude to try an impeach or overthrow the sovereign in place, since each member is the author.

With the concept of authorship, the individual wills their punishment. Furthermore, Pettit argues that the fear of punishment does not hinder the liberty or freedom of the individual. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes demonstrates this with the following example:

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71 Ibid., 110.
72 Ibid., 111.
73 Pettit, “Liberty and Leviathan,” 139.
“Fear and liberty are consistent: as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for fear the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to do it if he will.”

With punishing ingratitude, similar to other broken laws, Hobbes offers a restorative form of justice rather than retributive. Hobbes’s argument for a restorative form of justice demonstrates the importance of the sovereign’s role in educating toward proper reason. Hobbes argues that punishment is not always favourable, because it does not necessarily guarantee peace: “Not always to the commonwealth’s advantage that they be punished.”

Hence, Hobbes argues that ingratitude may be prevented with the guidance of right reason by means of education given by the sovereign. The fear of punishing ingratitude is necessary because ingratitude threatens sociability and unification. Ingratitude and the act of being inconsiderate is noted by Hobbes to be the most inhuman of all actions according to Cicero. However, even with the discussion on punishment Hobbes states that past actions can be overlooked if the individual provides a guarantee to comply with civil law in the future. In *On the Citizen*, the sixth law of nature looks at both punishment and revenge together rather than exclusively: “In revenge [*utilo*] or punishment [*poenae*] consider future good, not past evil.” However, Hobbes states that revenge is “motivated by vainglory,” because it reflects on the past rather than the future. Hence, while punishment is needed for the reassurance of peace, the use of revenge can never be justifiable. In fact, the use of revenge may be punishable as an unjust act. In *On the

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75 Ibid., 196.
77 Ibid., 49.
78 Ibid.
Citizen, Hobbes states his strong opposition toward revenge because it is a form of an insult. In On the Citizen, Hobbes states the following on the seventh law of nature is against insult: “For most men prefer to lose their peace and even their lives rather than suffer insult.” This natural law provides protection against slander, and protects the accused against improper judgment. In Leviathan, prohibiting revenge is the seventh law of nature and is described as: “A retribution of evil for evil […] Gloriing in the hurt of another, tending to no end.” The subsequent law on prohibiting revenge in Leviathan, is the eighth law of nature against contumely which states that all signs of hatred need to be avoided to avoid fighting. Even prior to the discussion on establishing a sovereign, Hobbes is trying to distinguish within natural law the concept of punishment from insult. Again, this aligns with the inalienable right of self-defence, for insult can lead to self-harm and contumely to war, therefore, can never be lawful.

While the fear of punishment for ingratitude is present, it does not mean the individual will be punished. Hobbes establishes the natural law of pardon which can be used with the case of ingratitude. The natural law of pardon protects the citizen from the sovereign power. The ability to use pardon toward ingratitude is necessary to prevent favouritism and arbitrary judgment on behalf of the sovereign. However, if the sovereign demonstrates the benefits of mutual aid by demonstrating that natural right is also preserved, punishment for ingratitude is not necessary but just precautionary. In On the Citizen, the fifth law of nature on pardon is described as “the past or remission of

79 Ibid.
80 Hobbes, Leviathan, 96.
81 Ibid.
offence”. Here, Hobbes states the importance of forgiveness if there is assurance for the future toward peace. In *Leviathan*, pardon is presented as the sixth law of nature; and here Hobbes also states that pardon is given “upon the caution of the future.” If ingratitude is a repeated act, the sovereign may be required to punish individuals who contribute to unsociability.

Similarly to Cicero, Hobbes states that in addition to ingratitude, inconsideration is the greatest crime an individual can commit to the commonwealth. Hence, Hobbes makes consideration and complaisance a natural law, for it is by right reason to follow them. Hobbes’s natural law of consideration and complaisance compliments the natural law of gratitude. Hobbes states that this law secures the “diversity of passions and the realization of the differences of opinion;” and “that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest.” The natural law of consideration does not dictate that one ought to limit their passions completely, but rather, not be *inconsiderate* by taking more than needed. Inconsiderate individuals are defined as those who “keep more than they need for themselves, and in hardness of heart, take the necessities of life from other people, and is too temporarily too stubborn to be corrected.” John Locke in *The Two Treatise of Government* makes a similar claim to Hobbes that dictates not to take so much that it spoils or goes to waste:

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83 Ibid.
86 Ibid., *Leviathan*, 95; *On the Citizen*, 48.
89 Ibid.
"He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share and robbed others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of (s. 46)."  

Hobbes and Locke are stating that the passions should not be limited to the amount to which they would feel pain or discomfort. Instead, individuals ought to be prudent, or moderate. Consideration demonstrates a social character where individuals ought to accommodate themselves to the rest.

1. 3 Gratitude is Dependent on Natural Equality

In order for gratitude to take place, individuals must recall their natural equality. Here, natural equality is emphasized not because equality is the goal for society but to consider the importance of equal treatment. This section will argue that equal treatment relies on equal obligation and equal distribution of freedom and right. Furthermore, that equal treatment does not equate to equal outcome when gratitude is given. In both On the Citizen and Leviathan, Hobbes describes individuals as being naturally equal. Hobbes states that individuals are equal in their natural capacity to kill the other, and everyone is equally vulnerable. Hobbes uses his introduction to the equality of man to foreshadow his argument on the equality between the sovereign and the citizen in regards to obligation and natural right. In On the Citizen, Hobbes states the equal vulnerability amongst individuals: “See how easy it is for even the weakest individual to kill someone

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90 Locke, The Two Treatise of Government, 299-300.
91 Hobbes, Leviathan, 74; On the Citizen, 26.
stronger than himself. Whatever confidence you have in your strength, you simply cannot believe that you have been made superior to others by nature.”\(^93\) Hence, the sovereign is given prerogative power to secure the safety of its members, and act against the transgression of pride. Furthermore, Hobbes’s argument on natural equality in the sovereign, allows its members to recall their role in authorship which was discussed in the prior section. The following will demonstrate that natural equality is needed for gratitude, but it is needed alongside inequality that is also present in the state of nature.

In *Leviathan*, chapter XL, Hobbes makes a strong claim on absolute sovereign, which may seem contradictory to natural equality:

> “The father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For him was the covenant first made, wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God.”\(^94\)

While Hobbes states the importance of civilian obedience toward the sovereign, he argues that the sovereign is bound by the same natural laws. Both Kinch Hoekstra and Leo Strauss observe that natural equality is preserved with the creation of the sovereign. Leo Strauss states Hobbes’s introduction of natural equality is a “new philosophy,”\(^95\) in which the sovereign and the citizen are equal in their capacity. Strauss states the following on this new philosophy:

> “Because all men are equal… the difference between the wise minority and the unwise majority loses the fundamental importance it had for traditional political

philosophy… when the equality of all men exalted principle, a new philosophy becomes possible."

The sovereign and the members of the commonwealth, equally vulnerable, makes them equally obliged to demonstrate gratitude. Hoekstra demonstrates that Hobbes’s argument of natural equality binds the commonwealth and its citizens as equal in their natural obligations. In both *On the Citizen* and *Leviathan*, Hobbes argues the sovereign shares the same natural duties because it safeguards the peace of the commonwealth. Similar to the commanders of an army, the sovereign is bound my natural law, and ought to keep his promises if he wants to remain well-liked or in popular favor. However, while the sovereign is obliged by natural law, he is not obligated to obey civil law. In *On the Citizen*, Hobbes states:

“For although those who hold sovereign power among men cannot be subject to laws properly so called, i.e. to the will of men, because sovereignty and subjection to others are contradictory, it is nevertheless their duty to obey right reason in all things so far as they can; right reason is the natural, moral and divine law.”

In *Leviathan*, Hobbes states:

“And the same law that dictateth to men that have no civil government, what they ought to do, and what to avoid in regard to one another, dictateth the same to commonwealths, that is, to the consciousness of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies, there being no court of natural justice but in the conscience only,

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96 Ibid.
where not man, but God reigneth, whose laws (such of them as oblige all mankind) in respect of God, as he is the author of nature, are natural, and in respect of the same God, as is King of kings, are laws.”100

The sovereign is not exempted from following natural law because of natural equality. In this regard, natural equality must be preserved. Furthermore, when both the sovereign and the members follow the natural law of gratitude it allows for direct communication and affiliation between the sovereign and the citizen. With the natural law of gratitude, the sovereign and the citizen will not be strangers to one another but will form a direct form of mutual assistantship and gain mutual empowerment.

Also, this “new philosophy”101 provided by Hobbes not only demonstrates that gratitude relies on the equality of natural obligation, but also demonstrates that gratitude relies on preserving equal freedom and rights. The sovereign must guarantee equal freedom and rights amongst the commonwealth, and this is projected as a sign of gratitude on behalf of the sovereign. This gratitude is given by the sovereign because the citizen follows the laws of the commonwealth. In Leviathan, chapter XXI, Hobbes states that natural right allows each individual to protect themselves: “For the right of men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them.”102 To remind the members of the commonwealth of their natural equality, is to remind them that they are equal authors of the sovereign, whom they have created to preserve peace. If the sovereign fails to provide the commonwealth with peace, each individual has the right to defend themselves. However, this natural right of unhindered liberty found in the state of

100 Hobbes, Leviathan, 233.
102 Hobbes, Leviathan, 114.
nature where obedience is disregarded, reminds the individual of their equal vulnerability. In remembering their equal vulnerability, they understand that gratitude is necessary for peace.

In *On the Citizen*, when Hobbes speaks of “trust” when identifying gratitude, he does not explain further what is meant by trusting others. However, here it will be argued that trust for Hobbes relies on natural equality. Also, the term trust may be used interchangeably with the term reliance. Individuals trust one another when they know they can rely on each other for benefactions. The benefactor and recipient must trust one another in order to feel confident in their transaction. Benefactors do not want to “lose on their benefaction,” need to trust their recipient to reciprocate in an equal benefaction or with great honour. Trust is created when equal or greater value is given to the benefactor to not lose on their benefaction. Furthermore, recipients want to trust their benefactors for the benefaction to come through and not retract on momentary notice. Strauss states that for Hobbes the lack of trust is specifically directed toward those of superior status or wealth:

“Hobbes’s point of departure is that man is at the mercy of nature, he distrusts good fortune and the fortunate, distrusts their gratitude and their gaiety, distrusts, in particular, in spite of all personal affection, the aristocracy, whose virtues are only ‘virtues of nature’.”

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104 Ibid.
Strauss was correct on this account, and that is why gratitude is most likely taken amongst equals. Individuals trust each other based on their equal vulnerability, or where they see the other as a second-self.

To avoid being partial, Hobbes’s argument on gratitude relies on natural equality. Natural equality, as Hoekstra argues, is of equal treatment but not equal worth or capacities. Hence, while arguing to recall the importance of our natural equality, Hobbes does not disregard inequality in chance or outcome. Inequality is present in the state of nature as being unequal in bodily strengths, experience, reason, and passion. Some individuals might have extraordinary strength because their age in experience. However, these attributes are not always apparent until the outcome of a battle. In the political state, the variety of passions that embody the individual can be preserved with gratitude. In On the Citizen, Hobbes argues that individuals ought to always “win gratitude,” to secure a “commodious” lifestyle. The continual search for gratitude demonstrates that inequality may follow amongst members of the commonwealth. While equality is needed between the benefactor and the recipient on the account of mutual trust, some benefactors will receive more gratitude because of their total amount of benefaction. The benefactor is to seek gratitude which implies competition and the search for glory. Pride, glory and competition are characteristics found in the state of nature that create war; however, these characteristics with the guide of right reason under gratitude are beneficial toward sociability. The continual search for gratitude by both the sovereign

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106 Hoekstra, “Hobbesian Equality,” 111
107 Ibid., 78-81.
108 Hobbes, Leviathan, 76.
109 Hobbes, On the Citizen, 47.
110 Hobbes, Leviathan, 78.
and the citizen will sustain sociability and keep the peace within a political state. However, Hobbes would argue that the sovereign and citizen should seek gratitude within the political state rather than look externally. Here, Macpherson’s reading of Hobbes was correct in that he wanted a mercantilist policy, prioritizing the citizens within the political state with regulatory policies, over a laissez-faire trade system.  

Inequality is a natural outcome from glory and pride. While Hobbes introduces the importance of natural equality which allows for gratitude to develop, the acceptance of gratitude demonstrates pride guided with right reason. However, Leo Strauss argues that pride and the search for glory will not allow for gratitude. In Strauss’s chapter on “New Morality,” he argues that pride will not allow for gratitude. He quotes the following passage in Hobbes’ *Leviathan*:

“The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men; and punishes those that break his Lawes, is to be derived not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power.”

Strauss states that individuals come to see themselves “as the cause of their good fortune.” Stricken with pride, gratitude is not given for the benefits received, hence they are not thankful towards others. In this particular passage within *Leviathan*, not being thankful toward God in creating man demonstrates that by nature human beings are.

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113 Ibid., 124
114 Ibid., 124.
not grateful. Strauss’ reading of Hobbes falls more along the line of Bacon’s “ingratitude which he presents as a Christian virtue.”\textsuperscript{115}

While gratitude depends on a degree of pride and glory, this may seem contradictory to Hobbes’s natural law against pride. In both \textit{On the Citizen} and \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes presents a natural law against pride. In \textit{On the Citizen}, the eighth law of nature is against pride, and in \textit{Leviathan} it is the ninth law. In \textit{On the Citizen}, Hobbes reminds individuals to look back to their natural equality to avoid pride. Hobbes states that the political foundation in Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} is based in pride because of the master and slave relation: “As if Master and slave were distinguished not by agreement among men, but by their natural aptitude, i.e. by their knowledge of ignorance.”\textsuperscript{116} In \textit{Leviathan}, the ninth law is against pride and states the importance of remembering our natural equality.\textsuperscript{117} To control pride requires time and experience; however, a degree of pride is essential to accept gratitude. With pride, the benefactor knows their worth and graciously accepts gratitude. Pride in knowing ones’ worth, cannot be fully limited because it allows for mutual aid and mutual empowerment.

While the sovereign treats members of the commonwealth with regards to their natural equality (equal before the law), the premise that follows which is giving benefits to the members of the commonwealth are not necessarily equal. Inequality can be the outcome of gratitude, but it cannot begin without natural equality. Hobbes’s examination of counsellors demonstrates that inequality will be an outcome of gratitude. Hobbes,

\textsuperscript{116} Hobbes, \textit{On the Citizen}, 49.
\textsuperscript{117} Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, 97.
similar to Machiavelli, wanted to teach princes how to rule properly. In *Leviathan*, chapter XXX, Hobbes’s discussion on the sovereign’s counsellors demonstrates the importance of treating individuals in accordance to their natural equality:

“Oh the best signs of knowledge of any art are much conversing in it and constant good effects of it. Good counsel comes not by lot nor by inheritance; and therefore, there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matter of state, than in deliberating the dimensions of a fortress.”\(^{118}\)

While he states the importance of addressing all his counsellors as equal by mere nature, he does not argue that they should all be valued equally. For Hobbes also states that inequality is created by the will of the sovereign.\(^{119}\) In *Leviathan*, chapter X, “great honours and dignity” is given by the sovereign to demonstrate gratitude to the members of the commonwealth.\(^{120}\) When the sovereign gives gratitude in form of great honour or dignity this will create inequality in the commonwealth. The sovereign when giving dignity places the individual in a public position such as “offices of command, judicature, and public employment”.\(^{121}\) While this form of inequality is necessary to demonstrate the worth of particular individuals, they need to be limited to demonstrate the scarcity of this worth. Hobbes does not reject inequality, because it is present in the state of nature. Hobbes states that individuals are not equal in all regards because they differ in their intellect by experience and bodily strength.\(^{122}\) Those who differ in intellect or age must

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\(^{118}\) Ibid., 231.
\(^{119}\) Ibid., 228.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., 52-54.
\(^{121}\) Ibid., 52.
be recognized. In other words, the presence of natural equality does not mean that inequality will not exist.

While members are not in a position of power to demonstrate, what Hobbes identifies as dignity, they reciprocate to the benefit received by the sovereign. Macpherson argues that Hobbes was demonstrating the bourgeois man and the social relations within a capitalist society. For Macpherson, Hobbes demonstrates that all benefits received from the sovereign are in proportion to the benefits returned to the sovereign. Hence, the benefits received will not necessarily be equal. Macpherson uses the concept of taxation to demonstrate the benefits given in return to the sovereign for preserving the peace. Furthermore, the poor and the wealthy alike have to fulfill their obligation by working, and this is a demonstration of gratitude.

1.4 Gratitude and Friendship

Gratitude is sustained because of friendship. The three conditions needed to produce gratitude (covenants, voluntary action, and natural equality), demonstrate the form of friendship required to support gratitude. In regards to friendship, Hobbes presents an argument that may seem contradictory. Hence, there has been a divide amongst academic literature on Hobbes as to whether he is promoting sociability with enmity or friendship. Scholars such as Nancy Stanlick and Gabriella Slomp examine Hobbes’s conception of friendship, and this analysis will demonstrate that gratitude creates and sustains friendships that would not be there otherwise. In examining both On the Citizen and Leviathan, one may encounter inconsistency on the topic of friendship. This

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125 Ibid.
inconsistency is whether friendship is of secondary importance or of primary importance because it is power. In *On the Citizen*, friendship is an adjective used to describe the natural law of gratitude. Within *Leviathan*, chapter X, Hobbes provides his clearest definition of friendship. The following will examine whether this depiction of “friendship as power”¹²⁶ in *Leviathan*, aligns with the same form of friendship used to identify the natural law of gratitude in *On the Citizen*. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes also states that friendship can provide negative effects on political society such as nepotism. Perhaps gratitude leads to nepotism in the political state, but it will be argued that friendship is necessary. For Hobbes, the benefits derived from friendship such as power and mutual aid, outweigh the negative effects of nepotism. Perhaps this is why Hobbes states in the beginning of *On the Citizen* that friendships are always of “secondary” importance for the individual.¹²⁷ If an individual seeks friends, it is for a certain advantage or to obtain honour from them.¹²⁸ Hence, friendships are not a virtue nor a good in itself; but is pursed for the benefits friendship can offer. Hobbes is describing the importance of utility friendships. The following will demonstrate that utility friendships ought to be sought after, but must be wary of nepotism and favoritism in the political sphere.

In *On the Citizen*, Hobbes makes it explicit that gratitude creates friendships, and he uses the Vulgate Bible to demonstrate this relation: “Prov. 3.29, Do not work evil against your friend since he has confidence in you.”¹²⁹ In both *On the Citizen* and *Leviathan*, Hobbes identifies and defines a list of natural laws, but does not define the

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¹²⁸ Ibid.
form of friendship he is proposing. This section will examine the form of friendship Hobbes may have been identifying being part of the utilitarian tradition. Hobbes presents a utility-based friendship that secures sociability. Utility friendships provide a “commodious living,” because individuals do not only want to secure peace, but “to live well.” Gratitude which provides this form of friendship can only be secured in a political state. Hobbes wanted individuals to have a commodious and happy lifestyle. He used the state of nature to depict a life of constant worry and fear; because in this state individuals are without friends, trust, benefaction, and gratitude. For Hobbes, this bleak outlook on life, or a life of no enjoyment, was not worth living. In *On the Citizen*, Hobbes observes that the individual has an innate desire for sociability but could not pursue a social life without a sovereign. Later, when Hobbes writes the *Leviathan*, he states that it cannot simply be a life worry free from death that drives our existence: “The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them.” Hence, it is evident that the fear of death cannot be the only passion. However, Strauss argues that for Hobbes, the fear of death will be triumphant over the other passions:

“For the man who has once come into contact with this world, joy and laughter are over. Man must be serious and that exclusively. It is the fearfulness of death rather than the sweetness of life which makes men man cling to existence.”

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132 Ibid.
However, as examined, Hobbes was not trying to promote a serious lifestyle without laughter or friends. It is our innate desire to be social, and this is facilitated under the sovereign. Contrary to Strauss, Stanlick argues the importance of commodious living for Hobbes. There needs to be a social life enjoyed amongst friends. Stanlick examines the family in the state of nature to demonstrate that life means more than sustaining our survival. Stanlick states that for Hobbes, “language, families, and protective associations in the Hobbesian state of nature, demonstrates that it is not only about survival”.

While the state of nature demonstrates the desire for sociability and the collective, the protective associations that are formed in this state are only temporary.

In the state of nature, temporary alliances are the closest the individual gets to friendship. Here, to forestall the attack you fear, you may form a league with others similarly vulnerable, …they combine forces for defensive purposes. In the state of nature gratitude cannot exist, because friendships cannot last without the political state. Slomp argues that friendship does not create the political state, but rather that the political state creates friendship. Within the state of nature, gatherings are temporary social relations. Hobbes distinguishes gatherings from civil societies which are alliances. Whether mere gatherings demonstrate friendships is debatable. Slomp argues that Hobbes’s state of nature allows for the development of “defence-based friendships,” where individuals can come together temporarily to secure their own preservation.

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136 Ibid., 350.
137 Hobbes, Leviathan, xxiii.
138 Slomp, “As Thick as Thieves,” 5.
140 Slomp, “As Thick as Thieves,” 5.
However, these friendships cannot last because the political state does not exist to make sure benefaction and goodwill has been returned by the recipient. Sociability is at risk if the recipient does not engage in gratitude.

Gratitude cannot take place without covenants. Hence, friendships are established with the creation of the sovereign. Once a covenant is made, such as a promise, gratitude becomes an obligation. Hobbes facilitates this duty or obligation toward gratitude stating these covenants demonstrate friendship. The concept of friendship demonstrates the importance of internal obligation. If an individual gives a benefit to another, it infers friendship, because the benefactor has confidence in the recipient to reciprocate in benefaction. There is an internal duty amongst friends, but it is always chosen voluntarily. An individual cannot be forced to be friends with another. Friendship is, however, secured in the political state because of civil laws.

Friendships created by gratitude rely on natural equality. Gratitude is felt toward those who are most similar to ourselves because the benefactor trusts them to return on their benefaction. A friend most similar to ourselves, means knowing the capacity and worth of the friend. Once this is known, benefaction is facilitated because they know they will not be repented nor lose on their benefaction. Hence, it can be taken that gratitude is an exchange of power, that strengthens both parties. For Hobbes, the individual’s egotistic psychology and self-interest exists amongst friends. Stanlick argues Hobbes’s friendship relies on self-interest because the individual must know their value and appreciate themselves: “The ability to care adequately for others is found in the ability to care for oneself.”

For Hobbes the individual knows themselves and their ‘price’ before.

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finding friends. In knowing our own self-worth, we understand who is equal to ourselves to give a benefaction in order to receive gratitude:

“To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love, but really secret hatred, and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor that, in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitly wishes him there where he might never see him more.”¹⁴²

While many may desire to engage in benefactions with those of superior rank or dignity, it is an act of deceit or secret hatred. Furthermore, the individual who is not equal who accepts benefaction and cannot demonstrate gratitude becomes a debtor and may lose on the potential of obtaining other friends.

Gratitude, which creates and sustains friendships, relies on self-interest. The recipient accepts benefaction from a friend by first knowing their worth; and demonstrates gratitude appropriately to ensure future benefaction from their friends. Self-interest is also the cause of benefaction. The benefactor knows their self-worth, and allows them to engage in benefaction. Similarly to Stanlick, Slomp states the importance of self-interest in Hobbes’s friendship: “Hobbesian friendship is contractual in nature, it entails the exchange of benefits or favors and it promotes empowerment and self-interest, while relying on reciprocity of trust and of positive disposition.”¹⁴³ In Leviathan, chapter X, Hobbes states that friendship is about gaining power and friendship, and ought to be pursued even for this reason alone.¹⁴⁴ Friendship is identified as an instrumental power

¹⁴² Hobbes, Leviathan, 59.
¹⁴⁴ Hobbes, Leviathan, 50.
which is based on good luck or fortune. Individuals are in continual search for instrumental power, and ought to continue to be if sociability is to be secured. However, while Hobbes’s friendship reminds the individual of their natural equality to repay their benefaction, gratitude may lead to material inequality amongst friends. The recipient may show gratitude with greater worth than the benefaction shown. Gratitude may be given in terms of “great honours” and “dignity”. Gabriella Slomp identifies this as asymmetrical friendships, where the “subordinate offers honour”.

In *Leviathan*, in addition to the positive amounts of sociability conducted by friendship with gratitude; he addresses the negative side effects of friendship in the political sphere. It is in *Leviathan*, chapter XXVII, that Hobbes states these negative side effects: “Friends beg relief from punishment; sometimes they even rescue a guilty person by force.” However, for those who are facing punishment for their crime, friendship gives them hope and may call on a friend for aid. However, the negative side of friendship in the political state must be addressed, because it identifies that friendship ought not to be taken into consideration when examining crimes. This does not mean friendship should not be sought after, but perhaps less prized in making political judgment. The search for friends within the commonwealth should never cease, because it will risk the other aspects of mutual assistance. In other words, to live well alongside friends’ triumphs over the fear of nepotism, because nepotism can be punished for its partiality.

147 Slomp, “As Thick as Thieves,” 7.
Chapter Two: Aristotle on Magnanimity

2.1 The Intellectual and Moral Virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*

The importance of benefactions is demonstrated both in Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude and with Aristotle’s moral virtue of magnanimity. While benefactions are required in a political state, benefactions alone cannot preserve sociability. Gratitude is needed to preserve sociability, and it will be observed that the great-souled man who embodies the virtue of magnanimity rejects gratitude. Contrary to Hobbes’s list of natural moral laws, Aristotle presents a distinction between two different forms of virtue: intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtues are those that require thinking, such as: wisdom, comprehension and prudence. Intellectual virtues are acquired from experience and, therefore, require time. Moral virtues are those of character, such as: courage, moderation, liberality, magnificence, greatness of soul, ambition, gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, and wittiness. Contrary to intellectual virtues, moral virtues are not found in the nature of human beings, but rather acquired by habit. In other words, moral virtues require human beings to engage in activities in order to acquire them. For Aristotle, all virtues are destroyed by deficiency and excess; therefore, Aristotle refers to them as vices and are blameworthy. For Aristotle, virtue must be the “proportionate” amount and must be “preserved by the mean.” Becoming a virtuous citizen may require a degree of sacrifice. Curzer’s *Aristotle and the Virtues* states that Aristotle

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150 Ibid., 26.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., 28.
154 Ibid., 29.
should not be read according to the *Panglossian Thesis*.\textsuperscript{155} The *Panglossian Thesis* states, “that virtuous acts are always overall pleasant to virtuous people, no matter what their outcome.”\textsuperscript{156} Virtuous acts can be painful and require endurance to perform. However, not attempting virtuous acts will be worse than not even trying because it can bring shame.

In book IV, chapter 3, of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle refers to those holding the virtue of magnanimity as the great-souled man (*megalopsuchia*). The great-souled man is described as the human being that embodies all moral virtues, and is described as the “kosmos”\textsuperscript{157} – the ornament or crown of the virtues (*NE* 1124a1-2). If an individual does not have this moral virtue, but has obtained other moral virtues, obtaining the characteristic of the great-souled man will make all the other virtues previously obtained greater (*NE* 1124a1-2).\textsuperscript{158} The great-souled man is neither deficient nor in excess; but rather is in the proper mean. The two vices opposing the great-souled man is its excess who is vain (*chaunotēs*), and the deficient who is small-souled or pusillanimity (*mikropsuchia*). The vain individual is not worthy of great things, but believes himself to be. The vain individual expects high honors that he does not deserve, because his benefactions were frugal or too small. Contrary to the vain individual, the small-souled man is worthy of great things but is too timid and ignorant to recognize it. The great-souled man embodies greatness and ought to receive great honors.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 77.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
2. 2 Magnanimity (*Megaloprepeia*) Distinguished from Generosity (*Eleutheriotēs*)

Aristotle’s magnanimity cannot be equated with simple generosity; for generosity belongs to the individual characterized by the virtue of liberality. Unfortunately, magnanimity and generosity can be mistakenly used to signify the same type of benefaction. However, a distinction must be made between the two. In book IV, chapter 3, Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins’ translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* clarifies the deviate usage of magnanimity, and uses the great-souled man as the proper translation of *megalopsychia*: “Megalopsychia often translated to magnanimity, from Latin, but this term in English has come to mean generosity or liberality rather than the sense intended by Aristotle.”\(^{159}\) Liberality is generosity, and should not be confused with magnanimity. While anyone can engage in liberality or generosity, magnanimity is about giving great benefactions. The liberal person contributes his benefactions on a smaller scale on a daily basis. The great-souled man concerns himself with things of upmost importance, to reveal his status and worth in the *polis*. The great-souled man is a rare individual amongst his inferiors, because is from good fortune and wellborn; hence has a superior position within the *polis* (*NE* 1124a21-23).\(^{160}\) Aristotle argues that providing and sustaining inequality amongst those in the *polis* is essential for great benefactions to prosper.

The liberal person only deals exclusively with money, and not honors. It is essential to consider that while Aristotle states that liberality does not meet the standards of greatness or goodness of the great-souled man, it is still a moral virtue. The liberal

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\(^{159}\) Ibid., 75.  
\(^{160}\) Ibid., 77.
person, knows how to finance his worth, and falls between the two vices: “prodigality and stinginess” (*NE* 1119b27). Liberality ought to be encouraged amongst the citizenry, especially those who are not born into wealth or status. While the liberal person would seem more inclined to accept the gratitude he deserves, because his benefaction is smaller in scale than that of the great-souled man; the liberal person also rejects gratitude. In the *Ethics*, Aristotle argues that the liberal person is “to give more to whom he ought than to take from whom he ought” (*NE* 1120a10-12). In other words, the liberal person has status in society and is generous to his inferiors in accordance to his own possessions. The liberal person does not count on other individuals to make a benefaction and will only rely on his own resources or possessions. Contrary to the great-souled man, Aristotle describes the benefactions of the liberal person as necessary and not necessarily noble in character (*NE* 1120b1-3). However, the liberal person has the chance to be noble in character because he decides to whom and where these benefactions go.

While the liberal person is described as being caring and his generosity helps aid the individuals residing in the *polis*, he is not a proponent of sociability on the account of rejecting gratitude. The great-souled, who embodies all the virtues, shares this trait of rejecting gratitude with the liberal person. The following section will argue that Aristotle’s great-souled man can never receive the gratitude he deserves, and may even come to feel indifferent toward wealth and resist taking benefactions that may lower their self-esteem.

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161 Ibid., 67.
162 Ibid., 68.
163 Ibid.
2. 3 The Contradictions Embodying the Great-Souled Man

Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* not only demonstrates the importance of benefactions, but of *great* benefactions. However, while the great-souled individual provides great benefactions to the *polis*, a problem arises because sociability ends with this benefaction. The great-souled man, while embodying all the virtues, he is more than likely to deny gratitude because he also embodies certain contradictions. Furthermore, it is these contradictions that characterize him as “superior (grounded in inequality) and autonomous”. The following will demonstrate that by embodying certain contradictions, the great souled-man, contrary to Hobbes’s benefactor, is indifferent to mutual assistance that allows for mutual empowerment.

When dealing with the topic of sociability and benefaction, the contradictions that tend to preoccupy the great-souled man need to be examined. There are three contradictions that can embody the great-souled man, and all relate to whether or not to accept honor for benefaction. First, while embodying greatness, nothing is great to him. Both Ann Ward and Peter Augustine Lawler examine why nothing seems great enough to the great-souled man. In comparison to his own greatness, nothing seems great; which may cause him to reject gratitude. Second, while embodying all the moral virtues and can be described as well-educated, he rejects “to be completely open with himself”. Hence, it will be argued that while the great-souled man presents himself as embodying self-knowledge and demonstrates truth to the *polis*; he “suffers from a deficiency of self-

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166 Lawler, “Tocqueville on Greatness and Governance,” 87.
knowledge. This contradiction allows for the great-souled man to protect his self-esteem. Third, while aiming at what is noble, he is performing these virtues for the sake of great honor. While embodying these contradictions, it will be argued that the great-souled man should remain at the height of moral virtues and citizens ought to attempt to give great honors for his benevolence. For Aristotle, without these contradictions that reside in the great-souled man, his great benefactions may cease and harm sociability within the polis.

At the beginning of book IV, chapter 3, the great-souled man is introduced as embodying greatness. The great-souled man embodies all moral virtues and only concerns himself with great things. Shortly after, Aristotle introduces the first contradiction of the great-souled man. Aristotle states that while embodying greatness, nothing is seen as great to the great-souled man (\textit{NE} 1123b30-31, \textit{NE} 1125a3-4, and \textit{NE} 1125a16-17). Ann Ward states the following on the contraction on the great-souled man:

“\textit{That the great-souled man is concerned with great and lofty matters, but it also seems that nothing is great to him. Aristotle’s suggestion is therefore this: the virtue of greatness of soul is concerned with great things, but to the proud person nothing is great. The implication is that the proud, or the great souled, look down on other things and persons, but look up to themselves as that which is great; the proud, or great souled, show a concern for their own greatness and, hence, superiority over others.}”

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\textsuperscript{167} Howland, “Aristotle’s Great-Souled Man,” 50.
\textsuperscript{168} Ward, \textit{Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics}, 58.
As Ward correctly argues, the great-souled is the proud person because he wants to keep his status and superiority over others. The great-souled man demonstrates gratitude to “place the benefactor in his debt.”\(^{169}\) Hence, the great-souled man is never in debt because he displays more gratitude than he knows he can be given.

While the great-souled man is in contradiction, this state can benefit himself and those around him. By examining each instance that Aristotle mentions this contradiction within the great-souled man (\textit{NE} 1123b30-31, \textit{NE} 1125a3-4, and \textit{NE} 1125a16-17), it is argued that he is worthy of great honors and ought to be placed at the height of moral virtues. First, Aristotle states: “It would in no way be suitable for a great-souled man to flee with arms swinging or to commit injustice: for the sake of what will he do shameful things, he to whom nothing is great? (\textit{NE} 1123b30-31)\(^{170}\) Since nothing is ever great enough, he does not see any reason in pursuing an act that is shameful. In other words, if nothing is seen as great to the great-souled man, he does not have any reason to do injustices. During battle, since nothing is great to the great-souled man, he is seen as a worthy contributor because he abstains from dangers and death. If he saw things as great in battle, he may act hazardously which may affect himself and his comrades. However, this is not to say that the great-souled man does not see some battles worth engaging in over others – for there are such things as great battles for the great-souled man. Hence, he may only fight in great battles and not concern himself with smaller battles. Generally, he does not concern himself with small things but only great things: “He is disposed to act in few affairs, namely, in great and noble ones (\textit{NE} 1124b25-26).”\(^{171}\) While the great-souled

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\(^{169}\) Ibid.


\(^{171}\) Ibid., 79.
man is courageous, he does seek death or things that may be hazardous: “Not one to hazard trifling dangers and he is not a lover of danger either (NE 1124b6).”\textsuperscript{172} However, Aristotle mentions that the great-souled man will have to face death and hazards. The great-souled man must enter a great war knowing he may need to give his life away. When the great-souled man is faced with dangers he does not object to it, but rather fights with pride and gives his life if needed (NE 1124b7-9).\textsuperscript{173} The great-souled man embodies this form of courage because nothing is seen as great to him in battle. He enters into a great battle without allowing external desires to tempt him. In other words, this contradiction in the great-souled man is necessary and is entitled to obtain great honor. The second instance Aristotle mentions that nothing is great to the great-souled man is: “The great-souled man is not given to admiration, since nothing is great to him (NE 1125a3-4).”\textsuperscript{174} The great-souled man does not listen to people who flatter him, because no word of man can ever demonstrate the worth of his benefactions. However, since he does not listen to flattery, he is not tempted to accept more honors than he deserves. Aristotle presents the third instance: “Nor is anyone ever vehement who supposes that nothing is great, whereas a shrill voice and quickness result from these things (NE 1125a16-17).”\textsuperscript{175} When the great-souled man sees nothing as great, he is calm and patient, rather than “vehement”\textsuperscript{176} (NE 1125a16-17). Hence, the great-souled man speaks in a vernacular that is understandable and clear. When examining this first contradiction

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., 80.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
that embodies the great-souled man, it becomes evident that this contradiction may benefit himself and the *polis*.

The second contradiction in Aristotle’s great-souled man can be characterized as while embodying self-knowledge with all the moral virtues, he rejects self-knowledge by not fully listening to what his inferiors have to say about himself; unless it preserves his pride. Lawler argues that Aristotle’s great-souled man “is unafraid to speak truthfully to others, but he dislikes completely truthful speech about himself”. The great-souled man embodies truth and is well-educated; and is not hesitant to share his knowledge with the members of the *polis*. The great-souled man relies on the esteem of others and does not seek to be corrected. Criticism toward the great-souled man will only make his benefactions cease. Hence, the polis becomes an arena for him to display his knowledge and truth. While rejecting criticism, he is still dependent on the polis to display what his knowledge and to demonstrate his moral worth. The great-souled man does not listen to those who are inferior, unless it is about his greatness. Hence, the great-souled man, as being amongst the superior, rejects having inferiors tell him that he has received any form of benefactions from his inferiors. By rejecting the benefactions being given, the great-souled man denies himself. It is important to consider that this denial of benefactions is self-made, and not imposed upon by any other power than his own. Aristotle states the denial, or rejection to remember all benefactions that were not created from his own benefaction: “Those who are great-souled seem in fact to remember whatever benefaction they have done, yet not those that they have been done (*NE* 1124b11-13).” In other

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177 Lawler, “Tocqueville on Greatness and Governance,” 87.
178 Ibid., 88.
words, the great-souled man may refuse to remember past benefactions that were given to him, and only recall the benefactions they have done. Hence, he refuses to embody self-knowledge, while presenting himself as the embodiment of self-knowledge. The great-souled man as the great benefactor, refuses to go into debt or feel like he owes something to his inferior by acknowledging their benefaction. The great-souled man will also feel ashamed in accepting benefactions from his inferiors, which would lower his self-esteem: “To benefit others but he is ashamed to receive a benefaction; for the former is a mark of one who is superior, the latter of one is inferior (NE 1124b9-12).” The great-souled man must have the proper esteem that will allow him to be a benefactor. If the great-souled man becomes timid, he would lean toward obtaining the vice of the small-souled who is timid. The great-souled man must never feel inferior, since his benefactions rely on self-esteem and knowledge of self-worth. Hence, to avoid feeling ashamed in accepting benefaction, inferiors must display their gratitude in a humble manner. This is demonstrated through Aristotle’s example of Thetis and Zeus: “Thetis did not speak of the benefactions she had done for Zeus (NE 1124b16-17).” The great-souled man ought to be given gratitude for his great benefactions; however, the example of Thetis’ gratitude toward Zeus demonstrates that the inferior in returning gratitude for receiving a great benefaction ought not to outweigh the greatness of the great-souled. Hence, in this example, Thetis remained quiet not to overshadow the great benefaction of Zeus; and in this manner, Thetis also demonstrates his thankfulness. The gratitude returned to the great-souled man is not of the same worth. Furthermore, the great-souled man needs high

\[180\] Ibid.
\[181\] Ibid.
self-esteem and for those of an inferior moral standing to claim that their gratitude can suffice for the great benefactions given by the great-souled man lowers his esteem that is needed. The superiority-inferiority relationship is beneficial to both the great-souled man and those inferior to him; thus, it must be maintained. This relationship rooted in inequality is essential because it guarantees the benefactions of the great-souled man. Part of maintaining this relationship between the superior-inferior, relies on inferiors not stating their benefactions to the great-souled man.

The third contradiction embodying the great-souled man is whether he ought to act according to what is noble or to accept the great honors he knows he deserves. The members of the polis can display their gratitude by displaying honor toward the great-souled man. However, the great-souled man ought to do what is noble and not for the sake of honor. Hence, the great-souled man may reject gratitude given in honor. What is displayed in the great-souled man is a conflict as to whether his actions are done for what is noble or for honor. The following question must be asked: Is the great-souled man concerned with what is noble or for honor? The great-souled man is considered with both. Although, honor is described as being the “greatest external good”\(^{182}\) (NE 1123b18), the great-souled man is not drawn to honor as a great thing. The great-souled man, however, is characterized as trying to obtain political power or wealth because it brings honor: “He is not disposed even toward honor as though it were a very great thing, and political power and wealth are choice worthy on account of the honor they bring (NE 1124a17-20).”\(^{183}\) Hence, the great-souled man is not drawn to honor as a great thing but

\(^{182}\) Ibid., 76.
\(^{183}\) Ibid., 77.
sees honor as deserving for doing honorable things. While the great-souled man wants to achieve political power and wealth, he is not base and his intentions are to enhance the political art. The great-souled man deserves honor for his honorable actions. However, he does not distress himself over bad fortune: “Especially concerned with honors, but he will surely also be disposed in a measured way toward wealth and political power as well as good and bad fortune, however it may occur: he will be neither overjoyed by good fortune nor deeply grieved by bad fortune (NE 1124a28-30).”\textsuperscript{184} While being concerned with honor, the great-souled man remains humble when in good fortune and does not allow bad fortune to alter his great acts. The question then resides if his greatness, if motivated by honor, should be deemed problematic. As previously stated, it seems that the great-souled man acts with the motivation of receiving honors, but the great-souled man deserves these honors regardless if honor was his motivation because his actions are great and at the height of virtues. The great and good actions performed by him need to be prized: “He would not be worthy of honor, either, if he were base, for honor is the prize of virtue and is assigned to those who are good (NE 1123b35-36).”\textsuperscript{185} The great-souled man can never be dishonored because “it will not justly pertain to him (NE 1124a11-12).”\textsuperscript{186} He is not base, but rather, the embodiment of greatness and the good. The great-souled man by embodying complete virtue, he is unlikely to be dishonored e.g. for his courage, moderation,truthfulness, and great benefactions. While it seems as though he is acting for the sake of honor, he realizes that by embodying complete virtue it would be difficult for inferiors to give him the real honor he deserves: “For there could be

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
no honor worthy of complete virtue, but he will nevertheless accept it as much as they have nothing greater to assign him (NE 1124a6-9).” 187 Hence, the great-souled man cannot receive proper gratitude for his benefactions. The great-souled man is characterized as receiving less honor that he is entitled to. However, he is not resentful nor does he cease his great actions because he is given fewer honors than he deserves for his action. The great-souled man is, therefore, characterized as feeling contempt towards small honors: “Honor that comes from people at random, or small honors, he will have complete contempt for them, since it is not of these that he is worthy (NE 1124a10-11).” This should be distinguished from the vice of the small-souled man; because the small-souled man does not know his own worth and is ignorant towards himself. The great-souled man knows that the honors he deserves will never be met by inferiors. However, the closing sentence of book IV, chapter III, Aristotle states that the “greatness of soul is concerned with great honor” 188 (NE 1125a35). The great-souled man is worthy of great honors and never asks for honors he does not deserve. However, whether great-souled man does ask and accept the proper gratitude is questionable. Those who seek more honor than deserved, are characterized as being vain. The vain try to imitate the great-souled man: “For they imitate the great-souled man without being like him, and they do this wherever circumstances permit (NE 1124b3-4).” 189 Underneath this impersonation, the vain individual does not embody virtue: “They do not do the deeds that accord with virtue, then, but they look down on others nonetheless. (NE 1124b4-6).” 190

187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., 80.
189 Ibid., 78.
190 Ibid.
individual desires honors, but is never worthy of them. The great-souled man deserves great honors because he acts according to virtue and can “justly look down on others” (NE 1124b6-7).¹⁹¹ The small-souled individual not concerning himself with honor at all, is seen as the worse of the two vices presented in book IV, chapter 3. The small-souled man diminishes his own self-worth, by not deeming himself worthy of the honors he deserves. Furthermore, the small-souled man is seen worse than the vain individual because “smallness of soul both occurs more often and is worse” (NE 1125a33).¹⁹² An individual must always acknowledge their worth, because to claim less than their worth is devaluing and demeaning. However, the great-souled man can choose to remain humble by accepting small honors from those at random, because he knows his worth.

2. 4 Magnanimity Fostered Through Friendship

The possibility for sociability for the great-souled man is considered amongst his friends. In the Ethics, Aristotle states that “an abundance of friends is held to be a noble thing” (NE 1155a29-30).¹⁹³ Friendship, which Aristotle describes as accompanying virtue, is necessary for great-souled men to develop within the polis. The great-souled man cannot become great alone, but requires friends to help develop moral virtues. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics states the importance of friendship: “For it is impossible, at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment to do what is noble: many things are done through instruments, as it were – friends, wealth and political power (NE 1099b1-2).”¹⁹⁴ Hence, to become a great-souled individual one must

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¹⁹¹ Ibid.
¹⁹² Ibid., 80.
¹⁹³ Ibid., 164.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 17.
have friends to practice their virtues to excel in them. Both Lorraine Smith Pangle and Ann Ward demonstrate the role friendship plays in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle describes the importance of *telios philos* (perfect friendship), and it will be argued that perfect friendships will require inequality even if the end-goal is equality. Similarly to Ann Ward’s reading of Aristotle, it will be demonstrated that perfect friendships can only be found in a timocracy, and will be illustrated with the family dynamic. The following will examine Aristotle disfavor of utility friendships and pleasure friendships.

Aristotle argues for friendships which are long lasting, and begins with the description of the family. Aristotle presents three forms of friendship within the family: the friendship between husband and wife; paternal friendships; and brotherly (or sibling relationships). The friendship between husband and wife is described as being aristocratic (*NE* 1160b33). Paternal friendships are described as being similar to kingship (*NE* 1161a12). Brotherly friendship is described as a timocracy (*NE* 1161a4). While Aristotle states that kingship is the best political regime; it seems that complete or perfect friendships can only flourish in timocratic or brotherly friendships. Timocratic friendships offer a unique element that is not available in aristocratic and kingship friendships. Here, Aristotle’s defines the concept of equality as the defining element that sets timocratic friendships apart from other familial friendships. Equality generates a form of ‘sameness’ amongst friends. Aristotle defines equality as sameness in perfect

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196 Ibid., 106
198 Ibid., 180.
199 Ibid., 179.
friendships as the following: “They wish the same thing for each other, or they exchange one thing for another” (NE 1158b1-3).\textsuperscript{200} Hence, timocratic friendships are not based in selfishness. Aristocratic and kingship friendships are based in inequality; therefore, they cannot be characterized as complete friendships. There are other prerequisites to complete friendships other than equality, including the following elements: likeness in character and virtue; and goodness. Perfect friendships cannot flourish amongst base individuals, but only in good individuals. In order to understand the development of complete friendship, familial friendships need to be considered chronologically. Hence, in order for complete friendships to develop, aristocratic and kingship friendships are needed first. There is a chronology when examining friendship. For without the flourishing of friendship between husband and wife, and paternal friendships; brotherly friendships or sibling friendships will not develop. Hence, by examining familial relationships as a chronological development, the importance of inequality presents itself. Inequality can be regarded as an important aspect in forming perfect friendships. Furthermore, kingship friendships are not rooted in equality, because these forms of relations demonstrate the importance of being a benefactor rather than a recipient. The basis of equality that is unique to timocratic friendships will be questioned on whether equality can be preserved in these relations. However, timocratic friendships ought to be pursued: “For without friends’ no one would choose to live” (NE 1155a5-6).\textsuperscript{201}

Aristocratic friendships, the friendship between husband and wife, sets the foundation for the emergence of all other familial relationships to form. Without the

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 163.
friendship between husband and wife, kingship and timocratic friendships may not
develop. Kingship friendships develop with the bearing of children, and timocratic
friendships develop when children have siblings; neither of which seem possible without
the friendship of husband and wife. Hence, Aristotle acknowledges the importance of
marriage. With marriage, husband and wife begin their life together by attaining a shared
living space — a home of their own. In book VIII, chapter 3, Aristotle acknowledges that
friends must live together in order to form complete friendships. By living together, both
partners take the time to get to know one another. It is only through time that complete
friendship can form. In the process of living together, husband and wife become like-
minded because they have “eaten together the proverbial salt” (NE 1156b28-29).²⁰²
Hence, they develop the same tastes towards variety of elements. The household becomes
the premise where husband and wife become alike. However, the question arises if they
ought to be separated for a questionable amount of time because of a particular
circumstance or event. Friendship between husband and wife may not last when
separated by a great distance: “But when someone is separated from the other to a great
degree, as is the god, then the friendship no longer endures” (NE 1159a3-5).²⁰³ When
separated by distance, husband and wife will no longer be alike and will grow in different
paths. While their marriage may persist, their friendship will begin to fade. The
household is the root of friendship for husband and wife to remain like-minded. In
addition, a home is characterized as shared living space, where all other familial
friendships will form. The household will become the basis of where their children will

²⁰² Ibid., 168-169.
²⁰³ Ibid., 173.
be raised, and where their friendships will flourish. In other words, living together will make husband and wife like-minded, and will allow for other familial relationships to become like-minded. However, while husband and wife grow to become like-minded by living together, their virtues remain unique to each. Husband and wife lack the form of equality or sameness in their friendship, which supports and sustains complete friendships. For Aristotle, women are naturally seen as more caring and remain in the private sphere as caregivers for their children. Friendship between husband and wife is not described as desiring the same thing for each other. In book VIII, chapter 10, Aristotle characterizes the friendship between husband and wife as being aristocratic. Aristocratic friendships carry similar features of the aristocratic regimes. Hence, inequality is sustained, and ought to be sustained, if the friendship of husband and wife is to persist. They each embrace and practice their particular virtues: “The man rules in accord with merit regarding the things over which man ought to rule, whereas all things suited to a woman, he hands over to her” (NE 1160b32-34). Husband and wife have different duties in the household, and ought not to be shared nor mixed. In addition, with friendships between husband and wife, one is likely to be of higher virtue and contribute more than the other. In book VIII, chapter 11, Aristotle states: “It accords with virtue, and to the better person does more of the good” (NE 1161a23-25). One will become a greater contributor or benefactor, while the other becomes a recipient of the good. Hence, they do not always exchange the same goods, thus they cannot be equal. However, aristocratic friendships ought to be cautious or wary of becoming oligarchical. In book

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204 Ward, Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics, 17.
205 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 179.
206 Ibid., 180.
VIII, chapter 10, Aristotle states: “The man who takes control of *all* things turns his rule into oligarchy” (*NE* 1160b34-35). One partner ought not to control all movements and decisions of the household. Their unique virtues must persist, and no one should become domineering over the other. This demonstrates that while inequality is necessary in aristocratic friendships, an extension of inequality that is identified in domineering must be avoided.

The friendship between husband and wife, allows for another form of friendship to develop. The friendship that flourishes from the aristocratic friendship between husband and wife, is the friendship each partner has with their child. In book VIII, chapter 1, Aristotle demonstrates that the friendship between parents and their children is natural and inherent to both of them: “By nature, friendship seems to be inherent in a parent for offspring and in offspring for a parent, not only in human beings but also in birds and most animals” (*NE* 1155a17-19). The child is by nature an inherent friend. Aristotle characterizes the friendship between parents with their children as a form of kingship, hence, based on superiority. Aristotle defines friendships based on superiority easily “dissolvable” (*NE* 1163a24-26); however, superiority in kingship friendships cannot be dissolved because the child is another self. Children are the extension of their parents. In book VIII, chapter 12, Aristotle describes children as another self: “Parents love children as they love themselves (for those who come from them are like other selves separately existing)” (*NE* 1161b27-28). The friendship between parents and

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207 Ibid., 179.
208 Ibid., 163.
209 Ibid., 185.
210 Ibid., 181.
their children is the expression of externalized self-love. Children are characterized as being inherently an extension of their parents. Hence, parents love their children as another self. In addition, Aristotle states that children love their parents knowing they are inherently from them: “Children love their parents on the grounds that they are born from them” (NE 1161b28-29).\textsuperscript{211} Children will inherently love their parents, regardless of external obstacles, because they are an extension of their parents. Parents, seeing their children as another self, present themselves as great benefactors. In book VIII, chapter 11, Aristotle states that parents are great benefactors and their children are the recipients of that benefaction: “[Kingship friendships] consists in superiority in granting benefactions” (NE 1161a12).\textsuperscript{212} Aristotle demonstrates that the friendship between parents and children is similar to a “shepherd for his sheep” (NE 1161a14).\textsuperscript{213} The shepherd and his sheep are dependent on each other; similar to parents and their children. For one cannot be fulfilled without the other: the shepherd needs his sheep to exercise his superiority; and the sheep needs the guidance of his shepherd. Similar to aristocratic friendships, the friendship of a parent to a child is imbedded in inequality. This inequality needs to flourish within this friendship. However, similar to political regimes, kingship friendships must be wary not to descend into tyrannical rule. If his friendship becomes tyrannical, children are made into slaves. Hence, in tyranny there is no friendship. Nevertheless, inequality is an important aspect for the flourishing of friendship between parents and child. Parents will be great benefactors to their children, and neither expect sameness nor proportional exchange. Aristotle described mothers as continually wanting

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 180.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
their children to excel and prosper (NE 1159a31-32). In book IX, chapter 7, Aristotle describes mothers, contrary to fathers, as the greatest of benefactors:

“More affection through painful labor, just as those who have themselves acquired their money feel more affection for it than those who have inherited it [...] mothers love their children more than their father, for giving birth is of the greater pain to them, and they know to a greater degree that their children are their own. And this would seem to be the case also with those who are benefactors” (1168a22-27).

A friendship between a mother to her child is imbedded in giving rather than receiving benefaction. In book VIII, chapter 8, Aristotle’s states that a mother shows love toward her child without seeking love in turn: “[Mothers] do not seek to be loved in return if both are not possible” (NE 1159a27-31). Expressing love, or loving, becomes an example of kingship friendship. Aristotle states that children will later honor their parents for their great benefactions: “These friendships involve superiority; hence parents are also honored” (NE 1161a20-21). However, this does not create equality. For giving honor does not contribute to sameness. In other words, the exchange of parental benefactions for honor is not a proportion exchange. Friendship between parents and children shows proportional exchange cannot always be met; and perhaps, this understanding is carried through in their children as they become friends with their siblings.

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214 Ibid., 175-176.
215 Ibid., 199-200.
216 Ibid., 175.
217 Ibid., 180.
From the two prior forms of friendship another friendship develops — brotherly friendship, or friendship between siblings. In book VIII, chapter 10, Aristotle states that brotherly friendship resembles: “Community of brothers is like a timocracy, since they are equals” (NE 1161a4).218 Communal or brotherly friendships are not only like-minded, but also, desire the same things for each other. This equality that is imbedded in proportionality, is the element that allows for complete friendships to form. They see each other as another self, and hence, love each other as another self. In other words, it is continually a proportional friendship. In book VIII, chapter 12, Aristotle states that within the family, timocratic friends come to see each other as another self because they both “come from the same persons [parents]” (NE 1162a2).219 Within the family, timocratic friendships are based in blood ties, hence, they are inheriting friends. In book VIII, chapter 11, Aristotle states timocratic friendships are similar as being “comrades” (NE 1161a26).220 Hence, timocratic friendships share the same things and desire the same thing as well. Equally defined by proportionality and sameness, is the underpinning of timocratic friendships. Equality will always be needed to sustain timocratic friendships: such as to be ruled and rule in turn.

However, timocratic friendships need to be observant not to become democratic or equal on all grounds; even if democracy is characterized as the “least corrupt”221 of the bad regimes (NE 1160b20-21). Hence, even in timocratic friendship, inequality is needed.

218 Ibid., 179.
219 Ibid., 182.
220 Ibid., 180.
221 Ibid., 179.
and cannot be free from it or else it will become democratic. Aristotle depicts the importance is inequality by stating that there needs to be a master in the household:

“Democracy is found especially in households where there is no master (since in these households all are equal on an equal footing) and in those where the ruler is weak and each person has license to act as he likes (NE 1161a5-9).”

Timocratic friendships must include a degree of inequality, and should not be equal on all grounds. Hence, to be ruled and rule in turn is problematic when trying to avoid democracy in a household. Using household relations as an example, Aristotle is concerned that timocratic friendships may become democratic; hence, it demonstrates that timocratic friendships cannot be enclosed with sameness or equal exchange. When the members of a household are on equal footing, members do as they please because there is no strong rule.

The fear of having timocratic friendships turning democratic, questions the proportionality and sameness in timocratic friendships. Perhaps timocratic friendships should not seek proportional exchange; and become more like “artisans” (1167b31-34) who are disinterested in proportional exchange.\(^{223}\) In book IX, chapter 7, Aristotle states: “Those who have done others some good, love and are fond of those who are the recipients of it, even if those recipients aren’t useful to them and might not be such later” (1167b31-34).\(^{224}\) An example of this is giving a sibling a benefit regardless of whether it can be reciprocated. While Aristotle does not characterize the problems that may emerge through equality, it seems that equality based on proportional exchange leads to particular

\(^{222}\) Ibid.

\(^{223}\) Ibid., 199.

\(^{224}\) Ibid.
problems. An individual should always love their sibling regardless of proportionality or sameness, because over time they will grow familiar and become similar. Furthermore, a sibling can surpass the other sibling, and that should be encouraged rather than resented on the grounds of keeping them equal. In other words, friendships amongst siblings should not resent wishing their sibling good fortune, because they may surpass them. Perhaps equality is not necessary for timocratic friendship. In other words, siblings can have a timocratic friendship even if one comes into good fortune. Since the two prior forms of friendship are required to arrive at timocratic friendship; it can be stated that there cannot be timocratic friendships without aristocratic friendship (the friendship between husband and wife) and kingship friendship (the friendship between parents and their child). The creation of timocratic friendship is due to the inequality found in aristocratic and kingship friendship. Furthermore, Ann Ward’s argues that while the friendship between mother-child are “not equal in all respects;” their relationship can be a timocratic friendship or a perfect form of friendship. Inequality is the basis for timocratic friendship, while equality is the end goal. Hence, this opens the argument that a parent to a child, or even an elder to a younger, can have timocratic friendships; for they can see “their child as another self”. Ward states, that “Aristotle reveals that a mother can give rather than receive an affection that serves as the model of friendship”. While the end goal of timocratic friendship may be sameness or like-mindedness that comes from spending time together; it is argued that timocratic

226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., 17.
friendships cannot flourish without a certain degree of inequality which entails wishing good fortune toward the other.

Contrary to this examination, Lorraine Smith Pangle argues that friendship is not a virtue for Aristotle. It will be argued that Aristotle’s great-souled man needs a life shared with perfect friends, or with those who are similar to himself. However, since there aren’t many great-souled men or “morally serious men,” perfect friends will be difficult to find. The great-souled man has a tendency to be unneighbourly and unsocial in the polis; because while he gives great benefactions and gratitude he is hesitant on how the gratitude he receives is displayed and makes him look in the polis.

For Pangle, Aristotle’s great-souled would see friendships as only secondary in importance to philosophizing. Pangle prioritizes Aristotle’s book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, and argues that philosophizing toward obtaining all the moral virtues is most desirable. However, if Pangle is correct, this would render the discussion on Aristotle’s friendship within the household and the relation to different forms of government as obsolete in its discussion for the great-souled man. For why would Aristotle elaborate on the importance of friendship within the household to render it unnecessary by book X? As examined, Aristotle’s Ethics emphasizes the importance of friendship; particularly timocratic or perfect friendships. Pangle quotes Aristotle to demonstrate the importance of the contemplative, self-sufficient theorizing lifestyle over friendship:

“But perhaps it is necessary to examine the universal good and look into the problem of what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is irksome, because those who introduced the theory of forms are friends. But for the sake of securing

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the truth it would perhaps seem better and necessary, especially for philosophers, to give up even one’s own. Both are beloved, but it is our duty to prefer the truth (\textit{NE} 1096a11-17).”²²⁹

Pangle argues that if we ever needed to make a choice, contemplation and self-sufficiency of the philosophic life is pursued over friendship:

“It is not that Aristotle means to force us to choose between friendship and virtue, or friendship and philosophy; all are needed in the best life, and all are compatible when one chooses one’s friends well. But perhaps he does mean to force us to decide how we should choose, should a choice be necessary.”²³⁰

For Pangle, friendship is seen as secondary but serves as a “bridge to philosophy”.²³¹ Hence, Pangle interprets Aristotle as believing friends provide a generous hand to the philosophic life.²³² After friends have met their use, these friendships will dissipate. However, Pangle does state that the philosophical life, without friends, is “less fervent, though still delightful”.²³³ However, once friends are no longer useful or of utility, friendship ends. Her interpretation suggests that Aristotle argues for an intellectual path of theorizing. In addition, she states that the contemplative life is “nothing to be mourned”.²³⁴ Contrary to Pangle, Aristotle was arguing for individuals to “philosophize together” (\textit{NE} 12 1172a5).²³⁵

²²⁹ Pangle, \textit{Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship}, 198.
²³⁰ Ibid.
²³¹ Ibid., 199-200.
²³² Ibid., 200.
²³³ Ibid., 199-200.
²³⁴ Ibid., 200.
Aristotle’s opening statement on friendship in book VIII is: “For friendship is a certain virtue or is accompanied by virtue; and, further, it is necessary with a view to life” (NE 1155a2-3). Since for Aristotle friendship is a certain virtue or accompanies virtue, it can be an end in itself. Also, friendship seems to accompany virtue. Pangle interprets that friendship is not a virtue, but can perhaps accompany virtue until the friendship is no longer useful. In book X, chapter 7, of the Ethics, Aristotle presents intellect and reason as the greatest of thing in human beings. Here, Aristotle states the following: “Intellect (nous) is the most excellent of the things in us” (NE 1177a21). Human beings have the capability to reason and ought to exercise that reason. Aristotle seems to be placing intellectual virtue above moral virtue. This section Aristotle argues that contemplation is an end in itself: “Contemplation alone would seem to be cherished for its own sake” (NE 1177b1-2). Individuals choose contemplation for itself and not for any external good. A wise person would not need to rely on others, even friends: “The wise person, is capable of contemplating even when by himself, and the wiser he is, the more capable of doing so he will be” (NE 1177a33-35). Perhaps the wisest person will no longer see a need for friendships. In book X, chapter 8, Aristotle states that happiness is achieved through contemplation: “None of the other animals are happy, since they in no way share in contemplation” (1178b28-9). Human beings are unique because they have the ability to contemplate, and need to engage in the contemplative life if happiness is to be obtained.

236 Ibid., 163.
237 Ibid., 224.
238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid., 228.
However, in book I of the *Ethics*, Aristotle states, that “by nature a human is political” (NE 1097b9-11).\(^{241}\) Hence, when discussing self-sufficiency, it is important to consider that human beings by nature are inclined to be involved in the political sphere. A contemplative life devoted to intellectual thought should not require isolation from the political sphere. For even the wise man needs friends and co-workers. In book X, chapter 7, Aristotle states: “It is perhaps better to have those with whom he may work, nonetheless he is self-sufficient” (*NE* 1177a34-5).\(^{242}\) Co-workers are essential because they may help you work better or more efficiently. However, Aristotle states the aspect of having co-workers or friends does not go against self-sufficiency: “For nonetheless he is self-sufficient” (*NE* 1177a34-5).\(^{243}\) Human beings need associates, even in the contemplative life and states the importance of “philosophizing together” (*NE* 1172a5).\(^{244}\) In book IX, Aristotle states: “Some [friends] drink together, others play dice, still others exercise and hunt together or philosophize together, all and each passing their days together in whatever they are fondest of in life” (*NE* 12 1172a5-9).\(^{245}\) Friends, who live together, philosophize together and share many other daily pleasures with each other. For friendships allow individuals to exercise their reason through speech. Individuals ought not to become fully dependent either on their friends, but nevertheless, seeking the company of friends is beneficial to preserve the social life within the *polis*. An individual cannot find himself in isolation, or completely away from others. With friends, they can discuss theoretical aspects.

\(^{241}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{242}\) Ibid., 224.

\(^{243}\) Ibid., 224.

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 208.

\(^{245}\) Ibid., 208-209.
Contrary to Smith Pangle’s reading of Aristotle’s friendship in his *Ethics*, Ann Ward’s *Contemplating Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics* demonstrates the importance of friendship in the contemplative life introduced by Aristotle in book X.\(^{246}\) In order to enjoy and be happy in a life dedicated to philosophizing, or a contemplative life, it needs to be accompanied by a friend. Friends, contrary to Smith Pangle are not simply bridges for Aristotle. Rather, friendship is needed when an individual is trying to obtain moral and intellectual virtues. Perfect friendships must be sought after. Perfect friendships are selfless and are pursued for their own good rather than for utility or pleasure. Ann Ward demonstrates the importance of perfect friendships with the mother-child relationship.\(^{247}\) However, Ward argues that perfect friendship, between timocrats, can seem imperfect on the account that it is reserved for men; where “women are confined to an imperfect form of friendship between husband and wife within the family”.\(^{248}\) However, Ward argues that the “mother’s love for her child and the self-sacrificing mother” demonstrate that timocratic relationships are not exclusively masculine.\(^{249}\) In other words, the great-souled man will not be limited in friendship on the regard that timocratic friendships can be found between men and women.\(^{250}\)

In book X, Jacob Howland argues that for Aristotle the great-souled man can become friends with other “morally serious” individuals.\(^{250}\) This allows for the great-souled man to engage within the community; however, it is quite limited since he can only be friends with those who are morally superior like himself. While the great-souled

\(^{247}\) Ibid., 104.
\(^{248}\) Ibid.
\(^{249}\) Ibid.
man cannot form perfect friendships with everyone, this form of friendship will benefit himself and in turn contribute to the political sphere of the polis. With friendship, the great-souled man may be more inclined to “accept honor as the greatest external good”. While observed in the previous section of this chapter, the great-souled man gives more gratitude than he accepts. Perhaps amongst friends the great-souled man can accept gratitude and “accept moral correction”, that will not harm his self-esteem in turn. However, since the great-souled man will only feel at comfort to accept gratitude with those who are “morally serious,” he still embodies a degree of indifference toward honor and independent judgment. The great-souled wants to be perceived as self-sufficient and morally perfect. This is not to state that the great-souled man should not seek perfect friendship, but it ought to be considered that accepting gratitude might remain a discomfort for the great-souled individual because he may want to remain self-sufficient.

251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., 51.
253 Ibid.
Chapter Three: Comparison of Hobbes’s Gratitude and Aristotle’s Magnanimity

3.1 Gratitude and Magnanimity as the Two Cardinal Virtues

Now that Hobbes and Aristotle have been examined separately, this section will introduce how Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude has been influenced by Aristotle. While it is evident that the great-souled man does not appear in Hobbes’s *On the Citizen* or *Leviathan*, it can be argued that Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude appears to have the same importance to the commonwealth in which Aristotle’s great-souled man has to the *polis*. Aristotle states that magnanimity is the “crown virtue,” and Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude is the crown virtue of his natural laws. The natural law of gratitude allows for the other natural laws to develop; hence, it is introduced earlier in the hierarchy in his list of the natural laws. Without the natural law of gratitude that secures sociability, the other natural laws cannot be achieved. For those who hold the natural law of gratitude, also hold the proceeding natural laws such as consideration, equity, pardon, impartial witnesses and complaisance. Gratitude relies on a covenant, voluntary motion, and natural equality to develop. These three necessary conditions for gratitude are what allow for the other natural laws to develop.

While for Hobbes the individual who embodies gratitude can be taken as the height of the commonwealth, and for Aristotle it is the great-souled man; Hobbes does not require any personal sacrifice that may cause dissatisfaction or angst. For Hobbes, the natural law of gratitude should be pleasurable. In other words, by displaying gratitude the individual of a particular commonwealth should not feel in debt or financially strained. However contrary to Hobbes, Howard Curzer argues that while trying to achieve

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Aristotelian characteristic virtue of magnanimity, the individual may fall into misfortune and this may cause pain or discomfort. Curzer explains that Aristotle should not be read according to the *Panglossian Thesis*, which states “that virtuous acts are always overall pleasant to virtuous people, no matter what their outcome.”²⁵⁵ In other words, to hold all the virtues requires patience and even a retraction from what is enjoyable. For Hobbes, since gratitude is a voluntary action, similarly to benefaction, it will not be entered into if it is painful or does not give pleasure. While Hobbes’s concept of gratitude provides for the community, it is rooted in self-interest and the passions.

While both Aristotle and Hobbes present a crown virtue, their argument differs as to who can adopt this crown virtue. For Aristotle, the great-souled man who holds all the moral and intellectual virtues is a rare individual who is morally superior to other members of the *polis*. Contrary to Aristotle, Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude is shared amongst all members of a commonwealth and the sovereign. In other words, gratitude for Hobbes is not restricted to the select few of noble character. Rather, gratitude is a consistent reminder of our natural equality. For Hobbes, the sovereign gives gratitude to its members of the commonwealth and accepts gratitude in turn. In Hobbes’s political works, self-sufficiency and independence is argued against with the natural law of gratitude.

Kristján Kristjánsso argues that for Aristotle a morally righteous person is not a grateful individual.²⁵⁶ Kristjánsso states that the great-souled man “places no value on

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gratitude, and devalues it". The crown virtue of magnanimity is at a tendency to appear self-sufficient, and this subtracts from his sociability. While the great-souled man needs friendships (specifically perfect friendships based on goodness) while he philosophizes, which demonstrates the social aspect of philosophy; he lacks the capacity to accept gratitude which prolongs sociability that would benefit the polis on a greater scale. Kristjánsson states the importance of gratitude toward sociability but states that Aristotle’s great-souled man does not experience “true gratitude” and “acting as the grateful person is not sufficient”. Contrary to Kristjánsson, David Carr does not see the benefit of attributing gratitude as a moral virtue. Carr objects to gratitude as a moral virtue on these two aspects: “First, is that of whether gratitude always requires a benefactor. The second is that of the extent to which gratitude might or should be conceived as a ‘duty-free’ moral virtue.” The first part of Carr’s argument states that gratitude can be given, even if the there was no benefaction. With this argument, the great-souled man can give gratitude to those who are not morally superior and place them continually in his debt. However, this argument does not “satisfy the great-souled man’s need for community.” Furthermore, for Hobbes it is the benefaction that creates and secures gratitude. The second point of Carr’s argument on gratitude as a “duty-free moral virtue,” does not account for the possible deontological aspect of gratitude. When examining Hobbes, the deontological aspect of gratitude was examined with A.E. Taylor’s imperative

257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
261 Carr, “Is gratitude a moral virtue?” 1476.
argument of the natural law of gratitude. Prior to the enactment of civil law, the deontological aspect of Hobbes demonstrated by A.E. Taylor states that individuals ought to follow right reason. Right reason and the imperative nature are needed for the cardinal virtue of gratitude to prosper; however, it is secured with civil law.

3.2 The Embodiment Contradictions

It has been shown that the great-souled man embodies certain contradictions that allow for his great benefactions to take place and benefit the polis. However, as observed with Hobbes, it is not just benefaction that promotes sociability, but with the fulfilment of mutual aid which comes with gratitude. Without gratitude, sociability between the benefactor and the recipient ends with the fulfilment of the benefaction. With gratitude, or thankfulness, sociability continues between the benefactor and the recipient. Gratitude follows covenants made to secure trust between members of the commonwealth. Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude demonstrates that indifference to wealth can be problematic. The benefactor must always seek gratitude for their benefaction. However, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle demonstrates the problems that reside in accepting gratitude. The great-souled man is known for his great benefactions, but is inclined to reject gratitude. The following will examine the possibility that Hobbes may have been influenced by Aristotle’s great-souled man; and when writing On the Citizen and Leviathan, became cautious of the rejection of gratitude that would end the possibility for mutual aid.

*Can a member of Hobbes’s commonwealth, who follows the natural moral law of gratitude, face the same contradictions that are in the great-souled individual? As previously examined in chapter two, Aristotle’s great benefactor demonstrated in the*
*Ethics*, known as the great-souled man, embodies three contradictions. First, while embodying greatness, nothing is great to him. Second, while the great-souled man presents himself as embodying self-knowledge and demonstrates truth to the *polis*; he “suffers from a deficiency of self-knowledge”.  

Third, while aiming at what is noble, he is performing these virtues for the sake of great honor. For Aristotle, these contradictions that reside in the great-souled man are necessary because they allow for his great benefactions. For Hobbes, contrary to Aristotle argument, the embodiment of the first two contradictions would be problematic to the commonwealth. The first contradiction in which the great-souled man embodies greatness and observes nothing as being great, would concern Hobbes because of his indifference to wealth. For Aristotle, there is no intention to “win gratitude”.

This “indifference to honor and independent judgment” may promote unsociability within the commonwealth. While the first contradiction allows for great benefactions to take place, it does not sustain a relationship between the commonwealth and its members; nor among the members of the commonwealth.

The second contradiction embodying the great-souled man demonstrates the importance of material inequality, but demonstrates the improbability of accepting gratitude on the account of maintaining superior status. The second contradiction would be problematic to Hobbes on the account that the great-souled man is just as likely to reject gratitude from equals as well as his inferiors. The great-souled individual refrains from being depicted as inferior, therefore, may only engage in benefactions with those of inferior status. However, in this circumstance, gratitude can be rejected on the account

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that the member of the inferior class will not be able to return an equally great benefaction because of their status. Also, the great-souled man would reject entering into a covenant with those of equal status because they will not want to be seen as inferior amongst their equals. For Hobbes, this is problematic because gratitude is demonstrated amongst equals because benefactions will not be given without the expectation of mutual aid which leads to mutual empowerment.

While demonstrating gratitude toward the great-souled man seems almost impossible, the third contradiction demonstrates the possibility of members of the inferior class to demonstrate gratitude by giving them great honors such as entitling them with political power. However, while the great souled man is motivated by great honors he remains humble by accepting small honors for his benefaction. This demonstrates that members of the inferior class ought to always try to demonstrate gratitude toward the great-souled man. While for Hobbes, gratitude is always to be sought after, it has been demonstrated that gratitude may be difficult to achieve from those of a different social class or with individuals who have different values. Hobbes argues that no individual would enter into a covenant with the expectation of losing on their benefaction. Hence, gratitude must be of equal or greater value, and no one ought to enter an agreement or make a promise they cannot reciprocate. Benefactions ought to be given to those who are most similar to ourselves.

For Hobbes, the creation of the commonwealth was made feasible because of the natural moral law of gratitude. If the embodiment of these contradictions was present in Hobbes’s thesis, the commonwealth would have never been created. Since the creation of the commonwealth came forth by a social contract, and each covenant accompanies a
promise and gratitude, the embodiment of these contradictions is unlikely. These contradictions may be embodied by some individuals, but the majority of the members of the commonwealth follow their duty. Also, the fact that the commonwealth is sustained, and has not reverted into the state of nature, demonstrates that gratitude is being shown between the sovereign and its members; and amongst members.

It is evident that Hobbes concerned himself with the problems of unsociability provided by the rejection of gratitude. Hence, Hobbes’s theory makes it difficult for these contradictions to emerge within the commonwealth. To avoid the embodiment of contradictions Hobbes introduces the concept of *in foro interno* (bound by their own conscience) and *in foro externo* (civil law which is punishable by the sovereign if it is not respected). First, the natural law of gratitude is bounded *in foro interno*, which is the internal court. In choosing to be a member of a certain commonwealth, there are certain duties that oblige in the conscience. Second, to avoid the possibility of embodying these contradictions, Hobbes states the importance of the possible intervention of the sovereign’s power to punish ingratitude for the sake of future good. Ingratitude cannot be punished without looking at the future good, or else it is revengeful. Revenge provides no good toward the commonwealth.

**3. 3 The Problems that Arise with the Rejection of Gratitude**

Since the great-souled man embodies all moral and intellectual virtues, he rejects gratitude on the account that he embodies the virtue of liberality. Aristotle demonstrates that those embodying the moral character of liberality (*eleutheriotēs*) are the source of rejecting gratitude. For Aristotle, the liberal person rejects the recognition for their benefaction, and is therefore, disengaged in any attempt to try and win gratitude.
According to Aristotle, the liberal person rejects gratitude and perpetuates ingratitude. However, Aristotle states the liberal person is noble, for liberality is a virtue that lies between the vices of excess, prodigality (asōtia), and deficiency or stinginess (aneleutheria). While the liberal person is noble, and there ought to be liberal individuals, the great-souled man is of higher worth to the polis. A liberal person does not seek any return, or gratitude, for their benefaction, and only wants to help others with their generosity.

For Hobbes, the search to live well and to have a commodious lifestyle can be provided if the natural law of gratitude is followed. Unlike the liberal person, Hobbes does not address the importance of being humble or to accurately balance between the two excess of prodigality and stinginess. Gratitude needs to be preserved in a commonwealth so sociability can foster and provide a commodious living. For it is this pleasurable lifestyle that provides unification in the political state.

3. 4 Excessive Gratitude and Political Judgment

The search for gratitude by a benefactor may lead to nepotism or favoritism in the political sphere. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle depicts gratitude with the images of Graces:

“Hence too people place a shrine to the Graces along with the roadway, to foster reciprocal giving, for this belongs to gratitude: one ought to serve in return to someone who has been gracious, and ought oneself, the next time, to take the lead to being gracious (NE 1133a2-5).”

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However, Aristotle does not present gratitude as a virtue between two vices. Gratitude, as fostering reciprocal giving, is warned against when making political judgment. In the *Ethics*, book V, chapter 5, Aristotle states: “Judges who unfairly distribute punishment are aiming at an excessive share either of gratitude or of revenge (*NE* 1136b34-1137a1).”\(^{266}\) Hence, for Aristotle judges may unfairly punish by seeking revenge on those being punished, or seeking gratitude from others on the account of ‘who’ is being punished. For the judge may receive the most praise and honour, in punishing an individual not well in favor by the members of the *polis*. Curzer argues that Aristotle’s account on the judgment of punishment describes that justice cannot be derived from gratitude or revenge:

“In general, Aristotle’s gratitude-or-revenge suggestion is that intentional mal-distribution is typically motivated by an excessive or defective desire for some good, although not necessarily for the good being distributed.”\(^{267}\)

For Aristotle, judges may give an unfair sentence because they have a desire to have a lenience repaid or to exact revenge. In search for gratitude, judges can alter their opinions on a particular case to gain a favourable outcome for themselves. It is this partial judgment that leads to mal-distribution and injustice. Hence, for Aristotle, the motivation to receive gratitude, similarly to revenge, ought to remain outside the sphere of justice and punishment.

Hobbes does not equate revenge to gratitude when making a judgment on punishment. While Hobbes argues that revenge needs to be avoided, he does not mention

\(^{266}\) Ibid.

gratitude in such terms. For Hobbes, gratitude has been described in *Leviathan* as holding proper manners; and in both *Leviathan* and *On the Citizen*, gratitude is a natural law. *Can Hobbes’s description of gratitude in On the Citizen, to try to win gratitude for the sake of mutual aid, override the concern of nepotism? And in turn, should judges turn away from a friend when making a political judgment even when gratitude is concerned?* Hobbes argues that individuals ought to always try and “win gratitude”. In this term, for Hobbes gratitude cannot be discouraged amongst friends. While partisanship is a possible outcome of gratitude, the mutual aid that derives from gratitude is beneficial to maintain sociability. Hence, what Aristotle deems as excessive gratitude would not be a problem for Hobbes’s commonwealth because gratitude can never be in excess. However, for Hobbes, buying preference is problematic. Partisanship belongs specifically to buying preference. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes states buying preference is not a sign of gratitude nor of reward:

“To buy with money or preferment from a popular ambitious subject, to be quiet and desist from making ill impressions in the mind of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained, not for disservice, but for service past), nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear, nor does it tend to the benefit, but to the damage of the public.”

Furthermore, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes warns when judgment is partial because they are friends: “Judges and witnesses are corrupted by riches. Friends beg relief from punishment.” However, even with this

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270 Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 196,
statement, friends are always needed, and not only in private affairs but in the political sphere as well.

3. 5 Monarchy and Timocracy Preserved by Friendship

Here, Aristotle and Hobbes’ argument for their preference in government demonstrates the type of friendship needed to preserve their political state. For Aristotle’s timocracy, perfect friendships are needed; and for Hobbes’s monarchy, utilitarian based friendships are needed and fostered by the political state. Despite their concluding preferences on government and friendships that help sustain the state, Hobbes was influenced by Aristotle’s account of friendship. For Aristotle, friendship needs to accompany virtue; and it is argued that similarly, Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude cannot be fostered without friends. Hobbes was influenced by all three forms of Aristotle’s friendship: utility, pleasure, and perfect friendship. However, it will be argued that Hobbesian friendship can be classified as utilitarian. While scholars such as Nancy Stanlick and Gabriella Slomp examine the Hobbesian friendship, Charles Taylor does not examine friendship according to Hobbes. Taylor references Aristotle to distinguish it from Hobbes’s atomistic fate. Taylor argues that social contract theorists create individuals who strive to be “self-sufficient alone,” which can be problematic.\(^{271}\) Taylor states that Aristotle presents “man as a social animal, or a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside the polis”\(^{272}\). However, the “primacy-of-rights”\(^{273}\) does not take away from the innate desire for a social life.

\(^{271}\) Taylor, “Atomism,” 190.
\(^{272}\) Ibid, 189.
\(^{273}\) Ibid, 188.
Gabriella Slomp argues that Hobbes does not argue for Aristotle’s perfect friendship or *philia*. While Hobbes states that perfect friendship cannot be sought out for itself; the Hobbesian conception of friendship has the characteristic of Aristotle’s perfect friendship as a second-self. Both Slomp and Stanlick examine Hobbesian friendships with those who are most similar to ourselves because we know their capacity and worth. Stanlick argues that for Hobbes the individual knows themselves by understanding their ‘price’ before finding friends. In knowing our own self-worth, we understand who is equal to ourselves to give a benefaction in order to receive gratitude. This is contrary to Aristotle’s great-souled man, who knows his worth, but places others in his debt to keep them as inferior to his moral stature. Furthermore, Slomp argues that Hobbesian friendship as a second-self with those who share a context:

“For Hobbes friendship is not a friendship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ that can exist in a cultural vacuum. Rather, in order to materialise, friendship requires a context (common language, shared values, trust and positive dispositions) that in Hobbes’ theory is made possible only by the creation of the political state.”\(^\text{274}\)

In order to have “common language, shared values, trust and positive disposition,” a sovereign is needed.\(^\text{275}\) In *Leviathan*, Hobbes demonstrates that friendship relies on the political state, because outside this state, life is bound to remain solitary.\(^\text{276}\) In the political state, individuals can find like-minded individuals that have the potential to demonstrate gratitude. Hobbesian friendship is always selfish rather than the selfless friendship depicted with Aristotle.

\(^{274}\) Slomp, “As Thick as Thieves,” 3.
\(^{275}\) Ibid.
\(^{276}\) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 76.
In addition, Aristotelian account of pleasure-based friendship and utility-based friendship can be depicted in Hobbesian friendship. To relate Hobbes to Aristotle’s pleasure-based friendships may seem contradictory when in *Leviathan* he states that, “there can be no pleasure but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company”. However, Hobbes also argues for a commodious living which can be provided with friendship. Hobbes is not arguing for a selfless form of friendship but one that is rooted in self-interest. Friendship is based mostly on its utility. In Hobbes’s political state, members of the commonwealth become friends and the sovereign and its members become friends as well. Their friendship rests on the utility of mutual aid. Hence, while regarding Hobbes’s influence from Aristotle’s three form of friendships, the Hobbesian form of friendship ought to be defined as utilitarian. Aristotle rejects the idea that utilitarian friendships can be true friendships, because it lacks the characteristics of perfect friendship (doing something for the sake of the other person). However, contrary to Aristotle’s view on utilitarian friendship which would be between two unequal individuals to derive benefit; for Hobbes, these forms of friendships are taken upon equals to remind the members of the commonwealth of their natural equality.

277 Ibid., 75.
Conclusion

Great benefactions contribute to sociability, but it cannot sustain it. All benefaction must be returned with gratitude to preserve communal relations. Within the political state, gratitude is the moral virtue that allows for mutual assistance and, therefore, mutual empowerment. It has been observed that sociability can be created and preserved with those who embody Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude; but those who embody Aristotle’s virtue of magnanimity can have the tendency to reject gratitude. Since it is difficult for the great-souled man to find perfect friendships, he is more likely to be indifferent to honor and remain within his independent judgment.

For Hobbes, the natural law of gratitude is concerned with preserving oneself as well as the collective. Charles Taylor was incorrect in stating that the individual is destined to live an atomistic lifestyle. Hobbes’s natural law of gratitude demonstrates that individuals can act collectively. Gratitude creates a unified personality and is demonstrated with Hobbes’s account of authorship. Gratitude unites the members of the commonwealth, and the individual to the sovereign. Furthermore, Hobbes argues that a commonwealth can either be a monarchy, democracy, or aristocracy.²⁷⁸ Hobbes’ preference, however, is for a monarchy rather than a commonwealth based on popular sovereignty. A monarchy provides security and peace for its members. Also, it seems that a monarchy provides the bases for the natural law of gratitude: a covenant, voluntary motion, and natural equality. In *Leviathan*, chapter XIX, Hobbes states: “In a monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a

monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects.”

When individuals are living a commodious lifestyle, their obligation toward the natural law of
gratitude is facilitated. Members of the commonwealth who enjoy benefits such as riches,
strengths, and reputation; demonstrate gratitude to the sovereign – and the sovereign
accepts this gratitude. Hence, mutual assistance is best preserved under a monarchy.

While Hobbes prefers a monarchy, he argues that there is an inconvenience that embodies
a monarchy, in that it can “enrich a favorite or flatterer”.

However, he argues that this favoritism is more likely in other forms of government, therefore, monarchy should be
chosen regardless of this inconvenience. For this inconvenience is outweighed by the
mutual assistance that is preserved with gratitude.

Aristotle’s great-souled man who embodies the virtue of magnanimity was
examined alongside Hobbes to demonstrate the importance of gratitude. For Aristotle, the
great-souled man can temporarily provide social relation in the polis. However, the great-
benefactions given by the great-souled man are not enough to sustain national identity.
The great-souled man does not engage in reciprocal giving. The great-souled man has a
tendency to be unsocial and unneighbourly. The great-souled man preserves his status in
the polis by demonstrating his self-sufficiency, and measures the gratitude not given by
him as unworthy or valued as greatness. While the great-souled man may present himself
as unsocial and self-sufficient, he is still in search for close friends that are a second-self.
He is searching for perfect friendships, that can only be fostered in a timocracy.

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279 Ibid., 120.
280 Ibid., 121.
However, this sociability is limited and not necessarily as reliable as Hobbes’s sociability brought with gratitude.

Aristotle lacks the key aspect of natural equality which allows Hobbes’s argument for gratitude to prosper. When one considers why gratitude prospers more efficiently in a monarchy rather than in a timocracy, the following assessment can be made: That Hobbes’s monarchy is rooted in natural equality but its end is inequality; Aristotle’s timocracy, is rooted in natural inequality but the end goal is equality. Aristotle’s timocracy develops from aristocracy and kingship, and the traces of inequality that are within these two form of governments have led to a timocracy. The great-souled man sees himself as superior, and this interferes with accepting gratitude that is needed to preserve sociability and the collective.
Bibliography


